Combating poverty in Europe: multi-level, multi-dimensional and multi-stakeholder models in local active inclusion policies

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<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACLI</td>
<td>Christian Associations of Italian Workers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALG I</td>
<td>Unemployment benefit I (Arbeitslosengeld I)</td>
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<tr>
<td>ALG II</td>
<td>Minimum income for job-seekers (Arbeitslosengeld II)</td>
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<tr>
<td>ALMP</td>
<td>Active Labour Market Policy</td>
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<tr>
<td>ALZ</td>
<td>Centre for unemployed (Arbeitslosenzentrum)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANCI</td>
<td>Associazione Nazionale Comuni Italiani – National Association of Italian Municipalities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASL</td>
<td>Azienda sanitaria locale - Local Health Service Enterprise</td>
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<tr>
<td>ASPI</td>
<td>Assicurazione Sociale per l’Impiego – Social Insurance for Employment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BA</td>
<td>Federal Employment Agency (Bundesagentur für Arbeit)</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIES</td>
<td>Commissione d’indagine sulla povertà e l’esclusione sociale - Commission of Inquiry on Poverty and Social Exclusion</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIGO</td>
<td>Cassa Integrazione Guadagni “Ordinaria”</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIGS</td>
<td>Cassa Integrazione Guadagni “Straordinaria”</td>
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<tr>
<td>CDU</td>
<td>Christian Democratic Union (Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands)</td>
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<td>CHP</td>
<td>Community Health Care Partnership</td>
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<td>CJS</td>
<td>Community Jobs Scotland</td>
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<td>CPP</td>
<td>Community Planning Partnership</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSP</td>
<td>Compagnia di San Paolo Foundation</td>
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<tr>
<td>DC</td>
<td>Democrazia Cristiana, Christian Democratic Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DWP</td>
<td>Department for Work and Pensions</td>
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<tr>
<td>ERDF</td>
<td>European Regional Development Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESA</td>
<td>Employment Support Allowance</td>
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<tr>
<td>ESF</td>
<td>European Social Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FWA</td>
<td>Free Welfare Association (Bundesarbeitsgemeinschaft der freien Wohlfahrtspflege)</td>
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<tr>
<td>FDP</td>
<td>Liberal Democratic Party (Freie Demokratische Partei)</td>
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<tr>
<td>GCC</td>
<td>Glasgow City Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>HMRC</td>
<td>Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs</td>
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<tr>
<td>IHK</td>
<td>Chamber of Industry and Commerce (Industrie- und Handelskammer)</td>
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<tr>
<td>INPS</td>
<td>Instituto Nazionale della Previdenza Sociale - National Social Insurance Institute</td>
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<tr>
<td>ISB</td>
<td>Association of social employment initiatives (Initiative Sozialgewerblicher Beschäftigungsinitiativen)</td>
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<tr>
<td>ISEE</td>
<td>Indicatore della Situazione Economica Equivalente – Equivalent Economic Status Indicator</td>
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<tr>
<td>JBG</td>
<td>Jobs and Business Glasgow</td>
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<tr>
<td>JCP</td>
<td>Jobcentre Plus</td>
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<tr>
<td>JSA</td>
<td>Jobseekers Allowance</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lep</td>
<td>Livelli essenziali delle prestazioni - Essential Levels of Provision</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LN</td>
<td>Lega Nord - Northern League Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>LSU</td>
<td>Lavoratori Socialmente Utili – Socially Useful Jobs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LTU</td>
<td>Long Term Unemployed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIG</td>
<td>Minimum Income Guaranteed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mii</td>
<td>Minimum Insertion Income, Italian national pilot project</td>
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<tr>
<td>MIP</td>
<td>Minimum income protection</td>
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<td>MIS</td>
<td>Minimum income scheme</td>
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<tr>
<td>NHS</td>
<td>National Health Service</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>NPD</td>
<td>German National Democratic Party (Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands)</td>
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<tr>
<td>NSC</td>
<td>New Social Card</td>
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<tr>
<td>OUB</td>
<td>Ordinary Unemployment Benefit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PD</td>
<td>Partito Democratico - Democratic Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PDL</td>
<td>Popolo della Libertà – The People of Freedom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PES</td>
<td>Public Employment Services</td>
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<tr>
<td>PiS</td>
<td>Party ‘Law and Justice’</td>
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<tr>
<td>PO</td>
<td>Party ‘Civic Platform’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSL</td>
<td>Polish People's Party oriented to the people living in rural area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RUB</td>
<td>Reduced Unemployment Benefit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAO</td>
<td>Social Assistance Organisation: a term referring to public social assistance offices in gminas and in cities (Municipal SAO)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SC</td>
<td>Social Card</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SGB II</td>
<td>Second Book of the Social Code</td>
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<tr>
<td>SGB III</td>
<td>Third Book of the Social Code</td>
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<tr>
<td>SGB XII</td>
<td>Twelfth Book of the Social Code</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPD</td>
<td>Social Democratic Party (Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SKL</td>
<td>The Swedish Association of Local Authorities and Regions - (Sveriges Kommuner och Landsting) represents the governmental, professional and employer related interests of Sweden’s municipalities, county councils and regions (<a href="http://english.skl.se/">http://english.skl.se/</a>)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SM</td>
<td>Single Mothers</td>
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<tr>
<td>SRA</td>
<td>The Social Resource Administration - is one administrative department in Malmö, with responsibility to provide funding support to those voluntary organizations which focuses the social sector.</td>
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<tr>
<td>TSO</td>
<td>Third Sector Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>WP</td>
<td>Working poor, workers whose equivalised income is less than 60 per cent of the national median income.</td>
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Foreword

Reducing poverty and social exclusion is one of the main challenges for ensuring social cohesion in Europe. The research project COPE – Combating Poverty in Europe: Re-organising Active Inclusion through Participatory and Integrated Modes of Multilevel Governance’ – analyses trends of poverty and social exclusion in Europe, and examines the dynamics of minimum income protection policies that potentially help alleviate the risk of poverty in Europe. A particular focus is on the situation of single mothers, long-term unemployed and the working poor, who face particular risks of poverty and social exclusion. To what extent have minimum income policies functioned as last resort social security for these three groups, and in what sense can ‘active inclusion’ policies credited with protecting them from poverty and social exclusion?

Co-financed by the European Commission in the 7th Framework Programme, the COPE project unites researchers and stakeholders from six European countries, the UK, Italy, Poland, Sweden, and Norway. Having started in February 2012, COPE runs over a three-year period. COPE’s method is comparative – analysing developments in five European countries (Poland, Germany, UK, Sweden and Italy). Its focus is inherently multi-level, looking in turn at developments at European, national and local level.

The present report is part of COPE’s effort to uncover the dynamics of local level policy reforms in the area ‘active inclusion’, namely reforms affecting local policies that specify the adequacy of minimum income benefits, the provision of employment services, as well as the organisation of access to social services. It focuses particularly on the three groups’ single mothers (SM), long-term unemployed persons (LU), as well as the working poor (WP).

This study analyses the dynamics and varieties with focus on multilevel governance and multi-stakeholders perspective in combating poverty at local level in five European municipalities: Dortmund, Turin, Radom, Malmö and Glasgow.

We also would our colleagues in the national COPE teams for all the time and effort that they have put into their national reports on local active inclusion policies and governance models, forming the backbone of this comparative report.
Summary

The report analyses five cities (Dortmund, Turin, Radom, Malmö and Glasgow) in five European welfare states (Germany, Italy, Poland, Sweden and the UK), belonging to a variety of welfare regime constellations (Conservative/Corporative, Southern European, Eastern European, Social Democratic and Liberal). The cities included in the report moreover share a similar background as industrialised cities, which have undergone extensive changes in recent decades. Each city is characterized by extensive problem pressure (high unemployment rates, low labour market participation, high costs for social assistance, pervasive patterns of marginalization and social exclusion) in their respective national context. The report seeks to analyse three key questions.

The report *analyzes the implementation and/or adoption of national active inclusion models in the local governance of active inclusion policies*. What effects have local autonomy and/or strong central steering on local adjustment patterns in relation to local active inclusion models? In short, our main conclusions are as follows:

First, local discourses and ideological positions on poverty play a significant role in local policy adaptation to national models of active inclusion policies.

- We find extensive variation across our local cases with regard to the local constitution of such discourses, partly reflecting welfare state regime typologies, partly reflecting local agency set-up and political leadership in local governments.

- Our analysis shows a strong and articulated local discourse on poverty in Dortmund, Glasgow and Turin. In each of these three cities, the issue of poverty is integrated into the main political agenda and embraced by both political leaders/parties as well as central societal actors. This illustrates that not only is poverty a local social problem, but also recognised as a political problem for local decision-makers to handle. The support for a local poverty agenda in these three cities is however consensus oriented in the cities of Dortmund and Turin, whereas much more conflict laden in Glasgow.

- Our analysis demonstrates that in Radom and Malmö – despite having a similar background and extensive problem pressures the previous three cities – poverty is not part of, or a driving issue in local political discourses and debates. In the city of Radom, this is due to ideological disputes between leading political parties. In the city of Malmö, this seems to be a reflection of the city’s long-lasting Social democratic heritage. Whereas this resulted in tensions and conflicts in the city of Radom, the result was more a process of de-politicization in the city of Malmö, as key actors treated poverty as an administrative matter, only.

- The comparisons completed in this project reveal that despite these local variations, one result runs across regime differences. The poverty issue is to a large extent subordinated to employment concerns in all our local cases, i.e. if one can get people into employment, poverty will no longer be a key problem in a local context. In all
our local cases, Working Poor has therefore been a category of people that tend to fall between public responsibilities.

Second, the poverty issue is entangled in complex central – local dynamics in all cases, irrespective of what national model of active inclusion being adopted in the country in question.

- Our investigations demonstrate that in the cases in which there exist a strong feature of central regulation and steering of local minimum income provision, we find disparate local reactions. Dortmund and Glasgow share several similarities when it comes to the national organization of minimum income support, with strong central regulation over the administration and delivery of benefits at local level. In each of these cases, the dominant minimum income support scheme is primarily a form of an unemployment support. Despite these national similarities in the regulation and organization of local provision, we found that in each case local actors sought to expand their discretionary powers. This was a key feature of the actions taken by local actors in Glasgow as they deliberatively sought to expand local powers in the areas of active inclusion policies, in direct opposition to central regulation. In the city of Dortmund, local discretion was not sought in response to central level actions, but a result of the strong tradition of local services provision in Germany.

- Our investigations also show that among the cases which operates in a centrally framed active minimum income agenda, but with local autonomy, we find acceptance by local actors of the rules and regulations stipulated by central actors. Local decision-makers in Malmö and Radom did not directly explore the local autonomy they had, despite the extensive problem pressure facing these cities. For instance, they did not develop policies or programme that to any greater extent diverted from central standards with regard to social assistance standards.

- The comparisons also demonstrate that the city of Turin can best be characterized as operating in a mix model of regulation over minimum income provision, as some schemes are centrally regulated whereas others are only part of local regulation patterns. This results in complex and fragmented local systems of minimum income support, which in turn have caused difficulties for local beneficiaries as they need to have extensive knowledge on local options and agencies.

- The local studies conducted in this report also show that local policies and practices are integrated into the European Union’s policies and practices. Local actors take part in trans-national networks, and the EU is a key funder for local (often nonpublic) actors. However, this is not part of the active inclusion strategy developed by the EU.

Third, local minimum income provision differs across local settings and welfare regime typologies.

- Our analyses demonstrate that the scope of the local minimum income provision is large in most of our cases. In Dortmund, Malmö and Radom a large proportion of the
population receive local public minimum income benefits (ALGII and social assistance support). This is also the case for the city of Glasgow. Funding does not seem to be an issue in the cities of Dortmund, Glasgow and Malmö, but more so in the city of Radom. The scope of the public minimum income scheme is more rudimentary in the city of Turin as a very small proportion of the local population actually receives public support from the local minimum income schemes. This demonstrates different public institutional capacities to cater for people living under financial hardship.

- The comparisons conducted demonstrate that categorical schemes are mostly used in the Italian context, but categorical provision is also integrated into the Polish systems of minimum income support. The most universal system is found in Sweden. As previously noted, the Working Poor is a category of beneficiaries that tend to fall between public responsibilities and local minimum income provision. In several of our local cases, third sector organizations need to step in to cater for their needs.

- The comparative analyses illustrates that means-testing is mostly implemented in the Swedish context. We find that individuals are required to seek all other solutions and use all other means before social assistance could be granted. The applicant and members of the household must give away some civil rights such as property rights. The other support schemes also follow principles of means-testing (above all in Turin and Radom), but allows individuals to income and financial assets to certain thresholds.

This report analyses the degree and form of multi-dimensional coordination between policy areas in local active inclusion models, i.e. patterns of coordination and/or integration between policy areas as well as between local public agencies responsible for the implementation of local active inclusion policies.

We find that local policy coordination and agency cooperation is primarily a reflection of national reform processes, but also that central regulation have adverse and unexpected effects at local level.

- The comparisons demonstrate that the most elaborated forms of coordination and collaboration between policy areas and different public agencies can be found in the city of Dortmund, as a reflection of the national Hartz reforms. The local practices exemplify a strong integration of employment and minimum income provision, as well as coordination with local social services. We find that local practices and governance arrangements in the city of Dortmund even further have sought to integrate local stakeholders into these operations.

- We find that at the outset, local practices and policies in the city of Glasgow ought to follow similar patterns, as also the UK government has installed a one-stop-shop logic into national employment and benefit policies, i.e. the JobCentre Plus. However, the central steering and close coordination between minimum income support and employment services linked to the JCPs had adverse effects locally. Our
investigations demonstrate extensive local activities, constructing a second tier of
local activation policies in the city of Glasgow, and furthermore a distinct separation
between central and local policies.

- In the cities of Malmö and Radom, local policies are articulated and organized in the
backdrop of a clear-cut institutional separation between centrally regulated
activation/active labour market policies, and local provision of minimum income
support. Our studies explore that in the city of Malmö, this institutional separation has
resulted in tensions between public agencies, and furthermore the expansion of a local
activation system, i.e. constituting a parallel system to the central PES. We find no or
very weak integration and coordination with both local social assistance provision,
and central PES. Our studies in the city of Radom does not demonstrate the
development of a second tier of employment services, but tensions and conflicts
between the centrally regulated and regionally implemented PES, and local minimum
income support.

- Coordination and integration between public employment services and local
minimum income provision does not seem to be an issue in the Italian context of the
city of Turin.

The report analyses the degree and form of multi-stakeholder involvement in local active
inclusion models, and above all the involvement of third sector organizations in debating,
planning and delivering welfare services for the three target groups included in the COPE
project.

We find that in all local cases, local third sector organizations play a greater role in local
social services provision, in some cases being an important complement, or in other cases
even replacing local public actions.

- The comparisons completed in this report demonstrate that in four local cases third
sector organizations are a central actor in local active inclusion policies, except for the
city of Malmö. In the cities of Glasgow, Turin and Dortmund we find extensive
involvement of third sector organizations in local anti-poverty policies and local
services provision. In each of these local cases, actors are involved in both
deliberation and planning of policies and services, as well as in delivering services. In
the city of Radom, local third sector organizations are primarily involved in local
services provision.

- Our analysis demonstrate that, following the patterns of a Social Democratic welfare
state, the city of Malmö has not developed policies to involve third sector
organizations in the planning of social services. They are neither involved in
delivering services to any greater extent. If third sector organizations are involved in
local service delivery, or provide people under financial hardship with support, this is
mainly as a minor complement to local public services.
In line with previous studies or a welfare mix, we observe that third sector organizations in the city of Glasgow are heavily involved in a broad range of policy areas, including emergency relief, social welfare services, employment services etcetera, sometimes based on contractual arrangements with public agencies, and sometimes acting on the basis of grants given to them. The organizational landscape is occupied by a wide variety and a large number of local third sector organizations. These are not only local actors, yet take part in national and international networks and gain financial support from EU sources, illustrating that scalar relations also involve nonpublic actors, possibly side-stepping central level actors.

Third sector actions in the city of Turin are of even greater importance. Large private foundations are not only complementing public actions and services in the city of Turin. We find extensive involvement in mutual partnership arrangements with public actors and other third sector organizations work together to initiate, administer and provide benefits and services for people in need, often or similar or even larger scope than local public authorities. These activities are extensively coordinated by a few foundations, having a central position in a local welfare society.

We find that third sector organizations are also heavily involved in local services provision in the city of Dortmund, partly involved in local policy debates and planning, but primarily operating as a deliverer of local public social services.

The city of Radom has also an extensive flora of local third sector organizations involved in local service provision. We find similar patterns of internal coordination among third sector organizations, as some of them shoulder a greater role in relation to local authorities. A majority rely on volunteers and less on paid staff, than in Dortmund and Glasgow. Many of them have financial support from EU sources.

We find that the greater role by local third sector organizations challenges established patterns of governance among local public authorities.

The comparisons completed in this report demonstrate that governance mechanisms such as partnership arrangements are more commonly used than forms of hierarchical or contractual arrangements, above all with regard to public – third sector relations.

We find that local third sector organizations are not only locally embedded, but rather involved in national and European networks, bringing ideas, policy proposals, projects and funding opportunities into the local context, partly sidestepping national level rules and practices.

Our investigations also raise questions regarding the future role of local public authorities. In the backdrop of the current crisis and cuts in local public welfare, local authorities and residents seem to rely more on third sector organizations. In some of our local cases this raise questions on the role of public agencies in extensive partnership arrangements.
The report contributes to current debates on best practices for a European strategy of active inclusion policies at local level

- The report shows that active inclusion policies do not reflect the extensive ambitions developed by the EU. Local policies and practices cannot support the plea for integrated policies in the areas of sufficient income support, inclusive labour markets and access to quality services.

- Based on our results, we can identify one example of best practice. Dortmund and Turin have the most intensive involvement from the third sector and other actors in the areas of social services production. In these cities, we find a large plethora of local third sector organizations cooperating with public agencies and also with for-profit organizations in a highly institutionalized way in delivering active inclusion policies. The notion of partnership arrangements in these two cities involves patterns of cooperation (shared information and support), coordination (common tasks and compatible goals) and collaboration (integrated strategies and collective purpose) in the local governance practices to combat poverty.

- Considering the local quality of these best practice suggestions, the report shows the relevance of the local level and local factors for the successful development of an active inclusion strategy, but even more so that a fully-fledged active inclusion strategy needs to take into consideration the local actor set-up of public as well as non-public actors in both policy-design and policy delivery if one seeks to meet the demands currently facing European welfare states in the backdrop of the crisis.
1. Introduction

The European Union (hereafter the EU) has made combating poverty into one of its main priorities. Constituting one of the five headline targets in the EU 2020 strategy, heads of states agreed to get at least 20 million fewer people in or at risk of poverty and social exclusion until the year of 2020. The target was set in the backdrop of an extensive financial, political and social crisis that has swept across European countries. Some Member states have witnessed sharply increasing levels of unemployment, long-term unemployment and social exclusion, putting pressure on national income support schemes and also on local support schemes of various types, such as minimum income schemes.

As the pressure on public welfare systems is mounting, associations and organizations of civil society (e.g. voluntary organizations, charities, third sector self-help groups, user organisations etcetera) have been reporting that they are meeting increasing needs and demands from citizens and also from public agencies to shoulder a greater role in provision of welfare in a European context. European wide organizations such as the Red Cross report that they experience a ‘… growing number of people living below the poverty line and needing assistance, and also a rise in the intensity of poverty, whereby those who were already poor are now poorer, as well as a widening gap between the rich and the poor. This means that those living at the margins of mainstream society – and those who are socially excluded – have grown in numbers and the distance to re-socialize, rehabilitate, find a job and re-join society has also increased (International federation of the Red Cross 2013, p. 5; see also Caritas Europa 2012, EESC 2012).

Just at the dawn of the financial and economic crisis, the EU introduced its active inclusion strategy (EC 2008/867). The main aims for the strategy were ambitious. The EU expressed that respect for human dignity was one of the organizations founding principles and that one aimed for the promotion of full employment and social progress, the combating of social exclusion and discrimination and the promotion of social justice and social protection (ibid.). Albeit written before the break of the crisis, the EU made a plea for a new form of policy coordination to be implemented at national and local levels, to better seek to combat the ‘… persistence of poverty and joblessness and the growing complexities of multiple disadvantages’ (ibid.).

The EU firstly acclaimed that Member States better could come to a grip with these social problems if one developed more comprehensive policies with regard to three pivotal policy areas:

- … sufficient income support, i.e. ‘… the right of individuals to adequate resources and social assistance as part of consistent and comprehensive efforts to fight social exclusion’,
- … inclusive labour markets, i.e. ‘… assistance for those who can work to enter or re-enter and stay in employment that best relates to their capacity to work’ and
- … access to quality services, i.e. ‘… proper social support is given to those that require it, in order to promote social and economic inclusion

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The EU secondly maintained that Member States could better come to a grip with these social problems if they developed a more comprehensive and integrated approach to these three pivotal policy areas. Such an integrated approach ‘ought to’ rest on:

- ‘… the right mix of the three strands of the active inclusion strategy, taking account of their joint impact on the social and economic integration of disadvantaged people and their possible interrelationships, including synergies and trade-offs’
- ‘… integrated implementation across the three strands of the active inclusion strategy to effectively address the multifaceted causes of poverty and social exclusion and enhance coordination between public agencies and services which deliver active inclusion policies’
- ‘… policy coordination among local, regional, national and EU authorities in the light of their particular roles, competences and priorities’
- ‘… active participation of all other relevant actors, including those affected by poverty and social exclusion, the social partners, non-governmental organisations and service providers, in the development, implementation and evaluation of strategies’ (bid.).

These aims and methods – which five years after introduction seem highly visionary – sought hence to develop a policy strategy to go beyond established categorical divisions between passive and active policies, between levels of policy implementation and beyond public and non-public actors’ involvement in policy design and delivery. Although the EU never actually put forward a clear-cut definition of active inclusion, the newly developed policy area seeks to facilitate ‘…the integration into sustainable quality employment of those who can work and [italics added] provide resources which are sufficient to live in dignity, together with support for social participation, for those who cannot’ (ibid).

Recent analyses conducted by the Network of Independent experts of the active inclusion strategy demonstrate that at national level the active inclusion strategy seem to have had little relevance for domestic policy reforms (Frazer & Marlier 2013, see also Clegg 2013). These experts noticed that coordination across ministries, agencies and policy areas was fairly weak in a large number of Member States and that implementation ‘… across the three strands of the active inclusion strategy to effectively address the multifaceted causes of poverty and social exclusion and to enhance coordination between public agencies and services … has been quite limited’ (ibid, p. 27). They concluded that fragmentation outweighed integration and that there was fragmentation of responsibilities across agencies and policy areas and there is also lack of effective coordination mechanisms. They moreover concluded that many national strategies were unbalanced and paid most attention to inclusive labour markets, primarily understood in terms of activation services and obligations to take a job offer. The function of adequate minimum income support and social services was – according to the Network of independent experts – generally overshadowed. Last but not least, they also notice that this unbalanced approach ‘… often seems to reflect a lack of understanding amongst policy makers as to what the term active inclusion means’ (ibid, p. 25).

This report seeks to analyse local active inclusion strategies in five European welfare states (Germany, Italy, Poland, Sweden and the UK) and above all active inclusion strategies in five
cities that during the last decade have experienced extensive socio-economic difficulties, e.g. in terms of high levels of unemployment, long-term unemployment and poverty in a national context. The cities chosen are Dortmund (GER), Turin (ITA), Radom (POL), Malmö (SWE) and Glasgow (the UK). The countries included in the project represent different welfare state regime typologies (Continental/Corporatist, South European, Post-Socialist, Social-democratic and Liberal), the cities have all a strong industrialized heritage, yet in recent decades have undergone an a process of intensive de-industrialization. Most of them have also been dominated by strong Social-democratic and/or left-wing parties (less so for the city of Radom).

The main research questions analysed in the report are as follows:

- The report seeks to analyse the implementation and/or adoption of national active inclusion models in the local governance of active inclusion policies. What effects have local autonomy and/or strong central steering on local adjustment patterns in relation to local active inclusion models?
- The report seeks to analyse the degree and form of multi-dimensional coordination between policy areas in local active inclusion models, i.e. patterns of coordination and/or integration between policy areas as well as between local public agencies responsible for the implementation of local active inclusion policies.
- The report seeks to analyse the degree and form of multi-stakeholder involvement in local active inclusion models, and above all the involvement of third sector organizations in debating, planning and delivering welfare services for the three target groups included in the COPE project.

The report hence seeks to contribute to the overall debate on the strengths and weaknesses of local welfare states/societies to introduce a full-fledged active inclusion strategy, both with regard to the comprehensiveness of the three pillars as well as to local institutional capacity for the successful multi-dimensional as well as multi-stakeholder integration. the main focus for the report are local policies in relation to three target groups (long-term unemployed, working poor and single parents) in need of support from local minimum income schemes and/or local social/welfare services.

This includes the activities of key actors/providers (public, non-profit, profit, family) within MI schemes and an analysis of their discourses and strategies, and the corresponding institutional local governance structures, based on form (partnership, network, public contract) and in relation to national and European levels.
2. Data collection and method

To foster greater comparability across welfare state regimes and also to encourage comparability in complex local settings, the following methodological procedure was carried out in this work package.

First, all national teams were encouraged to select one local case to be included into the project and members of the COPE team adopted a combination of primary and compulsory criteria together with secondary and optional criteria. With regard to the primary and compulsory criteria, the COPE team agreed to study a medium to large city/municipality (the definitions of ‘medium’ and ‘large’ are based on existing national contexts) as an administrative unit of study. This city/municipality should feature a history of high poverty, long-term unemployment rates and social exclusion in a national context. As a secondary and optional selection criterion, the COPE team agreed to study a city/municipality that should be ‘moderately badly’ affected by the post-2008 crises; by this we mean we should not select the ‘worst cases’. It was furthermore added that the city/municipality in question should have received EU funds (targeted at disadvantaged regions and/or social groups, particularly our three target groups).

Second, to foster greater comparability across local levels, the COPE team agreed that it was necessary to collect background data to review the existing local socio-economic and political conditions of relevance for the objectives raised in the COPE project, as a contextualisation in the analytical interpretations of empirical interview data. This reasoning was based on a review on previous research that indicates that local welfare systems differ considerably between and within national contexts and that one could anticipate to find extensive variation within countries with regard to the challenges local agencies are facing when it comes to issues of poverty and active inclusion policies (local levels of poverty, long-term unemployment, poverty levels, political participation etcetera). The countries included in the COPE project – Germany, the UK, Sweden, Poland and Italy – represent different welfare state regimes and rely on different traditions and regulations on the role of local agencies and government in the provision of minimum income support (Esping-Andersen 1990; 1999, Saraceno 2002). In some countries, local self-governance and self-determination is an essential political rationale, above all with regard to the governance of local minimum income schemes and the central state has a limited mandate and few means to intervene into the organization of local minimum income schemes. The local arena might also entail local traditions of cooperation between public and non-profit organizations in the delivery of services and goods to poor and socially excluded groups, varying extensively between local arenas within countries (see chapter 3 below for further elaboration).

The background reports produced by national teams on their local cases were carried out by classic desk-research (e.g. analyses of financial statements, annual reports, budget documents, evaluation and monitoring documents, organizational charts and other relevant public documents from local authorities and other relevant agencies, combined with basic statistical information on the local case) and covered the following themes a) local political context, local socio-economic factors (and when possible for our 3 target groups), governance structure of local minimum income schemes, formal regulation of minimum income
standards, local activation structures. Outline for the background report is inserted in Appendix 1. Background reports can be downloaded from the project webpage, http://cope-research.eu/.

The final step in the data collection procedure included a completion and analysis of ten expert interviews. It was agreed that the interviews mainly focused on a combination of key persons (senior civil servants) from public authorities (e.g. units for social services and social assistance provision or similar together with local labour market office and local PES office) together with relevant non-public actors, e.g. key representatives of civil society organizations (service and/or advocacy organizations, providing voice and offering guidance and support for people suffering from poverty and social exclusion) or non-public for-profit actors. It was also intended that all national teams ought to include interviews with local politicians, representing parties in and out of office. It was furthermore agreed that the interviews mainly should focus on people centrally placed in these organizations and not front-line staff. These general guidelines were then adjusted to fit local conditions. Interview guidelines are inserted in Appendix 2.

During the course of data collection for the WP6 it has proven difficult and sometimes impossible to collect comparable data for issues relating to local poverty status, local minimum income support and related issues. This is sometimes due to the complex local conditions that exist in a European context, in which such data is not available. This has made it sometimes difficult to fully integrate the local reports, above all with regard to background data on socio-economic conditions.
3. Taking stock on existing research

The following chapter will shortly reflect and elaborate on a series of ongoing research debates on the governance and coordination of social policies, activation policies and social assistance/minimum income policies in a European context (see for instance van Berkel & Møller 2002, van Berkel & Valkenburg 2007, van Berkel, de Graaf & Sirovatka 2011 & 2012, Eardley et al 1996, Lødemel & Trickey 2001, Hvinden & Johansson 2007, Kazepov 2010). We do not seek to review or present these debates in detail. Our ambition is rather to discuss a few themes that are of central relevance for the purposes of the COPE project and this report on the implementation and organization of local active inclusion policies, i.e. addressing issues of vertical – horizontal coordination as well as dimensions of horizontal coordination. The first section brings forward the general debate on vertical and horizontal coordination of social policies and issues on scalar social policies. The discussions that follows seek to explore such governance dynamics from three alternative perspectives. First, we explore the discussion on scalar social assistance regimes, initiated by Kazepov et al (2010). Second, we address issues of inter-agency partnership models and inter-agency cooperation, especially within the fields of active inclusion policies. Third, we address the role of multi-stakeholder involvement in planning, and above all delivering welfare services, as an illustration of a welfare mix.

Debating vertical and horizontal governance of social policies

The shift from ‘government’ to ‘governance’ has attracted much academic and political interest over the last decade (e.g. Kooiman 1999 & 2002, Newman 2001 & 2005, Pierre & Peters 2000, Stoker 1999). Academic debates suggest a flow of authority away from traditional institutions of government: ‘upwards’ in terms of greater significance of trans-national and supra-national decision-making and regulatory structures and processes, and ‘downwards’ in terms of greater role of regional and local authorities, actors and decision-making bodies (Daly 2003). Or as Kazepov maintains: the main two trends with regard to social policies are the reorganization of regulative powers at different territorial levels and the multiplication of actors involved in ‘… designing, managing and implementing social policies’ (Kazepov 2008:248).

Addressing the multitude of levels involved in the governance of public policies, many authors have argued that national governments’ decision-making capacity has been circumscribed by new international regulations, stemming from the EU and other international organizations. Economic globalization, the construction of an internal market within the EU and labour market mobility across borders have made it more difficult for national governments to make autonomous decisions and retain capacity to enforce decisions taken. Arguably, internationalization and globalization have placed nation-states and national regulative institutions in a different situation, generally downplaying the capacity to act as the regulative power in a wide range of policy areas. Such processes of re-scaling have taken many different guises and often been spurred by recent developments of the EU (e.g. Ferrera 2005a & b). The role of the EU and its regulatory capacity varies across policy fields, yet it has certainly created a new level at which social policies are being discussed and regulated,
illustrating the nested quality of current social policy-making in European welfare states (ibid.). National governments appear to be less capable of determining social development within their national boundaries, a symptom generally described as a ‘hollowing out’ of the state (Kooiman 2002).

However, many observers also acclaim that sub-national (regional and local) arenas, entities, cities and urban conglomerates have become increasingly important areas for public policy regulation (e.g. Mingione, Oberti & Pereirinha 2003, Kazepov 2008, Kazpeov 2010). It is commonly held that the solution is a more active role for sub national, regional and local risk protection (e.g. Evers 2003, Keating 2003, Fyfe & Milligan 2003). The main argument is that the complexity of the mechanisms behind many social risks (e.g. poverty, economic exclusion or homelessness) and the greater diversity of life courses, risks, needs and preferences call for concerted efforts in close dialogue with the person where he or she is: in local contexts. Nevertheless, scholars warn that a greater reliance on localised provision – as an alternative to national and encompassing provision – will create new cross-territorial disparities, greater social inequality, fragmented solidarities and undue burdens on women and families (e.g. Brenner 2004, Ferrera & Rhodes 2000, Esping-Andersen 1996, 2001, White 2003).

Embedded in this extensive debate we find different arguments why local welfare provision is better and more important (e.g. Andreotti et al 2012, pp. 1925-6). Local level provision is seen as more effective. Contemporary societies are gaining in complexity and so are also the needs and expectations on large parts of the population. The best way to cater for citizens’ welfare needs is hence – it is claimed – in relation to their local social, cultural and political context. Local arenas are also seen as more democratic than other political arenas. A localisation of public policies to sub-national arena can encourage the more direct participation of citizens and involvement in deliberation, debates and decision-making procedures, as well as opening up an arena for the involvement of associations and organizations of civil society to be involved in local policy-making procedures, directly and/or indirectly presenting and representing the views and claims by their members or a wider set of beneficiaries. Third, a localization of social policy provision is also seen as an important step in fostering the sustainability of such policies as this would enhance a greater involvement and diversification of resource supplies/suppliers from local economic actors and social groups (See also Mingione & Oberti 2003).

Analyses into local welfare provision have however, made a key distinction between local welfare states and local welfare societies. The approach seeks to go beyond the understanding that public policies and public agencies are the most important object of analysis, instead such actors and policies must be understood in their local context, which ‘…has its own distinctive cultural, economic and social resources contributing to the creation of a different mix of actors, who in turn contribute to affect the resources’ (Andreotti et al 2012, p. 1934). A general definition of a local welfare system can be found in Mingione & Oberti (2003: 3) who argue that such local systems ‘…are conceived as dynamic processes in which the specific local social and cultural contexts give rise both to diversified mixes of actors underlying the strategies for implementing social policies and to diverse profiles or needy or assisted populations’. A study of a local welfare system must hence start from ‘…its
socioeconomic and cultural conditions and from the social structures in which it is
embedded’ (Andreotti et al 2012:1934). It is ‘… important to analyse the mix (of actors) and
their interplay embedded in a local institutional context’ (Minigione & Oberti (2003) (see
appendix 1 for a model for analysing local welfare systems).

Partly embedded in these debates on the greater role of local level provision, we also find a
parallel discussion on the relevance of new forms of policy-making. Lower levels of voting
and involvement in political parties have made politicians anxious about a ‘decline of
representative democracy’. Throughout Europe we see the emergence of new discourses on
citizens’ involvement and a search for new forms of civic participation beyond representative
democracy, often under the heading ‘civil dialogue’ (Grote & Gbikpi 2002; Fung 2004; Fung
& Wright 2003; Newman et al 2004; Barnes et al 2007). The wide ranging term ‘participatory
governance’ refers to a relocation of authority from traditional political institutions to new
arenas for political participation as well as (public) service delivery (Schmitter 2002; Heinelt
2007; Greven 2007). Involved are also innovations in decision-making processes, i.e. the
ways in which governments engage diverse societal actors in discussion and deliberation
about policy development at large, policy implementation and policy delivery (e.g. Grote &
Gbikpi 2002). Such efforts could be interpreted as forms of horizontal coordination, as
Koiman argued (1998) that the dividing lines between public and private actors are becoming
increasingly blurred. These academic debates illustrate the complexity studies of local
governance patterns needs to recognise.

First, local welfare systems are not a mere reflection – if ever – of central regulation and
implementation of national reform processes. Quite the opposite, local welfare systems –
their elements and actors – are embedded in wider vertical and horizontal relationships which
influence how these systems function, what they deliver and for whom. A growing role for
local welfare systems does not necessarily involve a decentralisation or retrenchment of
national risk protection. Rather than an unambiguous spatial rescaling where higher levels of
governance withdraw from earlier responsibilities and leave them to the local level, we are
probably going to witness more complex multi-scalar systems developing (Loboa et al.
2009). In this process, national, transnational or supranational actors may well be
strengthening their roles as regulators and/or allocators of resources vis-à-vis local welfare
systems, rather than giving up the supervision and control of such systems (Majone 1993,

Second, state and public actors are no longer – if ever – the main actor in designing as well as
delivering public services of different kinds, reflected in the increase in the role of the state as
the facilitator and co-operating partner. Governments are increasingly working in networks
and developing joined-up services in partnership with different societal actors for the purpose
of effective resource allocation and conflict containment (White 2008), both for the sake of
fostering political participation as well as of building more effective public policies. Ranging
from loose collaborative networks, to more formalised partnership arrangements and direct
contracting out models, new forms of relations and interactions are being constructed
between public and non-public actors, illustrating the complexities of horizontal coordination
and the many forms of governance mechanisms embedded in such horizontal relationships.
Notions such collaborative government, one-stop shop models and partnership arrangements
are examples thereof (Askim et al 2011, Fimreite & Lagreid 2009, Minas 2010). Arguably, horizontal coordination need to elaborate and be analytically sensitive to distinctions between whom to involve and under what conditions (participatory governance and participatory coordination) as well as what actors to be involved in delivering social services (e.g. co-production, co-governance and marketization) (e.g. Pestoff et al 2012).

Coming to a closure on these initial discussions on vertical and horizontal coordination, it appears as if the challenges that lay ahead regards integrating analyses of vertical as well as horizontal policy coordination and governance models and to study the effects such forms of coordination might have on each other. For instance, non-governmental service providers may be integrated in relationships outside the given local area. Local non-profit providers could be integrated into national or transnational networks of associations and organizations of civil society (Kendall 2009); local faith-based providers may be members of world-wide religious communities; while for-profit providers may be subsidiaries of large national or multi-national enterprises. A full and extensive analysis of vertical and horizontal coordination combined must hence recognise that public and non-public providers (at different levels) of risk protection and welfare services are involved in complex – both vertical and horizontal – multi-scalar relationships (supranational, transnational, national, regional and local governance), transcending administrative boundaries and – possibly – that these relationships will influence the perceptions, orientations, goals and practical approaches of these providers, including the likelihood of them entering partnerships or using other forms of governance arrangements.

**From national models to scalar social assistance regimes**

The argument raised above regards to analyse national systems in a multi-level perspective, and even more so, considering that the state and the central government is not the only rule-maker in a complex system. These debates have made their ways into current reasoning on social policies, social assistance models and minimum income schemes.

One of the first and most influential piece of work was carried out by Eardley and colleagues in the mid-1990s (Gough et al 1997, Gough 2001, Lødemel 1997). Just a few years after the publication of the classic work on the *Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism*, these scholars demonstrated that such a regime typology might hold true if one investigated some central social insurance systems, yet was less relevant when comparing social assistance (Esping-Andersen 1990). Based on a detailed comparison of social assistance models in 24 OECD (comparing degree of centralization (central-local variation), extent of family obligations (individual, household or family), toughness of means-testing (earnings, asset disregards), worktest applied (have to work), the extent to which benefits are legal entitlements (e.g. appeal to court) they came up with no less than seven social assistance regime types.

Some clarifications ought to be made. The so-called public assistance model was based on an extensive set of means-tested arrangements, which in turn were ordered in a hierarchy of acceptability and stigma. This model included tough asset-tests, but also had inbuilt earnings disregards. Benefit levels were generally low, yet combined with fairly strong procedural
rights. The model *welfare states with integrated safety nets* had large national and general programmes social assistance programmes, partly with procedural rights and partly with means-testing disregards. The *dual social assistance model* to a large extent included categorical assistance for certain groups. It allowed local discretion, but within a national political or legal framework. The so-called model of *citizenship based, but residual* provided assistance in one single general scheme. Benefit levels were relatively generous, yet the role of local authorities was substantial, and combined with a strict means-test. The model of *rudimentary assistance* reflected combinations of nationally regulated categorical benefits, yet with extensive local discretionary relief provided by municipalities or charitable bodies. The model of *decentralised discretionary relief* was based on extensive local discretionary relief and with no or extremely low national regulation, as well as linked to social work and wider kin obligations (Eardley et al 1996; Gough *et al* 2001).

These typologies have later served as a starting point for further explorations, demonstrates for instance in the more recent work by Marx & Nelson (2013). They added a series of dimensions to discuss the original models further, summarized in table 1 below. The notion of extent reflects the amount of money being spent on social assistance in each respective welfare state context. The notion of generosity regards the benefits levels in a comparative perspective. Using the term structure, these authors sough to combine analyses of to what extent national models included and/or excluded individuals from seeking and gaining benefits (detering functions). The countries included in the COPE project are marked in bold text.

**Table 1 Social assistance models in comparative perspective.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MIP arrangement</th>
<th>Countries</th>
<th>Extent</th>
<th>Generosity</th>
<th>Structure</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Selective welfare systems</strong></td>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Average</td>
<td>Exclusive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>The public assistance state</strong></td>
<td>USA</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Below average</td>
<td>Inclusive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Welfare states with integrated safety nets</td>
<td>Australia, Ireland and the UK</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Above average</td>
<td>Inclusive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Dual social assistance</strong></td>
<td>Germany, France, Belgium, Spain, Italy, Japan</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Average</td>
<td>Neither inclusive, nor exclusive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizenship based but residual assistance</td>
<td>Denmark, Finland, Sweden and the Netherlands</td>
<td>Average</td>
<td>Above average</td>
<td>Neither inclusive, nor exclusive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rudimentary assistance</td>
<td>Portugal, Greece, Turkey</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Below average</td>
<td>Exclusive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decentralised discretionary relief</td>
<td>Norway, Austria, Switzerland, Iceland</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Average</td>
<td>Neither inclusive, nor exclusive</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


It is of course interesting to notice that according to these original models, Germany and Italy belonged to the same regime category. The UK model was primarily belonging to a cluster of
liberal welfare states and Sweden together with some of the other Scandinavian welfare states.

Since then several important contributions have been made into the debates on social assistance models and minimum income models (e.g. Bahle et al 2011, Immervoll 2009, Lödemel & Trickey 2001, Marx & Nelson 2012, Pfeifer 2012, Standing 2003). A key contribution to these scholarly debates is the recently completed project on rescaling social policies (e.g. Kazepov 2010). They explicitly sought to bring in a territorial dimension to social policy analysis, analyzing patterns of vertical coordination as well as horizontal coordination in European social policies. Social assistance policies was one areas of direct investigation and in contrast to the previous modelling business, a different configuration of models emerged as national social assistance schemes were investigated with regard to levels of re-scaling as well as involvement of nonpublic actors in public service delivery.

The first model was coined a strong local autonomy, centrally framed model. Characteristic for this model regarded the shared responsibilities by central and local governments, yet with an emphasis on local political autonomy. The state had the legislative power over social assistance provision, yet management and delivery of services and benefits was mainly an issue for local governments, which have the possibility and partly a responsibility to implement national policies in accordance with local conditions. The model strongly relied on a principle of local autonomy and that local governments are better equipped to make decisions due to their knowledge of local social, cultural, economic and political conditions. The autonomy granted to local governments was restricted by the use of institutional and regulatory tools, e.g. national guidelines providing local authorities with a set of rules to be followed. Local agencies and actors have – however – extensive leeway to interpret and change the formal rules, according to local conditions.

Examples of a local autonomy – centrally framed could primarily be found in the Scandinavian countries, belonging to the Social democratic welfare state regime. Social assistance regulation in countries like Norway, Finland and Sweden have generally been based upon strong local autonomy for local municipalities, however, embedded in a system of national regulation (e.g. guidelines, framework laws, possibilities to appeal to administrative courts etcetera). Typical for these countries is social assistance models is state responsibility over planning and benefit eligibility criteria while municipality responsibility over management and delivery. A typical feature is also fairly well capacitated local authorities with regard to administrative structure, financial resources etcetera. Kazepov & Barberis (2012) conclude that ‘… the state retains its primacy and decentralization takes place with strong attention paid to control processes…. (ibid, p. 224)

The second model explored by Kazepov et al (2010) is coined centrally framed countries. The model gives strong emphasis to the role of the state and its legislative and regulative power. It is the state that through (mainly) legal regulation decides over all aspects of social assistance provision, e.g. access criteria, amount, and duration. The model includes limited variation within countries as sub-national governments are weak. France was the main example of a centrally frame country, exemplified by the introduction of the RMI and the strong centralization of social assistance provision in France. However, although this implied
a strong central regulation and a strengthening of the rights-element in social assistance provision in this particular country, this national scheme embodied a categorical logic making it complex for central governments to regulate the full implementation of benefits at local levels.

The third model is *regionally framed countries*. Unlike the two previous models, the regulative responsibility for social assistance provision is not located to the central state, but to the subnational level, which ‘… has an exclusive legislative responsibility in the field of social policies and social assistance in particular’ (Kazpeov & Barberis 2012, p. 225). Typical for this model is hence a legislative tier beside the central state. With regard to social assistance provision, national influence ‘… and/or control on planning and eligibility criteria is very limited, as it usually takes place at regional level, while management and delivery are delegated to lower territorial actors, namely municipalities’ (ibid, p. 226). Such decentralization and subsidiarity give rise to extensive variation within geographical areas (nations, yet also regions and other relevance geographical areas). Due to the limited recognition of rights and as effective enforceable rights, regional variation depends on local capacities and interest in developing and pursing policies in the areas of social assistance provision. Local entities with weak institutional capacities might hence be restricted from developing and exploring such policies and Kazepov talk of territorial fragmentation and ‘…drift towards very localist variations with cities having often high autonomy in the design, management and implementation of social assistance schemes (ibid, p. 226). Countries exemplifying such regionally framed policies are e.g. Italy, Spain and Switzerland, which all have a high degree of regulative capacities decentralized to subnational levels (regions and cantons), nevertheless have institutional set-up with regard to the capacities of local governments and actors.

The fourth model in Kazepov typology is *a mixed frame in transition*. The model is less easy to disentangle with regard to key its features, as it is based both on the idea of mixing elements of other models as well as being in a period of transition. The central state has a key role in developing legal regulation, yet with an increasing role for subnational bodies. A key element in this particular scalar regime is also the extensive involvement of international actors, e.g. the European Union in domestic governance arrangements, also in the field of social assistance policies. Barberis, Sabatinelli & Bieri (2010, p. 190) acclaim that different ‘… territorial authorities – though lacking legislative power – intervene consistently not only in the management and delivery of social assistance measures, but also in their planning’. It is argued that the model is typically involving weak coordination between actors and policy spheres, in practice resulting in unclear and overlapping responsibilities as several actors are involved in social assistance provision and related matters. According to these scholars, Poland is an illustration of a mixed frame in transition.
Table 2. The different role of actors in scalar regimes

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Role of third sector</th>
<th>Level of funding</th>
<th>Main private actors</th>
<th>Type of governance</th>
<th>Level and type of discretion</th>
<th>Example of countries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Local autonomy, centrally regulated</strong></td>
<td>Less important (increasing)</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Profit</td>
<td>Managerial and participative</td>
<td>Medium Intra Legem (within a rule)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Centrally regulated countries</strong></td>
<td>Important (increasing)</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Profit/non-profit</td>
<td>Managerial and corporatist (rather centralized)</td>
<td>Medium Intra Legem, sometimes also extra legem (interpreting the rule)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Regionally regulated countries</strong></td>
<td>Very important (increasing)</td>
<td>Varying, in ITA very low</td>
<td>Non for profit</td>
<td>Corporatist (pluralistic and highly fragmented)</td>
<td>High extra legem, highly diversified</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Countries in transition</strong></td>
<td>Very important (increasing)</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Non for profit</td>
<td>Corporatist (pluralistic and highly fragmented)</td>
<td>High extra legem, sometimes contra legem</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Kazepov & Barberis (2012).

The discussion demonstrate that to a large extent did these scholars explore the vertical – horizontal dimensions to social (assistance) policy coordination in a comparative perspective. However, to some degree they also included thinking on a horizontal dimension to such governance models. They also sought to analyse how the four scalar regime types (local autonomy, centrally framed; centrally framed countries, regionally framed countries and mixed frame in transition) involved nonpublic actors, as a dimension of horizontal coordination and governance. In their analysis, two key aspects of horizontal coordination are integrated into the analysis: relevance of network governance and social workers discretionary powers. The role and function of nonpublic actors is related to the scalar regime, however yet not a result thereof. The discussions could be summarized in the table above.

The role of social workers in the models is further depicted in relation to three rationalities of rule interpretation: *intra legem* (within a standard or a rule); *extra legem* (interpreting the rule and between rules) and *contra legem* (contrasting, avoiding or beyond the rule). The authors acclaim that intra legem is more common in models where there exist central legal regulation, and less so in countries where subnational authorities are granted legislative powers. Moreover, they assert that the role of third sector organizations differ considerably across the models. In the regionally framed and transition models, third sector organizations fulfil an important role in planning, managing and delivering assistance to people in financial need, as an alternative to public social assistance delivery. This also reflects the public institutional capacities, e.g. demonstrated through the differences in funding capacities in all models. The local autonomy, centrally regulated as well as the centrally regulated countries tends to reflect social democratic and corporatist welfare states, which have a higher degree of public institutional support for public social assistance and provision, than in other countries.
The countries included in the COPE project could be placed in each of the models above, i.e. Sweden being the example of a local autonomy centrally framed country; Germany and the UK as potential illustrations of centrally framed countries and Italy as a regionally framed model. Poland is also included in the COPE project and can be analysed as an example of a model in transition. Each of these models can be much more generally debated, and to what extent they actually materialize the tentative model descriptions explored by Kazepov (ibid.), e.g. can one actually place Germany and the UK together in a centrally framed mode together with France. Can Poland be an illustration of a country in transition? For how long? Some of these issues will be further explored in this report.

Multi-dimensional elements in horizontal welfare governance

The topic raised above seeks to detect a vertical dimension (central – local dynamics) in social assistance design and delivery. This report seeks to analyse the local implementation of national models of active inclusion policies as well as to analyse the local governance models (e.g. partnerships and/or contractual arrangements) in local entities. Such a horizontal dimension can be explored by the related scientific debates on partnership arrangement and inter-agency cooperation.

Partnership arrangements in local welfare governance

The notion of a partnership has strong resemblance to our discussion above, yet needs special attention as it is a slippery term and has several connotations (Lowndes & Skelcher 1998, Mörth & Sahlin-Andersson 2006, Rees et al 2012, Skelcher & Sullivan 2008). The very term partnership is part of a greater collaborative discourse in how we understand public policies and public agencies and involves a wide range of notions such as inter-agency working, cooperation, coordination, joined-up government, participatory governance, collaborative governance etcetera. Citing Haywood and Wright, Powell and Glendinning (2002, p.5) acclaim that ‘… the search for ‘coordination’, joined-up solutions’ and ‘horizontal coordination’ is the philosopher’s stone of modern government…. ‘.

There are several reasons why current governments have been interested in developing partnership arrangements with other societal actors. And the list that is commonly mentioned within the scholarly literature is fairly long. If we explore the reasons mentioned by one key scholar, we come up with the following set of arguments for why governments seek collaboration with other non-state actors (Geddes 2008, p. 215).

- It assists in problem solving. It brings together the approaches and experiences of a range of partners, which share but usually have different perspectives on problems, differences in expertise and knowledge basis.
- Joint working across sectors might also stimulate new thinking on old problems, that is partnership arrangements can produce innovation as individuals and organizations ‘… are exposed to new ideas and ways of working’ (ibid.).
- Cross sectorial partnership arrangements opens up for new resources and possibly also the more effective usage of existing resources.
• Bringing together a full range of actors reduces the risks for policy failure, at least in terms of easing off the pressure from one actor responsible for the issue at hand.
• Partnership arrangements stimulate and increase the legitimacy of actions taken and for the governance process, by building alliances with involved stakeholders (Geddes 2008, p.220).

Geddes also reminds us that the partnership solution also includes costs since such arrangements could easily involve greater costs than working alone, but also that the very complexity of getting involved might risk successful decision-making and last but not least, that partnership, delegated authority and involvement of a greater number of non-public actors in deliberation and decision-making processes might risk transparency and accountability for public policies and public decision-making.

What is then a partnership? First and foremost, it is important to make a very categorical distinction between different modes of social coordination or governance, i.e. between market, hierarchy and network. These three forms of coordination and governance are generally seen as ideal-typical forms of ways by which we can analyse interactions as well as relations between actors. These distinctions have been discussed by many social scientists (e.g. Williamson 1985) and it is commonly held that a market mode of governance is based upon contractual relationships, above all over property issues. Markets provide a high degree of flexibility for actors to decide whether they should form alliances, yet circumscribed by both the resources available. Hierarchies operate according to a different logic as they include limited flexibility for those in line. Bureaucratic operations dominate as well as administrative and central command. Such forms of coordination tend to result in formalization and routinization. The last of these three ideal-typical models is the network. Unlike the other two, this form of coordination revolves around interdependent relationships and based on elements of trust, loyalty and reciprocity, conflicts are generally resolved within the network on the basis of participants concerns.

A partnership arrangement is generally perceived as a form of network governance, although this is sometimes disputed. A minimal definition to a partnership would ‘… require the involvement of at least two agents or agencies with at least some common interests of interdependencies… and would also probably require a relationship between them that involves a degree of trust; equality or reciprocity’ (Powell & Glendinning 2002, p.3). A more practice oriented definition of a partnership could however include elements such as, otherwise independent bodies; which agree to cooperate to achieve a common goal; which create new organizational structures or processes to achieve such a goal; and plan and implement a joint programme which includes sharing relevant information, risks and rewards (ibid.). Mörth (2006, p. 38) offers a similar, albeit slightly different definition of a partnership as she acclaims that it is based on lasting cooperation between equal partners, which jointly seeks to achieve commonly established goals. Participation is voluntary and both partners contribute to the partnership and its activities and it also includes elements of shared responsibilities. Underlying all these elements of a partnership, lies the idea that working together is better than working alone. With regard to the topic raised in this volume, it is important to have in mind that a partnership can be operationalized to promote integration vertically, i.e. between different tiers of government – European, national, regional, local and
grass roots) and horizontally (between different spheres of society – public, private, voluntary and civil) (Geddes and Bennington 2001, p. 2).

The issue of trust is essential in partnership arrangements. Many authors maintain that the notion of trust is what separates partnerships from both markets and hierarchies. However, trust is not something that one can easily accomplish as it requires acceptance of differences as well as interest in compromises and mutual learning (e.g. Downing, Powell & Glendinning 2004). Within this extensive literature it is partly argued that trust and a collaborative capacity requires…

‘.... strong leadership; the development of a shared vision and a common basis of knowledge; a willingness to recognize difference; compromise and ensure that all partners are treated equal; and cultural change both at the individual and organizational level’ (Geddes 2008, p-217).

However, in reality trust might be an ideal for partners to strive for. More commonly is that partners might be highly unequal, not willing to change or take the other partners perspective in a reciprocal manner. The ‘absence’ of trust might lead into more hierarchical forms of coordination and/or more contract like arrangements where actors get involved not on the idea to share and based on mutual interdependencies.

Studies of partnerships or other forms of collaborative governance arrangements are faced with a set of intriguing questions. Mörth and Sahlin-Andersson (2006) argue that one can detect some general dilemmas facing participants in partnership governance models. The first dilemma regards how to balance the need for coordinating with other actors and the degree to uphold one’s own autonomy. A partnership needs at some stage more formal and clear procedures and also aims and methods to reach those aims. Such practices and goal-establishment procedures are an essential part in establishing the partnership as an organizational unit it itself, with a certain degree of visibility or other external actors. However, as such processes of creating formal and more established rules and routines carry on; they might inflict with and even challenge partner organizations autonomy. We can refer to this as the autonomy dilemma. The second dilemma put forward by Mörth and Sahlin-Andersson regards the boundaries of a partnership. Actors that enter into a partnership arrangement might have a joint vision of what is to be accomplished by such a collaborative arrangement, but the challenge facing most partnership participants is where to draw the lines between the vision, aims, activities and resources being part of the collaborative partnership arrangement and the vision, aims, activities and resources that are belong to one’s home organization. Collaborative arrangements such as partnership might run the risk of taking over other previously independent organizations and agencies, or in some cases, this might also be a purpose for why some actors seek to sign up for such collaborative efforts. This might be called the demarcation dilemma. Last but not least, these two authors also point out that issues relating to responsibility are hard to grasp in collaborative arrangements. This is of particular importance when it comes to public agencies involvement in partnership arrangements and brings forward the complex issues of how citizens can hold politicians and public agencies accountable for their actions? Where are the public decisions actually taken
and by whom? And how can public control be exercised in such multi-agency arrangements? This might be called the responsibility, but partly also the accountability dilemma.

**Interagency cooperation or integration in local welfare governance**

The current debates on *interagency cooperation and integration in public services* run parallel to this more general debate on partnership models. In general one can say that the notion of partnership involves more far-reaching forms of cooperation than what is usually referred to as inter-agency cooperation, since partnership models may include a large range of public and private actors whereas interagency cooperation more generally refers to cooperation and integration between public agencies. New forms of inter-agency cooperation have gained increasing prominence in the development and delivery of welfare services and activation strategies.

The arguments in favour of greater cooperation between public agencies follow a similar line of reasoning as the arguments in favour of more extensive partnership models, explained above. For instance, it might assist in problem solving, stimulate new thinking on old problems, more effective usage of resources and improve legitimacy for the public actions being taken as one cannot be criticized for letting people ‘fall in-between of public agencies’ respective responsibilities’. Inter-agency cooperation within welfare governance can, however, take a variety of forms. In practise it might imply that public agencies can ‘…. bring their front offices together under one roof, or establish a new agency in which their front office activities are shared and direct client contacts take place. More far-reaching forms are possible too, and may involve full mergers of formerly independent agencies’ (van Berkel, de Graaf and Sirovátka 2011). However, one of the most prominent forms of inter-agency co-operation within the welfare governance field regards the recent focuses on making social policies more employment friendly, and above all integration benefit eligibility tests with an offer to participation in an activation/active labour market project.

However, it goes beyond the scope of this report to develop a full-fledged analytical framework for the study of models of inter-agency cooperation, yet it is possible to make a basic distinction between degrees and forms of inter-agency cooperation and forms of consensus/conflict over central elements in a coordination process. Based on a review on why actors seek to enter into such a joint arrangement, Skelcher and Sullivan (2008, p.757) maintained that four different forms of integration were possible to disentangle.

- Cooperation – shared information and support
- Coordination – common tasks and compatible goals
- Collaboration – integrated strategies and collective purpose
- Coadunation – unified structure and combined cultures (ibid 2008, p.757).

Besides these four notions, these scholars also acclaim that it is equally relevant to analyse how participants have similar or different views with regard to some key elements of an organization’s activities. For instance can we detect consensus and/or conflicts between the actors involved with regard to the following elements?
• Domain consensus – agreement among participating organizations about the role and scope of different bodies in the network
• Ideological consensus – agreement about tasks and how to approach these
• Positive evaluation – respect by members of one organization for the value of the work of others
• Work coordination – activities programmed between organizations to maximize efficiency and effectiveness (ibid.)

Whereas these analytical concepts illustrate patterns of cooperation from an organizational perspective, several social policy scholars have analysed patterns of integration an inter-agency cooperation in a much more concrete manner. Clasen & Clegg (2011) for instance maintained that current social policy and labour market reforms contained several layers of policy and system integration. They detected that income protection systems were integrated in a series of welfare states, demonstrating a broad integration in terms of both accessibility and eligibility to income protection. This could imply the integration of previously separated systems for income replacement in terms of unemployment. They also found patterns of integration and inter-agency cooperation expressed in forms of closer connections between benefit provision and activation programmes, possibly addressed as a form of conditionality for individuals, but also system and policy integration. Other forms of integration could be the direct operation of activation policies, sorted under one roof (see also van Berkel 2011, Minas 2008 & 2010). The last-mentioned example is the most commonly debated form of integration and inter-agency cooperation in the fields of minimum income provision and active inclusion policies. Across European welfare states there is a combined debate and reform trajectory of greater integration of services (at local level) in the forms of so-called one-stop-shop models, in which several public agencies are supposed to work together (Askim et al 2011, Minas 2009 & 2010). Whether these one-stop-shops actually rest on more coadunation than cooperation is a matter for empirical research. Studies, however, seem to emphasize that national and local models sometimes includes several tasks and services (e.g. like in Finland focusing on social services provision, labour market support, health counselling and benefit provision, partly also in Norway and Germany) compared to models in the UK and Denmark, which much more directly address issues of labour market integration and benefit provision, solely (Johansson 2007, Askim et al 2011). As an illustration, Minas acclaims that there are narrow and broad doors in one-stop-shop models (2010), in which a broader door is established in countries like Germany and Finland since several policy areas and professional practices are integrated into the same unit, whereas a much more narrow forms of integrated services are found in e.g. Denmark and the UK, since these are merely focusing on employment services and benefit provision, and not social services or medical services of any kind (ibid.).

Multi-stakeholder involvement in horizontal welfare governance

The third research debate that we seek to explore in this report regards the role played by nonpublic actors in planning, managing and delivering social services and financial assistance for people in need. The role and function of nonprofit actors/third sector organizations (charities, voluntary organizations, community groups etcetera) in welfare production has been a central feature in academic debates on welfare mix, mixed economy and third sector research (e.g. Powell 2007, Evers & Laville 2004, Ascoli & Ranci 2002, Evers 1995 & 2005). This section will shortly explore these debates as an illustration of horizontal
coordination in the countries analysed in the COPE project, primarily with regard to the involvement on non-profit actors as a form of multi-stakeholder involvement.

**Welfare mix in welfare regime typologies**

The role played by third sector organizations in different welfare states certainly differs, across national boundaries and regime typologies. The bulk of research into this field indicates that the landscape of welfare mix follows some key traits of historical development (e.g. Bode 2006, p. 349). Associations and organizations of civil society were often key actors of welfare provision before the modern welfare state had been established. As such, they offered social services to people in need, sometimes independently from involvement of state and local authorities and sometimes in cooperation with public agencies. Historical analyses also indicate that associations and organizations of civil society have been involved in planning, delivery and supervision of social services in a wide range of European countries. As such, they participated in coordinating and governing this particular system of welfare policies and partly acted as an expert on particular social problems and group needs, and partly as an advocate and claims-making organization to better promote the needs and wishes of particular groups. The bonds between third sector organizations and public authorities were sometimes close and based coordinated cooperation, and such ‘… inter-agency collaboration was largely based on trust or connivance rather than on comprehensive demands on (output) accountability. Market relations and competitive structures did not play a role’ (ibid, p. 349). This particular form of organized welfare mix seems to have undergone extensive changes in recent years (e.g. Ascoli & Ranci 2002). There is a greater push towards privatization and marketization of welfare services, combined with a greater push towards co-governance and use of collaborative techniques such partnerships, in which third sector organizations play a role (Pestoff, Brandsen & Verschure 2012).

One of the most influential inputs into these historical – but even more so – comparative debates on welfare mix and the role played by third sector organizations is certainly the so-called John Hopkins comparative project, which has analysed the size and organization of the nonprofit sector in a large number of countries (e.g. Salamon & Anheier 1997 & 1998). Benefitting from these comparative studies, we can make some general conclusions with regard to the countries studied in the COPE project.

We find that among the countries included in the COPE project there appears to be extensive differences with regard to the size of the third sector (nonprofit sector), among which Sweden and the UK has the largest sectors (in terms of paid staff and volunteers as part of the economically active population) followed by Germany, Italy and then Poland. However, these comparative studies also demonstrate that the construction of organized civil society is differently structured. Sweden is by far the country which mainly organizes volunteers, and associations and organizations of civil society employing staff members. This stands in sharp contrast to the situation in Germany and the UK, in which paid staff members are a much more common feature and above the amount of people volunteering.
Table 3. Civil Society Organizations workforce as a share of the economically active population, by country, 1995-2000 (selected countries)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Paid staff</th>
<th>Volunteers</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>3.54 %</td>
<td>2.33 %</td>
<td>5.89 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>2.26 %</td>
<td>1.49 %</td>
<td>3.76 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>0.64 %</td>
<td>0.17 %</td>
<td>0.80 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>1.74 %</td>
<td>5.11 %</td>
<td>8.10 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>4.84 %</td>
<td>3.63 %</td>
<td>8.54 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Developing/transitional</td>
<td>1.18%</td>
<td>0.73%</td>
<td>1.91%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Developed</td>
<td>4.65%</td>
<td>2.72%</td>
<td>7.41%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36 country average</td>
<td>2.72%</td>
<td>1.61%</td>
<td>4.36%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


These short notifications also embed other country differences. One might assume that more paid staff members implies more professionalized organizations and possibly also more well-resourced organizations, than associations relying on the volunteering efforts of members and other interested beneficiaries. The John Hopkins comparative project also made comparisons on which sectors national civil society organizations operated in making an analytical distinction between organizations working in the fields of culture, education, health, social services, environment, development, civic/advocacy, foundations, international and professional. There are of course several shortcomings in making such distinctions between sectors, nevertheless they give us some indications into what fields and sectors national associations and organizations are mainly operating in. Among the countries included in the COPE project we find that whereas Sweden had as high as share of the economically active population as the UK, this is primarily located in the fields of cultural activities (mainly sports, culture and leisure activities) and less so involvement in the field of social services. A different pattern emerges for Germany and Italy, in which we find much more third sector involvement in the areas of social services than in Sweden. The UK and Poland are somewhat in-between these ‘extremes’ (see table 4 below).
Table 4 Civil Society sector FTE workforce, by field (percent of total), 1995-2000.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Culture</th>
<th>Education</th>
<th>Health</th>
<th>Social Services</th>
<th>Environment</th>
<th>Development</th>
<th>Civic &amp; advocacy</th>
<th>Foundations</th>
<th>International</th>
<th>Professional</th>
<th>n.e.c</th>
<th>Total (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>19.7</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>21.8</td>
<td>27.2</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>23.9</td>
<td>14.8</td>
<td>18.0</td>
<td>26.1</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>32.7</td>
<td>22.2</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>19.5</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>45.5</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>15.4</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>27.5</td>
<td>25.4</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>16.0</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Developing/transitional</td>
<td>16.6</td>
<td>24.9</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>19.3</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Developed</td>
<td>21.4</td>
<td>20.4</td>
<td>18.5</td>
<td>20.2</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36 country average</td>
<td>18.8</td>
<td>22.9</td>
<td>13.7</td>
<td>19.7</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Government – nonprofit relations in COPE countries

If we pursue our analyses of the role of third sector organizations in delivering welfare services and in particular social services of different kinds, we can make the following general analytical remarks with regard to the roles in each of the countries included in the COPE projects.

The relationship between government and third sector organizations in Germany are characterized by the principle of subsidiarity, like the German welfare state in general. Historically the main German welfare associations were formed at the end of the 19th century and become the associational complement to the centralized welfare state that took shape during the Weimar Republic. After the WWII their role become much more codified and legally institutionalized, that is, in ‘… several legal acts (concerning welfare, services for the youth and care for the elderly) voluntary organizations were given a special public status and a privileged role as service providers; they had to be the first to be contracted whenever a publicly funded new social service or institution was set up’ (Strünck 2010, p. 57). The Free Welfare Organizations have an important institutional role in the architecture of the German welfare state.

This principle of subsidiarity has implied that the German third sector is dominated by a smaller set of centralized and institutionalized welfare associations that employ a large number of people (as illustrated above). The social services sector is dominated by six large welfare associations: i) Deutscher Caritasverband, ii) Diakonisches Werk, iii) Arbeiterwohlfahrt, iv) Deutsches Rotes Kreuz, v) Deutsches Paritätischer Wohlfahrtsverband and vi) Zentrale Wohlfahrtsstelle der Juden in Deutschland (Strünck 2010, p. 58). Each of these organizations has clear connections to wider societal interests in the German welfare state, e.g. Caritas to the Catholic church and Diakonie to the Protestant church and Arbeiterwohlfahrt to the social democratic party/labour movement. They provide services in areas such as health care, social help for young people, family support, care for the elderly and disabled, lobbying for marginalized groups etcetera. Recent estimates demonstrate that these six welfare associations are one of the largest employers in Germany and in 2004 it was calculated that a total of 1.3 million people were employed by them, only being outnumbered by the public sector. More updated data illustrate a similar picture as Caritas has more than 500,000 people employed (2013) and more than 500,000 volunteers (www.caritas.germany.org). Due to the size of these organizations one might assume that they have hampered the development and mobilization of other associations and organizations in civil society, working and representing marginalized groups of different kinds.

If we move on and make a brief reflection on the role of third sector organizations in social services delivery in Italy the following main traits appear. As indicated in the John Hopkins project, the third sector in Italy is to a large part involved in delivering social services to the population. Moreover, a large part of social service delivery in an Italian context is carried out by third sector organizations, neither public nor for-profit actors. Ranci & Mantagini (2010, p. 109) summarize the role of the Italian third sector in social service delivery stating that ‘Without the contribution of the third sector in terms of resources and services, the capacity of the Italian welfare system to meet welfare needs would be much lower that it is’.
The Church and charitable organizations have – historically – been the most important actors in this field, being the main actors in providing services (of different kinds) for a large part of the population. Yet, like in many other countries, the role of charitable organizations become under severe attack in the 1960s and 1970s and new types of voluntary organisations developed. In the Italian context, there was a general upsurge mobilizing and organizing citizen involvement and also to fight social marginalization, often materialized in the forms of social co-operatives (Thomas 2004). Such cooperatives have a multifold purpose. They both seek to provide members with work, but also founded upon solidaristic purposes, seeking to provide poor people with social services and integrating excluded people into work (see Barbetta 1997). Ranci & Montagini (2010) records that there are almost 20,000 third sector organizations operating in the field of social service provision. A large proportion of these rests on volunteers alone (approx. 70 per cent) combined with small sized professional organizations (approx. 18 per cent). Only a few organizations have more than 50 people employed. There are hence both similarities (great involvement in service delivery), and differences (higher degree of voluntary organizations) than in Germany.

The relationship between Italian third sector organizations and public agencies could be characterized as based on the principle of a partnership, in which the latter funds for the services whereas the former delivers such services. However, Ranci & Montagini notice that the Italian models differs from other continental models as the levels of government funding is much lower than in comparable countries. They also maintain that these third sector organizations have never really been involved in policy-making. Instead the state has taken a pragmatic and functional approach to their involvement, i.e. providing funds in exchange for services. Third sector organizations have hence not generally shouldered a role as advocates for certain groups, a function generally left for the political parties, the church and the unions. However, more recently two profound changes have taken place in how this relationship is being organized. On the one hand side changes in laws regulating local governance have implied that third sector organizations can and partly need to be involved in local social planning processes. This assumes a change in the previous partnership models and possibly a greater advocacy role for third sector organizations at local level. On the other hand side, there is a greater tendency that public funding are much more following market-logics in terms of putting services out for tender or by much more introducing money-for-value logics in public spending (ibid). This has implied that third sector organizations experience a greater competition from for-profit organizations in social services delivery, which for a long time was almost a sheltered section of public services. Due to the high degree of decentralization in Italy, there of course exist considerable differences between regions and local entities.

The Polish third sector has undergone extensive changes in recent years. Before WWII the Polish third sector was dominated by large foundations, which reflected the major interest of the Polish society and which also carried the major bulk of social services for the population. The Catholic Church was obviously one important actor, yet also based on ethnic affiliation. Such features paid an important role until the start of the WWII. All such foundations were, however, eliminated and their assets confiscated after the WWII and most of such organizations were hence closed (Krzyszkowski 2010, p. 171). Independent groups and associations, however, started to emerge in the 1970s and formal (re-) recognition of the role of third sector organizations took place in mid 1980s as they were granted formal legal status,
once more. These extensive changes are important to recognize and there is a need to critically examine existing comparative data, e.g. as present above.

However, during recent years the third sector has gained a more profound role in the Polish welfare state. A newly implemented Act (the Act on Public Benefit and Volunteer Work, 2003) extended the function of third sector organizations in delivering social services and also introduced a novel financing mechanism. At present, Polish individual tax payers can choose to devote 1 per cent of their individual tax be directed to third sector organizations instead of public authorities. Moreover, the role of the EU has been central in the development and prosperity of third sector organizations in a Polish context. Recent investigations indicate that at present approximately 60,000 third sector organizations active. Among this vast population most of the organizations are based on volunteering efforts and only 40 per cent of the third sector organizations have employed staff members, often on a part time basis. Approx. 16 per cent of the now active population of third sector organizations express that they work with social services and social assistance, of which 6 per cent express that these issues is their main priority (Przewlocka et al 2013). A large part of these organizations are involved in delivering services for disabled and chronically ill people as well as on poor and multi-child families. Fewer organizations – but still a considerable part – are involved in offering services such as direct ‘emergency need’, e.g. food, clothes and direct financial support (Krzyszkowski 2010, p. 174). The involvement of EU funding is essential for the understanding the role of third sector organizations in Polish welfare systems, offering an important alternative funding source for local, regional and national organizations, yet also imbuing greater challenges in terms of transparency, professionalization, keeping financial records.

The role of third sector organizations in delivering social services in Sweden follows a different logic than the other three countries discussed above. The Swedish welfare state holds a salient position in comparative welfare state research as well as in comparative nonprofit studies (e.g. Esping-Andersen 1990, Janoski 1999, Salamon & Anheier 1998). It is generally seen as the archetype of a Social democratic welfare state, mainly granting citizens universal public social services and universal social protection systems. Nonprofit organizations as well as for-profit actors have generally held a marginal position in producing welfare services for the population. The Swedish – as well as Nordic – third sector has primarily relied on voluntary efforts; large membership based organizations and rarely involved professional service provider organizations (e.g. Svedberg & Olsson 2010, Wollebeak & Selle 2008). However, despite an extensive role of public authorities and agencies in public policies and public service delivery, the Swedish third sector is as large as, or even larger than comparable countries. However, as already indicated the third sector in Sweden follows its particular traits it is largely based on membership based organizations and a great dominance of unpaid voluntary work, rather than professionalized paid work. The relationship between the welfare state and third sector organizations operating in the welfare field is ambiguous. Historically, third sector and voluntary organizations played a key role in providing services for people in need, yet with the expansion of the welfare state they have fulfilled a less important role. However, Svedberg & Olsson (2010) notice that third sector organizations nevertheless have played a key role in certain policy areas, e.g. homelessness, battered women, abused children etcetera.
The relationship between the state and for-profit/nonprofit actors is, however, in a state of flux. Recent research demonstrates increasing privatization as for-profit actors have taken on a much greater role in producing public services for larger groups of the population, above all with regard to school and caring issues (e.g. Hartmann 2011, see also Sivesin 2003, Trägårdh et al 2013). Since the turn of the Millennium researchers have also piled evidence of a changed order in how the Swedish government defines the nonprofit sector (e.g. Wijkström & Einarsson 2006, Svedberg & Olsson 2010). These changes have become more evident with the introduction of the present Centre-Conservative government, in office since 2006. In his first opening speech, the Conservative Prime Minister expressed that the solidarity of the public welfare system was ‘… a complement to a society that to a great degree is characterised by compassion, responsibility and idealism… Increased cooperation among public, private and the non-profit sectors is necessary to develop our society’ (Declaration of government, Sep 2006). Moreover, ministers in charge of social welfare policies and nonprofit issues also maintained that for a long time there had been ‘… an ideological blindness to what the nonprofit sector contributes and could contribute with [in the Swedish welfare state]’ (Sabuni & Hägglund 2007). These ideological statements have been reflected in a series of national reforms, e.g. the introduction of National Compact models in the areas of social welfare services and integration, a National Act on Systems of Choice to foster consumer choice and a greater variety of services producers (including for-profit and nonprofit) etcetera.

The relationship between the state and the voluntary sector – or third sector – has taken several different forms in the UK context (Kendall & Knapp 2005; Kendall 2003). Like in several other European countries, these two sectors developed parallel for a long period of time, but after the WWII the state gained momentum and third sector organizations lost some of their significance as a service provider. This started to change in the late 1970s as the Thatcher government came into office and declared that public services were to be reduced and that for-profit as well as nonprofit providers were a better alternative. This gave the sector a more prominent role, as well as more income from state authorities, but the growing contract culture also caused uneasiness among third sector representatives, in terms of being subordinated to providing service based on public contracts, and not directly relating to the needs of their beneficiaries. Since then there has been a greater political interest into the third sector and above all after New Labour came into office. The Blair government made the third sector and partnerships with the third sector and community groups into one of its main priorities. The growth in size and scope of the sector has hence been complemented by more frequent relations and contacts between public actors and sector representatives. The introduction of the Office for the Third Sector is such an illustration, but several others might be added. The present Conservative government has to a large extent also expressed interest into the third sector, yet we also find evidence of a reorientation towards the sector. The recent political discourse has implied a shift in terminology, as the Conservative government change into a language of civil society, instead of third sector. This conceptual shift is part of a broader political and discursive shift from the New Labours modernization agenda, towards the current Conservative government’s Big Society agenda, seen as a fundamental change in the relation between state and citizens. Community involvement, voluntary organizations and charity
work plays a cornerstone in these ideological re-orientations, as the Big Society seeks to encourage citizen and community engagement and increase the role of voluntary organizations and social enterprises in public service delivery (Alcock 2010b).

The slowly growing interest into the third sector can also be illustrated in the scope of the third sector. Recent investigations demonstrate that approx. 730,000 people (2011) are currently being employed in the UK voluntary/third sector, which is a minor decline since the year before, but still a major increase since the start of the Millennium by 34 %, or 185,000 people. This represents approx. 2.6 per cent of the total workforce. There is a wide number of organizations active in the country. According to the NCVO there are around 900,000 third sector organizations. This figure needs, however, to be read cautiously as the NCVO itself argues that this includes 171,000 registered charities as well as around 600,000 ‘below-the-radar’ groups (Alcock 2012). This last figure is, what Alcock refers to, a guesstimate as no one exactly knows how many organizations or associations are actually in operation at the moment. However, it appears as if there has been a parallel increase in governmental funding to the sector, from £8 billion in 2000 to £12.8 billion in 2008, 36 per cent of total income (ibid.).

Embedded in this development lies a more profound change in government – third sector relations. Several scholars have observed that the relationship between government agencies and third sector organizations have increasingly been shaped according lines of a marketization logic (McKay et al 2011). Both Conservative and Labour governments have over the last decades paid increasing efforts to install more market-like relations with the third sector organizations, and attempted to create more efficient markets for public goods through opening up the market for delivery of public services to providers from private and third sectors on a ‘best value’ basis (Newman, 2007). The New Labour government had a strong belief that charities and other third sector organisations were best placed to deliver public services due to their responsiveness to the consumer. The process of opening up public service delivery to a wider range of private and non-profit providers gained extensive speed in the new millennium and many charities saw increasing shares of their income derived through government contracts. This indicates that financial relations between government and third sector organizations have increasingly been the subject of market mechanisms, i.e. replacement of grants with commercial income and public contracts, partly as a result of government contracts but also their sale of goods and services.
4. National models of active inclusion policies

The national adaption of an active inclusion strategy in Member States of the European Union varies considerably (see Clegg 2013, Frazer & Marlier 2013). The following section shortly summarizes the governance of active inclusion policies at national level, above all focusing on the organization of national minimum income schemes (mainly of last resort) and the extent to which such schemes are linked to activation policies and good quality social services; see also reports from the Network of National experts, Strati (2012) in Italy, Halleröd (2012) on Sweden, Topinska (2012) on Poland, Bradshaw et al (2012) on the UK and Hanesch (2012) on Germany.

Organization of national minimum income systems

The countries compared in the COPE project (Germany, Italy, Poland, Sweden and the UK) all belong to different welfare state regimes and – as illustrated above – also to different social assistance regimes or scalar regimes (see previous chapter). To fully grasp the organization and use of different governance mechanisms at local level – which is the main objective for this report – we will shortly present some key dimensions of national minimum income schemes. The discussion is based on previous investigations within the COPE projects (see Clegg 2013 and national reports on WP5).

First, the scope of national minimum income schemes in national welfare state context varies across the COPE countries. The notion of size can be analysed in various manners, yet if one uses number of minimum income claimants as share of the working age population we can conclude that the Swedish, Polish and Italian minimum income scheme(s) are smaller than this is the case in Germany or the UK. That is, in the last-mentioned welfare states we find that national benefit schemes cover a larger proportion of people, than in the three countries included in the project.

Second, the organization of national minimum income schemes varies in the COPE countries with regard to the comprehensiveness of national schemes. The Italian case is difficult to fully grasp with regard to this dimension since there is no – at present – national overarching scheme of last resort (e.g. a national social assistance scheme, or similar), yet we find a combination of minimum income schemes. In Germany there is one large minimum income scheme (ALG II) for people being unemployed and being able to take a job offer, combined with the smaller Socialhilfe and categorical benefit schemes for war veterans and refugees and asylum seekers. In the UK, minimum income provision for people of working age is divided into means-tested unemployment assistance (JSA-I) and Income Support. Poland has primarily two major minimum income schemes (permanent and temporary allowance). At the outset these seem fairly comprehensive, yet are based on categorical conditions. The permanent allowance are specially designed for those who are not able to work due to e.g. old age, disability or family responsibilities and the latter for those who are considered to be unable to work at present, based on a range of legally specified support criteria. Sweden has some minimum income schemes for certain groups (mainly for refugees), yet the main
minimum income scheme for people of working age is the means-tested social assistance system, covering all age groups and family statuses.

Third, the organization of national minimum income schemes also varies with regard to the degree of discretion based on local agencies, authorities and grass-root professionals. The German and the UK systems are extensively centralized with regard to eligibility criteria and also with regard to benefit levels. The Italian, Polish and Swedish systems give greater leeway for regional and local agencies to make amendments in relation to national regulation, at least in theory but not necessarily in practice. The extent to which there is strong regulation vis-à-vis local discretion differs to some degree depending on the topic at hand (e.g. sanctions, benefit levels, eligibility), yet is an evident feature that separates the Polish, Swedish and Italian systems from the German and the UK systems of minimum income support. There is also a greater involvement of professional social workers in the Polish and the Swedish systems than in the other three systems of minimum income support.

Fourth, the financing of minimum income systems in the COPE countries also differs considerably. The UK system stands out as the most centralized since minimum income support is completely funded out of central taxation. The German system is also based almost entirely on central funding sources and central taxation. The Polish system could be depicted as a mixed model as it combines funding from both central and local sources, yet mostly based on local sources. The funding of Italian minimum income schemes depends on the scheme in question, but schemes that are directed at those of working age, of last resort, are mainly funded by local authorities.

Fifth, the delivery of minimum income benefits also differs across the COPE countries, and partly reflects the already exhibited pattern of central and local regulation. Minimum income benefits in the UK are delivered by central authorities and the local branch of JobCentrePlus. The situation is similar in Germany as in most municipalities ALGII is delivered by the local JobCentre unit, being the joint institution of the federal employment agency and the local municipalities. In slightly more than 100 municipalities, the delivery is run entirely by municipality run bodies. The UK and German systems are hence centrally governed, and delivery is linked to an agency sorting under the field of employment affairs. The delivery in Sweden, Poland and Italy is mainly organized according to local conditions and by local municipalities, often linked to the social services units.

Sixth, the generosity of national minimum income systems also differs across the COPE countries. Previous analyses indicate that the systems in Germany, the UK and Sweden are fairly similar when it comes to benefit levels, but not particularly generous in relation to other European countries (Bahle 2011). These studies also indicate that minimum income support in Poland is less generous than the three countries already mentioned. Although the Polish and the Swedish systems have strong elements of local regulation, there seem to be a strong element of central regulation with regard to benefit levels, indicating that there might be less variation across local entities in these countries. Due to the highly decentralized nature of the Italian system of minimum income support, it is hard to make interpretations on generosity of minimum income provision as this differs across regions and local areas.
Table 5. Five Minimum Income Protection Systems between National Employment Regulation and Local Social Regulation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th><strong>National Employment Regulation</strong></th>
<th><strong>Local Social Regulation</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>Germany</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scale of MIP</td>
<td>Extensive</td>
<td>Extensive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financing</td>
<td>National</td>
<td>National (Local)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Governance</td>
<td>National</td>
<td>National/Municipal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regulation</td>
<td>National</td>
<td>National/Municipal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scope for intra-national variation in benefits</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PES Delivery</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes (generally)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individual Action Plans</td>
<td>Yes, always</td>
<td>Yes, always</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Job search requirements</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sanctions</td>
<td>Yes, graduated</td>
<td>Yes, graduated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suitable work rules</td>
<td>Explicit</td>
<td>Explicit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social work involvement</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extent of individual discretion</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Clegg (2013).
These dimensions illustrate key similarities as well as differences with regard to the regulation as well as organization of national models of minimum income support in the countries included in the COPE project.

According to Clegg (2013) it is possible to summarize these national differences according to two broader rationales: employment vs. social regulation (see table 5 above). Clegg argues that the German and the UK systems can ideal-typically be depicted as a model of ‘minimum income protection as national employment regulation’ (Clegg 2013, p. 68-70). The key functioning of the national minimum income scheme is to …

‘... support the functioning of the (national) labour market by protecting individuals against typical labour market risks. In one sense, this can be seen as the absorption of poverty-related policies by unemployment protection ..., but insofar as the typical labour market risks of post-industrial society go beyond unemployment alone, ... then the target group for these schemes is rather broader than for traditional unemployment protection systems (ibid, p. 69).

This model hence embeds strong connection to employment services and employment policies and a detached order from traditional social work professional or social work case management. The organization of minimum income support in Italy, Poland and Sweden – although highly different – could be depicted as a model of ‘minimum income protection as local social regulation’. The regulation of social risks related to the labour market is done elsewhere. The main function of this model is to reflect local conditions and to uphold local social order, i.e. to make sure that individuals have sufficient financial support to participate in local social and community life – and not directly the labour market. As such, this model if much more in favour of personalized approaches and methods and less standardization of policies and measures.

Elements of inter-agency coordination in national models

The COPE project seeks to analyse the forms and degree to which there is coordination and integration between policy areas of relevance for the active inclusion strategy: adequate income support, inclusive labour markets and services. Based on previous COPE reports (WP5) we can make the following general descriptions of national policy coordination.

The strongest degree of integrated models is found in Germany. The organization of the JobCentres are following the logic of a one-stop-shop model, integrating the decision-making authority over benefits and services under the same roof. Although services are carried out by other actors than the JobCentre agencies, they are closely linked to both provision of benefits as well as activation services of different kinds. Social services are, however, funded by the local authorities and linked to the social services units. In cases where municipalities have the full authority to delivery minimum income benefits we find less integration and more parallel systems. To what degree these models also reflect how integration and actual integrated efforts take place at local levels is an empirical issue.

The UK model seems to resemble some elements from the German model of strong integration. The JobCentrePlus is organized according to an ideal of a one-stop-shop model,
yet including minimum income support and labour market services, only. Other (social) services are delivered and organized by local authorities and not part of the JobCentrePlus. Arguably, the UK model seems to combine integrative efforts as well as clearly separated systems as well as central and local regulation, depending on the issue at stake.

The Swedish model illustrates low levels of formal integration between policy fields and administrative units. The local labour market offices are run and regulated by the central Public Employment Services and although there have been attempts and instances of organizational integration, this is not part of a national strategy. On the contrary, the Swedish system rather demonstrates a two pillar system as there is little formal integration between minimum income schemes and provision and labour market services. Social services in the Swedish case are delivered based on universality and organized by the local authorities.

In Poland, social assistance as well as social services are organized and delivered by the local authorities – like in Sweden. Employment services are, however, organized and governed by central authorities and usually at a higher administrative level than the municipalities. With regard to formal organization, we arguably find several similarities between the Polish and the Swedish model. Yet with regard to extensiveness of activation services and also social services, the countries seem to differ. The Italian model embeds limited forms of inter-agency cooperation at a national level, and above all, as there is limited central regulation of minimum income policies in an Italian context.

These models are tentative and the full width of the models needs to be critically examined in subsequent chapters.
5. Problem pressure in five European countries

The countries included in this report (Germany, Italy, Poland, Sweden and the United Kingdom) all experience different welfare state regime trajectories as well as different forms and degrees of problem pressure with regard to unemployment, poverty and long-term unemployment patterns. They have also distinct reform paths and combinations of coordination in the field of minimum income schemes and are hence characterized by differing traditions in the field of minimum income protection policy. The following discussion will shortly reflect on these national conditions before exploring our five local cases. For a more extensive analysis of key changes in the countries included in the COPE project, we refer to Clegg (2013).

Labour market changes and unemployment patterns

There is much to say about similarities and difference with regard to labour markets and unemployment patterns in the countries included in the COPE project. With regard to labour market regulation, we find that the UK has since 1999 legislated minimum wages and Poland since 1956. Germany, Italy and Sweden belong to those EU member states without a national minimum wage, relying instead on collective agreements to regulate minimum pay rates. When it comes to regulation of permanent employment contracts we find Germany and Italy at one extreme and the UK on the other extreme with a very weak regulation of employment contracts; Sweden can be placed between these extremes. One common path is a dynamic of employment flexibilization in each country, encouraging creativity to go around standard employment relationships and, as in Poland, use in a higher degree atypical and non-standard employment contracts.

Furthermore, these five European welfare states have different configurations with regard to national employment patterns. Sweden has traditionally been one of the countries in a European perspective with the highest employment levels, in relation to the EU-27 as well as in relation to the countries included in the COPE project. However, some of the countries included in the COPE project have undergone extensive changes with regard to labour market participation in the last decade, above all Germany and Poland. The table below summarizes employment changes for selected years for the countries included in the COPE project.

Table 6. Employment rate in COPE countries (selected years).

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>60,9</td>
<td>63,1</td>
<td>69,6</td>
<td>71,5</td>
<td>+11,6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>42,4</td>
<td>48,4</td>
<td>49,5</td>
<td>50,5</td>
<td>+8,1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>54,2</td>
<td>48,4</td>
<td>49,5</td>
<td>57,5</td>
<td>+3,3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>75,3</td>
<td>75,5</td>
<td>75,0</td>
<td>76,8</td>
<td>+1,3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>66,8</td>
<td>68,5</td>
<td>67,9</td>
<td>68,4</td>
<td>+1,6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU-27</td>
<td>57,3</td>
<td>60,0</td>
<td>62,1</td>
<td>62,4</td>
<td>+5,1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Source: EUROSTAT (employment defined as the number of persons aged 20 to 64 in employment by the total population of the same age group.

Whereas several European countries were struck by the financial crisis in 2008, this seems to be a less significant feature for most of the countries included in the COPE project. Germany, Italy and partly Poland have experienced a period of extensive employment growth since the turn of the new Millennium. The UK and Sweden have more or less had similar levels of employment for the last decade.

The percentage of part-timers in the total workforce varies across the countries (see Table 7). Germany, Sweden and the UK have part-time employees more than twice in relation to Poland which is also the only country that has reduced the rates of people working less than full time. In 2004 and 2005 Italy had a rate of part-time employees near the level in Poland, yet the rate increased continuously until 2012. Germany, Sweden and the UK are constantly showing significantly higher levels than EU-27 average.

Table 7. Persons employed part-time – per cent of total employment.

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EU 27</td>
<td>17.2</td>
<td>17.8</td>
<td>18.1</td>
<td>18.2</td>
<td>18.2</td>
<td>18.8</td>
<td>19.3</td>
<td>19.6</td>
<td>20.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>22.3</td>
<td>24.0</td>
<td>25.8</td>
<td>26.1</td>
<td>25.9</td>
<td>26.1</td>
<td>26.2</td>
<td>26.6</td>
<td>26.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td>13.6</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>15.5</td>
<td>17.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>7.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>23.6</td>
<td>24.7</td>
<td>25.1</td>
<td>25.0</td>
<td>26.6</td>
<td>27.0</td>
<td>27.0</td>
<td>26.5</td>
<td>26.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>25.7</td>
<td>25.2</td>
<td>25.3</td>
<td>25.2</td>
<td>25.3</td>
<td>26.1</td>
<td>26.9</td>
<td>26.8</td>
<td>27.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Eurostat.

Part-time employment among women is more prevalent. The differentiation between men and woman with part-time employment is between twice (in Poland), three times (EU-27 and Sweden) and even four times (Italy, Germany and the UK) higher among woman (ibid.).

National unemployment rates follow similar, yet not completely matching trajectories. With some exceptions, the unemployment rate rose steadily in each country in the COPE project over the last five years. In 2012, most of the countries included in the COPE project experienced unemployment levels almost similar to the EU average. Within the group of five countries, Germany strongly deviates from the others as unemployment has decreased significantly for a longer period of time. For instance, in 2009 the unemployment level reached 7.8 per cent in Germany and then continued to decrease to 5.9 per cent in 2011 and 5.5 per cent in 2012. There are several explanations to this, yet one is most likely a greater flexibility of the German labour market introduced by Hartz reforms of the mid-2000s (Clegg 2013). The other four countries included in the COPE project have all witnessed increasing unemployment levels for the last five years.
Table 8. Unemployment rate in COPE countries.

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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>-3.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>6.1</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td>+4.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>+0.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>+1.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>+2.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU-27</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>+3.3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Eurostat. The unemployment rate represents unemployed persons as a percentage of the labour force based on ILO definition. The labour force is the total number of people employed and unemployed. Unemployed persons comprise persons aged 15 to 74 who: i) are without work during the reference week; ii) are available to start work within the next two weeks; iii) and have been actively seeking work in the past four weeks or had already found a job to start within the next three months.

Figure 1. Long-term unemployment as per cent of total unemployment (1995-2010).

Source: Eurostat (LTU defined as 12 months or longer).

The long-term unemployment (unemployed 12 months or more) rate of total unemployment show different patterns across the countries. In the UK, the figures was 43.5 per cent in 1995 and decreased to 20.9 in 2005 to increase up to 32.6 in 2010. These strong variations in levels of long-term unemployment can be found even in Sweden which in 2010 had the lowest rate (17.8 per cent) in our five studied countries and in EU-27. The rate for long-term unemployment in Italy (48.4 per cent) and Germany (48 per cent) was in 2010 considerably above the EU-15 value at 39.9 and considerably above the level in the other three countries.
Another observation from the figure above, is that the post-2008 downturns in EU seems to be affected the levels for long-term unemployment; the rate has increased in each country between 5 and 8 per cent from the late 2008 until 2010. Poland escapes the same negative development but still witnesses an increase in long-term unemployment of just over 2 per cent under the same period of time.

**Social protection, poverty and social assistance**

The countries included in the COPE project belong to different welfare state regimes and have hence also different configurations with regard to degrees of social expenditure, as well as types of spending.

Based on existing Eurostat data one can conclude that Sweden and Poland stand for extreme positions regarding expenditure for social protection as per cent of the countries own GDP. The Swedish welfare state is often characterized as ‘universal’, that is, built on extensive social protection systems and a wide spread umbrella of social welfare services. Job-seeking, labour market training and childcare services are accessible for everyone irrespective of labour market status and affiliation to benefit scheme. Most of these income schemes and support structures are funded, administered and regulated by the state and/or regional and local governments (Angelin et al. 2013) which can explain that the total expenditure on social protection in Sweden range over 29 per cent while Poland spends about 19 per cent of the country’s GDP on social protection.

Table 9. Social Protection as per cent GDP, 2006 – 2011.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2011</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>29.0</td>
<td>27.8</td>
<td>28.0</td>
<td>31.5</td>
<td>30.6</td>
<td>29.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>26.6</td>
<td>26.6</td>
<td>27.7</td>
<td>29.9</td>
<td>29.9</td>
<td>29.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>19.4</td>
<td>18.1</td>
<td>18.6</td>
<td>19.2</td>
<td>19.2</td>
<td>19.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>30.3</td>
<td>29.2</td>
<td>29.5</td>
<td>32.0</td>
<td>30.4</td>
<td>29.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>25.6</td>
<td>24.7</td>
<td>25.8</td>
<td>28.6</td>
<td>27.4</td>
<td>27.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Poland, which exemplifies an Eastern European welfare state, can be described as a welfare system in transition (Kazepov 2010, see below for more detailed discussion on the actual representation of Poland as a country in transition). Poland has undergone dramatic changes since 1989 when the country left the communist system striving to become a part of the European Union. One important change was aimed towards deeply institutional and structural changes trying to reform social policies towards well develop European welfare states.

Somewhere in-between these two cases we find Germany, Italy and the UK, each country representing different developed welfare states in an European context. The size of the gap in total expenditure on social protection between Sweden and Germany is less than 2 per cent. Italy and the UK, with 25 per cent respectively 24 per cent are close to the expenditure profile
for Germany. It is noteworthy that the expenditure for social protection is, across the countries, dominated by costs for health and pensions (see below).

However, these five countries have in the last decades faced growing pressure on means-tested provision for people of working-age due to generally similar changes in social protection institutions, in the regulation and operation of the labour market and in changing patterns of family formation.

Figure 2. Social Protection as per cent GDP (2007).

![Social Protection as per cent GDP (2007)](image)


One common challenge which affects the system of minimum income protection among people of working age in each of our five countries, is the retrenchment of unemployment insurance. With the exception of Italy, where reforms in the 1990s enhanced the generosity of unemployment benefits, yet an improvement from a very low base, the other four countries had similar trends of reduce generosity and restricted accessibility to unemployment protection (Clegg 2013). Even Sweden, a country with high universalistic ambitions described as the social democratic welfare system (Esping-Andersen 1990), the archetypal welfare state (Svallfors 2004, Kangas & Palme 2005), has in the last years developed an unemployment insurance system which is less generous than the OECD average regarding replacement rates (Angelin et al. 2013). But before addressing issues of minimum income replacement and coverage, we need to shortly reflect on issues relating to poverty (see table 10).
The table demonstrates the incidence of poverty in the five countries, compared to EU-27 average. What stands out with regard to comparing these five countries is the extraordinary development that Poland has undergone in recent years. From being a country experiencing extensive levels of poverty in a European comparison, it is now a country which has poverty levels of a European average. The most significant contribution to these changes regards the sharp decline of the population experiencing severe material deprivation. Another important reflection that needs to be made regards the development in Italy, and above all with regard to severe material deprivation, which just recently have increased considerably: from 6.3 percent in 2006 to 14.5 percent in 2012.


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>2012</th>
<th>2006-2012 (% difference)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>People suffering from social exclusion (three indicators combined)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<tr>
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<td>27.8</td>
<td>27.2</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>25.3</td>
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<td>24.5</td>
<td>28.2</td>
<td>30.4</td>
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</tr>
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<td>14.9</td>
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<td>15.0</td>
<td>16.1</td>
<td>18.2</td>
<td>+1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
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<td>23.2</td>
<td>22.0</td>
<td>23.2</td>
<td>22.7</td>
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<td>-1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU-27</td>
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<td>23.7</td>
<td>23.2</td>
<td>23.7</td>
<td>24.3</td>
<td>24.3</td>
<td>-1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People at risk of poverty (60 per cent median income, percentage of population)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>15.2</td>
<td>15.2</td>
<td>15.5</td>
<td>15.6</td>
<td>15.8</td>
<td>16.1</td>
<td>+3.6</td>
</tr>
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<td>18.7</td>
<td>18.4</td>
<td>18.2</td>
<td>19.6</td>
<td>19.8</td>
<td>+0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>18.7</td>
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<td>18.2</td>
<td>19.6</td>
<td>19.8</td>
<td>+0.2</td>
</tr>
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<td>Sweden</td>
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<td>12.2</td>
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<td>12.9</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>14.2</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>The UK</td>
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<td>18.7</td>
<td>17.3</td>
<td>17.1</td>
<td>16.2</td>
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<td>-2.8</td>
</tr>
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<td>UK-27</td>
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<td>16.5</td>
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<td>16.4</td>
<td>16.9</td>
<td>17.1</td>
<td>+0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Severe material deprivation (percentage of population, see Eurostat for definition)</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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</tr>
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<td>17.7</td>
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<td>1.3</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1.3</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>The UK</td>
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<td>4.5</td>
<td>3.3</td>
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<td>5.1</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>+0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK-27</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>+0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People living in households with very low work intensity (percent of population, see Eurostat for definition)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
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<td>9.0</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>-0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
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<td>7.9</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>6.8</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>5.4</td>
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<td>5.9</td>
<td>6.8</td>
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<td>+3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The UK</td>
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<td>10.4</td>
<td>12.6</td>
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<td>11.5</td>
<td>--</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK-27</td>
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<td>9.7</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>-0.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Eurostat.
The changes observed in the table above need further analysis, yet are nevertheless important background data for our analyses of how local authorities have handled issues relating to poverty and active inclusion policies.

When it comes to minimum income provision and above all social assistance schemes, Italy is the only country without a general nationally regulated social assistance scheme. Instead, the social assistance field is administrated through a complex and non-transparent ways. Germany and the UK have a complex institutional system to manage social assistance schemes with differentiations between claimant categories. In contrast, Sweden and Poland do not use a high level of claimants’ categories. Poland has two minimum income schemes: one permanent for claimants who are not able to work (due to old age, disability or family responsibilities) and one temporary for people living in short-term poverty (Clegg 2013). In Sweden, the social assistance scheme guarantee that individual residents receive the support and assistance to ensure a reasonable standard of living; the benefits are not targeted according to categorical definitions (Angelin et al. 2013).

To some extent, these institutional differences are reflected in the size of national social assistance systems, e.g. in relation to the share of the working-age population who receive minimum income benefits varies considerably between the countries accordingly to the figure 3. Poland and Sweden reflects a separate group of with Sweden which has the lowest share of people from the working-age population receiving minimum income benefits, namely slightly more than 2 per cent followed by Poland with 3 per cent. These figures can be compared to Germany with more than 11 per cent and the UK with almost 9 per cent of the working-age population reliant on minimum income benefits. The share in the UK is even higher reaching 16 per cent if we take into account tax credits also (income-related cash transfers paid to working people through the tax system rather than as benefits); we do not have reliable data for minimum income benefits in Italy (Clegg 2013).
Figure 3. Minimum income provision, per cent of working age population (20-64 years).


If we explore the link between poverty and unemployment a partly different pattern emerge with regard to coverage rate for unemployed people.

Figure 4. Poverty Rates, per cent of population and unemployed population, 2007.

Source: Eurostat; Poverty = <60% Median Income (Clegg 2013).
The gap in poverty between unemployed population and the population as a whole is highest in the UK (43 per cent) and Germany (37 per cent) while in Sweden is lowest (18 per cent). The differential in poverty rates is on the same level in Poland and in Italy (25 per cent) which follows the same pattern as for EU-27 average.

Also when it comes to in-work poverty we find variation between the countries. We already explained that there is no national minimum wage in Germany, Italy and Sweden, instead wages are set by collective bargaining. On the other hand, the UK have legislated minimum wages since 1999, and Poland since 1956. However, in Sweden, in-work poverty is not considered a major problem. Therefore, no specific policies have therefore been launched to reduce the number of the working poor. Sweden, the UK and Germany had in 2009 the same rate for working poor, namely 7 per cent. Poland is the country that stands out. Even if Poland had a positive development during the last years – from 14 per cent in 2007 to 11 per cent in 2011 and increased to almost 12 per cent in 2012 - still shows the highest rates regarding working poor.

**Summary**

The discussion above situates our local cases in different national contexts. The countries included in the COPE project are analytically located in different welfare state regime typologies, also reflected in the level and type of social expenditure. ‘Belonging’ to a Social democratic regime typology, Sweden has the highest levels of social expenditure followed closely by Germany, Italy and the UK. There is then a considerable gap to Poland when it comes to levels of social expenditure.

The discussion above also demonstrates some key background data with regard to employment and unemployment conditions, and here we find different national trajectories in recent years. Most of the countries included in the COPE project have improved levels of employment in recent years. This is certainly a fact in Germany, Poland and Italy, yet less to in the UK and above all in Sweden (yet having much higher levels of employment at the starting point for the comparison). Moreover, unemployment is increasing in all countries over the last five years, except for Germany. The rise has been most evident in Italy in which we find a sharper increase in unemployment levels than for the EU-27 average. Also in Sweden, the UK and Poland unemployment levels have increased since 2007. The development is the reverse in Germany, which have witnessed significantly decreasing unemployment levels over the last five years. Long-term unemployment patterns follow almost similar pathways, however in Germany; long-term unemployment is still a major challenge and seems to remain on fairly high levels, despite decreasing unemployment and rising employment levels. The most remarkable shift with regard to long-term unemployment has occurred in Poland, sharply decreasing since the Millennium shift.

The discussion above has also addressed issues relating to poverty and social exclusion, analyzing the three main variables developed by the Eurostat to measure poverty and at risk of poverty and social exclusion, linked to the EU 2020 strategy. With regard to these
indicators we find the most interesting and also sharp differences among the countries included in the COPE project.

Starting with the indicator on relative poverty, we notice that Poland, the UK and Italy have more or less the same poverty levels of approx. 19 percent (in 2006). Since then these figures have remained fairly stable in Poland and Italy, yet been slowly decreasing in the UK. We find a different trajectory with regard to Sweden and Germany. In these two countries levels of relative poverty were much lower in 2006/2007 of approx. 12 percent, yet have since then increased more significantly, above all in Germany, less so in Sweden.

These more moderate changes stand in sharp contrast to changes regarding indicators relating to notions of ‘absolute poverty’. Using the Eurostat indicator of material deprivation, we can identify extensive different between the COPE countries. Whereas the UK, Germany and Italy had fairly low levels of material deprivation before the crisis started (that is in 2006/2007) of approx. 4-6 percent, they have since then departed pathways. In Italy they levels of material deprivation have more than doubled in only five years and is now at a level of 14.5 percent (2012). The situation in Germany and the UK has more or less remained stable with regard to issues of material deprivation. The Polish development is completely different. Starting from extremely high levels of material deprivation (in a European context) of approx. 27 per cent (almost three times the EU-27 average) in 2006, these levels have decreased considerably (14 per cent in five years) and are now lower than the figures for Italy. Severe material deprivation has remained and still remains very low in a Swedish context.

These general labour market and poverty indicators give rise to the following general conclusions regarding national trajectories and problem pressures on national and local minimum income schemes and related services. Poland has undergone a quick transformation – it appears – from being a country having much higher levels of unemployment and poverty in a European context, to a position similar to a European average. Italy seems to be entering into a challenging phase for national and local minimum income protection, primarily materialized in the sharply increasing levels of material deprivation in only a few years. Sweden is coming from a favourable position, yet is more and more ‘adjusting’ to a European average in terms of slowly increasing unemployment and also levels of poverty, above all then relative poverty. Germany seems to retain the positive development it started at the beginning of the new Millennium. The development in the UK does not stand out in the context of the COPE countries and follows more or less similar trajectories as the Swedish welfare state, yet from lower ‘worse’ starting positions. These short reflections frame the following discussion which will focus on local problem pressures in the cities chosen for local comparisons.
6. Local problem pressure in five European cities

In this section, we provide a description and brief analysis of the population patterns, employment levels, unemployment rates and poverty and social assistance indicators in five cities in the COPE project, Dortmund, Turin, Radom, Malmö and Glasgow. These cities find themselves in countries with different welfare and labour market traditions and regimes. In order to understand the municipalities’ context, we will provide in the beginning of this section an overview of the problem pressures bearing on minimum income protection in those five countries which our targeted cities belong to: Germany, Italy, Poland, Sweden and the United Kingdom. The aim is hence to analyze the dynamics and varieties with focus on multilevel governance and multi-stakeholders perspective in combating poverty at local level in five European municipalities: Dortmund, Turin, Radom, Malmö and Glasgow. Each municipality has a history of high poverty, long-term unemployment rates and social exclusion in a national context. These municipalities have undergone industrial restructuring and are characterized by social innovation in combating poverty.

Patterns of industrial reconstruction

Each of the cities included in the COPE project share a history of industrial reconstruction, which will be elaborated below. The city of Dortmund is a major city in the Ruhr Area and has a strong industrial tradition that dates back to the beginning of the industrialization in the 19th century. Due to the landmark structural changes in the past decades, Dortmund faced severe problems over the past 40 years. The first layoffs in the mining industry took place in 1958 and the last coal-mine in Dortmund was closed down in 1987. From 1960 to 1994, the number of employees in the industry dropped from 127,000 to less than 38,000. By today, Dortmund has lost about 90,000 jobs in the cause of these developments. Nevertheless, the City has been able to cope with the economic and social consequences of these structural changes. From the very beginning of the structural changes, there was a broad consensus in Dortmund between political, economic and social actors in the public as well as in the third sector to call for joint actions. Dortmund is characterized by creative social and employment policies (Spannagel 2013).

Turin is one of the major Italian cities. After World War II, it became a major European crossroad for industry, commerce and trade and is currently one of Italian main industrial centers, being part of the “industrial triangle”, along with Milan and Genoa. The history and the development of Turin are very closely linked with Fiat, the most important automotive industry in Italy. Fiat become the symbol of Italy’s miraculous economic boom and Turin experienced the most large growth rates of any Italian city during the post-war period. This led to a situation in which the city became economically and socially dependent on its major “employer” and when the global oil shock of early 1970s emerged Fiat’s crisis determined also a very severe crisis for Turin itself. From the 1990s onwards Turin has undergone a process of industrial restructuring. It aimed at shifting from an industrial area towards a service/tertiary sector. This transformation has produced a diversified labor demand specialized not only in the area of transportation (cars, aircraft and space transport), but also finance (insurance and pension funds), ICT (software and telecommunications) and
knowledge (research and culture). However, Turin has been experiencing a prolonged period of economic stagnation in all the main economic indicators, which precedes the recent economic crisis. Since 2008, the crisis has exacerbated the economic difficulties already present and has rapidly deteriorated the economic situation, with deep consequences in the labor market. From mid-2000s is characterized by social innovation in combating poverty (Maino & Zamboni 2013).

Radom is a medium-sized city in Poland and is nowadays a typical post-industrial city in a Polish context. In the past, Radom was a poor working-class city and a part of the Central Industrial Area. The workers revolted in June 1976 against increase in food prices. This protest and accompanying urban unrest were brutally suppressed by the communist authorities. Judicial proceedings associated with it had given political dissidents an opportunity for consolidation and greater public actions in the following years. Since the beginning of 1990s, the City experienced the collapse of big industrial companies (e.g. military equipment factory). Radom has been experiencing very high unemployment and poverty; however the City is currently under the economic restructuring. The process is strongly supported by the city authorities trying to use a very large potential of NGOs to solve the problem of social exclusion, which is innovative as far as the rest of Poland is concerned. Radom is looking for its own ways to combat poverty due to the sense of uniqueness of the political and economic position within the Mazovia region (Kozek, Kubisa & Zieleńska 2013).

Malmö is a city located in the Southern parts of Sweden and was one of the most industrialized cities throughout Scandinavia. However, since the 1970s it has undergone a process of labour market transformation. Large shipping companies, manufacturing in textile, businesses were closed down rapidly and the number of jobs decreased quickly. The process of industrial reconstruction had started at the late 1970s, yet the early 1990s marked a more significant shift in a gradual transformation of the local labour market. Malmo’s main industry sectors now include environmentally friendly technology, logistics, retail and wholesale trade, media and service industries. One key factor is the establishment of the local University (25,000 students) founded in 1998. Malmö has increasingly adjusted and tried to change its image and nowadays describes itself as a ‘city of knowledge’. Malmö is featuring a history of high poverty, long-term unemployment rates and social exclusion in a national context and the municipality is characterized by social innovation in combating poverty (Panican et al. 2013).

Like the four other cities included in the COPE project, Glasgow experienced major changes in employment levels and labour market opportunities. Since the onset of industrial decline throughout the UK, but specifically in the manufacturing sector during the 1980s and early 1990s, Glasgow has experienced an increase in long-term unemployment and inequality and scored continually highly on deprivation indicators. While unemployment rates have reduced over time and there has been a concerted effort to increase employment levels in the city, issues around poverty and inequality remain. Glasgow was not particularly affected by the first half of the downturn in 2008/2009, yet in 2009/2012 it dropped noticeably from the 4th to the 28th in the ranking of UK cities and is currently facing a number of recession related
labour market issues. These issues are compounding the issues of poverty, deprivation and inequality in a post-industrial city which has a history of unemployment and labour market detachment for many of its residents. Glasgow is innovative regarding strategic approach to managing economic development, regeneration, city-wide employment strategies and policy making for poverty alleviation (Bennett & Clegg 2013).

**Population trends in the five cities**

The following section will shortly analyze demographic elements of the cities included in the COPE project.

*Dortmund* is a large city in a German context, albeit not one of the largest. It has slightly less than 600,000 inhabitants and has experienced a slightly decreasing population trend in recent years. The process of population decline started in the 1970s as a reflection of local structural changes. Nevertheless, Dortmund is still the 8th biggest city in Germany (Spannagel 2013). Like many other German cities, Dortmund is affected by a typical aging process. Between 2000 and 2011, the share of children (0-17 years) decreased slightly to figures a bit lower than 16 per cent. The number of citizens aged 18-39 also fell, whereas the share of people older than 40 increased. Taken together, about two third of the inhabitants are working-aged (15-64) (Spannagel 2013). Dortmund has also a fairly high share of migrants. Over the past decade, the percentage of foreign citizens in Dortmund was rather constant by slightly less than 13 per cent. The number of EU-foreigners rose markedly over the last ten years, from about 2 per cent in 2000 to almost 4 per cent in 2011. At the same time, the shares of Turkish citizens, the largest non-EU population, fell steadily from 5 per cent to 4 per cent. Nevertheless, they still are the largest foreign community in Dortmund. Regarding ethnic composition of the migrants living in Dortmund, in 2012 more than 23 per cent were Turks. The second largest community is the Polish with a share of almost 22 per cent. The migrants live very concentrated in a few districts; mainly in the Northern City District (Nordstadt) (ibid.).

*Turin* is the 4th biggest Italian city after Rome, Milan and Naples. In 2012, the population stood at 911,823. However, Turin has undergone extensive changes with regard to population patterns. In 1974 it was reached the maximum number of inhabitants (1 202 846), after which began a long period of decline that ended in 2002, when there was the lowest level since the fifties (896,918). In the last decade, the population has stabilized at around 900,000 inhabitants and demographic dynamics showed three major trends: (i) the growing number of immigrants which has helped to mitigate the decline in births, (ii) the stabilization of residents in the City, after a period of emigration towards the metropolitan area and other municipalities in the rest of the province and (iii) the progressive aging of the population. In 2012, foreign residents were 142,191, which represented 15.6 per cent of total population of Turin. Between 2000 and 2012 the percentage of immigrants on resident population increased almost than four times and now it is one of the highest among the Italian cities. In particular, the foreign nationality in municipality of Turin is Romanian, followed by Peruvian, Moroccan and Chinese.
The Polish city of Radom is the smallest city in the COPE project (220,000 people). The population has been fairly stable during the last decade, yet slowly decreasing. Population loss can mainly be explained by a re-ruralisation process connected with the search for a better quality of life in the countryside for people holding stable income and jobs (Kozek, Kubisa & Zieleńska 2013). Radom has a small ethnic diversity, foreigners constituted only 0.1-0.2 per cent of the workforce in 2005-2010 and a small Roma community (ibid.).

The city of Malmö is the third largest city in Sweden with more than 300,000 inhabitants. However, local demographic patterns have changed considerably over the last decades. Malmö was up until the 1970s a city occupied by large industries and had been a local feature since industrialization started to expand in Sweden from the late 20th century. Due to urbanization, as well as possibilities to get work in local industries, the number of inhabitants in Malmö grew steadily and peaked in the beginning of the 1970s as the local population amounted to 265,000 people. As Sweden in general and Malmö in particular was struck by the oil crises and greater international competition in the manufacturing industry, a period of population decrease erupted. From the early 1970s and until the mid-1980s Malmö lost more than 35,000 inhabitants, approximately 13 per cent of the City’s population. This decline came to a stop at the late 1980s and since then the population have steadily increased with a very high speed. According to recent Eurostat data, Malmö is one of the quickest growing cities (in terms of size of population) throughout Europe and during the last years the population have grown with about two per cent annually. There seem to be different reasons for these changing population trends: (i) changes in local infrastructure (and above the construction of a bridge between Malmö and Copenhagen) opened up for Malmö becoming a regional centre in Southern Sweden, (ii) like many other Swedish cities, the local University has expanded tremendously which has contributed to both short-term and long-term population growth and (iii) during the last two decades, Malmö become one of the main cities for foreign born individuals to seek refugee status and to settle down in Sweden (Panican et al. 2013).

These patterns, combined with a general population growth in Sweden and urbanization patterns, implies that more people than ever live in the City of Malmö and also that Malmö has one of the youngest population cohorts in Sweden. The share of people in the age group 16-44 was in 2011 almost 45 per cent; a clear majority (67 per cent) of the inhabitants in Malmö were in the working-age (age 16-64) (ibid.). One of the most obvious demographic changes concerns the number of foreign born, illustrated in table 11. Recent calculations indicate that Malmö has residents from more than 170 different nationalities. The two main groups are people from Iraq (a major immigrant groups throughout the 1990s amounting to almost 11,000 people) followed by Danish, at present just over 9,000 residents (ibid.).

The last of our cases is the city of Glasgow, which is the largest city in Scotland and the 4th largest city in the UK. From 2001-2011 there has been an overall small increase in the population of Glasgow by 20,000 people. In total in 2011 there were 598,800 residents in Glasgow, with over 420,000 people of working age. This increase in population reflects an increase in the working age population of approximately 40,000 people over the time period (Bennett & Clegg 2013). In Glasgow has been a slight change in the ethnic composition
during the last decade. The majority (87.23 per cent) are identified as White Scottish, British or Irish which is a decrease from 92.76 per cent in 2001. A further 4.2 per cent of individuals are recorded (in a report from Glasgow City Council Development and Regeneration Services department) as ‘other white’ in 2010, an increase from 1.79 per cent in 2001. The rise in other white population is due to an increase in residents from other European countries. In 2001 the Black and Minority Ethnic (BME) population was recorded as 31,510 representing 5.45 per cent of the population of Glasgow City. By 2010 this had grown to 50,793, or 8.57 per cent of the population. Pakistani residents comprise the majority of this BME group. It is anticipated that the forthcoming population and demographic data will demonstrate an increase in ethnic minority figures for the City including a growth in Roma and Asylum seeking numbers (ibid.).

Table 11. Population trends in COPE cities.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Dortmund</th>
<th>Turin</th>
<th>Radom</th>
<th>Malmö</th>
<th>Glasgow</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Size in national context</td>
<td>8th</td>
<td>4th</td>
<td>Medium-sized</td>
<td>3rd</td>
<td>4th</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>largest city in Germany</td>
<td>largest city in Italy</td>
<td>city in Poland</td>
<td>largest city in Sweden</td>
<td>largest city in the UK.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of inhabitants</td>
<td>580,000</td>
<td>911,823</td>
<td>220,000</td>
<td>300,000</td>
<td>598,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population change</td>
<td>Minor decline during the last decade</td>
<td>Extensive pop. decline since mid-1970s</td>
<td>Minor decline during the last decade</td>
<td>Ongoing population growth during the last decade</td>
<td>Minor population growth during last decade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population structure</td>
<td>Partly increasing people of working age (esp. 40-64)</td>
<td>Partly decreasing population of working age</td>
<td>Decreasing population of working age</td>
<td>Partly increasing population of working age</td>
<td>Increasing population of working age</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Share foreign born of population</td>
<td>Approx. 13 per cent</td>
<td>Approx. 15-16 per cent</td>
<td>Approx. 0.1-0.2 per cent of the working population</td>
<td>More than 40 per cent of population</td>
<td>Approx. 10 per cent</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The discussion above indicated both similarities and differences between the five cities included in the COPE project. Turin, Malmö and Glasgow can be considered as large cities in their national contexts while Dortmund and Radom are medium-sized municipalities. However, this classification of cities can be problematized. Dortmund, as medium-sized municipalities with 580,000 inhabitants may prove to have a more institutional complexity compared with Malmö, a large city in Sweden with 300,000 people. When it comes to patterns of population change, Dortmund, Radom and Turin have a decline in population size. The two first named cities have a decline by 10,000 under the last decade but once again, Dortmund is almost three times larger by population compared with Radom which makes the decline less important in Dortmund. More essential is the fact that the working populations declined by 6 per cent in Radom. In Turin, the population reduction is substantial; since 1974 the population decreased by 25 per cent largely dependent on the industrial restructuration emerged from 1970s determined in the first hand by Fiat’s crisis. Furthermore, Turin has a progressive aging of the population. The age group 64+ increases while the age group 25-44
decrease. Malmö has had a population growth under the last decade with about two per cent annually which make this municipality to one of the quickest growing cities in Europe. In the same time, Malmö has one of the youngest population cohorts in Sweden with a majority of population in the working-age; yet, the City continues to have high poverty, long-term unemployment rates and social exclusion in a national context. Even Glasgow has an overall increase in the population. However, the increase is modestly compared with other cities of the same size and is one of the UK’s slowest-growing cities. Nevertheless, over the last decade, the working-age population has gradually increased.

When it comes to ethnic composition, the share of foreign born across the municipalities varies very much. Dortmund and Turin can be described as having a mid-range ethnic diversity. The share of the foreign-born population in the total population is 13 per cent in Dortmund and 15.6 per cent in Turin which place these municipalities in the middle of our data values in this study. Glasgow and Radom have a low ethnic diversity. If we judged from our data that the foreigners constituted only 0.1-0.2 per cent of the workforce in Radom in 2005-2010, than this municipality have hardly any ethnic diversity. That can be compared with Malmö which in our study is placed on the other extreme. Malmö, a municipality with high ethnic diversity has 40.8 per cent inhabitants with a foreign background (the largest community from foreign born has non-European origin); since 2006, the group of foreign born accounted for a major part of local population increase in Malmö.

**Employment trends in five European cities**

In this section, we introduce both local employment and unemployment patterns with focus on the last ten years. We intend to present even local long-term unemployment patterns and unemployment situation for the three target groups in this report (SM, LU and WP).

Figure 5. Employment rates (per cent) of working age population (15-64 years) in Dortmund and Germany 2001-2012.

![Employment rates](image)

Source: Spannagel (2013)

The development of the employment figures in the city of Dortmund departed from 55.8 per cent in 2004 and rose steadily up to 66 per cent in 2008. After a slight decline down to 63.3
per cent in 2010 the figures rise again to 64.8 in 2012. If we compare this development to the nation-wide employment figures (see Figure 5), we can state that both run parallel. However, the employment rates in Dortmund are on average four to eight percentage points lower than the German average (Spannagel 2013).

A similar pattern emerges as we focus on issues relating to unemployment patterns (see table 12 below). Previous sections demonstrated that for Germany in general unemployment fell considerably over the last years and above all since the start of the new Millennium. Also unemployment levels in Dortmund have fallen, yet from significantly higher levels than for Germany in general. On average, the unemployment rates are about 5 percentage points higher than the nation-wide figures.

Table 12. Unemployment in Dortmund 2005-2012 in per cent of the civilian labour force.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total no of unemployed</th>
<th>Unemployment rate1</th>
<th>Total no of LTU</th>
<th>LTU-rate</th>
<th>LTU-rate in % of all unemployed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>49,882</td>
<td>18.1</td>
<td>22,651</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>45.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>48,324</td>
<td>17.1</td>
<td>27,211</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>56.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>40,110</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>19,829</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>49.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>38,753</td>
<td>13.8</td>
<td>18,121</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>46.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>37,517</td>
<td>13.1</td>
<td>16,038</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>42.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>37,144</td>
<td>13.1</td>
<td>15,864</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>42.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>36,258</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>15,998</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>44.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>37,583</td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td>16,062</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>42.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Spannagel (2013).

In Dortmund, the number of unemployed persons fell markedly since 2005, i.e. since the unemployment assistance scheme ALG II scheme was introduced as part of the Hartz Reforms. The figures dropped constantly since 2005 by more than 10,000 persons down to about 36,000 in 2011. The figures show a slight rise from 2011 to 2012. Dortmund still exhibits the second highest unemployment rates among the 15 biggest German cities (Spannagel 2013).

When looking at the figures for long-term unemployment we can state that they develop quite parallel to the unemployment rates. The figures decreased significantly between 2005 and 2011 and slightly rise in 2012. In 2012, 16,062 persons were long-term unemployed in Dortmund. That is 6,500 persons less than in 2005. Despite this positive development, Dortmund has a severe problem not only with unemployment in general but especially with long-term unemployment. This becomes obvious when one out of two unemployed persons in Dortmund faces unemployment for more than 12 months. In 2006, the share of long-term unemployed among all unemployed even exceeded 56 per cent.

If we turn to two of the target groups of the COPE project, working poor and single parents, we note that the share of working poor is on the rise (from 2.7 per cent in 2007 to 5.7 per cent in 2012), while the number of unemployed single parents is declining slightly (from 1.3 per cent in 2007 to almost 1.1 per cent in 2012) (Spannagel 2013).
Employment patterns in the city of Turin needs to be depicted both in relation to a national average as well as in relation to a regional average. Compared to the North region in Italy, the province of Turin presents employment rates relatively lower (e.g. 63.3 per cent) than North East with 66 per cent in 2012. Between 2008 and 2012 there has been a decrease of 25,390 employed in the province of Turin, which still a recovery from 2004 with 45,546 employees (Maino & Zamboni 2013). However, in the Turin area, unemployment has steadily increased in the last seven years and even more than doubled in 2012 (9.8 per cent) compared with 2006 (4.1 per cent). The situation has worsened particularly in Turin metropolitan area (see Table 13), where there has been one of the most consistent worsening levels of unemployment in Italy. In the province of Turin, unemployment is hitting hardest females (10.8 per cent in 2012 compared to 8.6 per cent of Northern area and 8 per cent of Milan) and young people (33.9 per cent in 2012 compared to 26.6 per cent of Northern area and 28.7 per cent of Milan) (ibid.).

Table 13. Unemployment rates in Italy and a comparison between Provinces of Turin, Genoa and Milan in per cent (2007-2012).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>2012</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>10.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North-East</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>6.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North-West</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>8.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Province of Turin</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>9.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Province of Genoa</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>7.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Province of Milan</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>7.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Previous sections demonstrated that Poland in general experienced a period of improving labour market indicators, e.g. employment and unemployment. However, it has proven difficult or even impossible to collect labour market data with regard to the Poviat of Radom. Thus, only statistics for the Radomski sub-region (NUTS 3) will be presented in this section. The employment rate in the sub-region Radomski increased markedly in years 2003-2011 (from 57 to 66 per cent). However, the discrepancies between genders persist: in 2011 the employment rate for women reach 59.7 per cent and for men 71.3 per cent. The employment rate in Radomski was higher than the average for Poland in the years 1997-2011 (Kozek, Kubisa & Zieleńska 2013). The region experienced high unemployment from the very beginning of the transformation in 1990s. The number of people registered as unemployed in local PES dropped markedly in years 2002-2012 – from almost 28,000 to approximately 21,100. Registered unemployment rate dropped from 28.2 per cent in 2004 to 19.5 per cent in 2008 and increased gradually to 22.6 per cent in 2012. Unemployment rate in the years 2004-2012 for the City of Radom remained significantly higher (between 9-10 per cent higher) than the national average (ibid.). Moreover, long-term unemployment is a serious social problem in Radom. In 2012, the population of the long-term unemployed people who registered in the local PES amounted to 9,550, among which 5,234 had been out of work for more than 24 months. The share of the long-term unemployed dropped in the years 2003-2012, from 60 to 45 per cent. The greatest drop was observed in the number of those unemployed for over 24 months.
Employment patterns in the Swedish city of Malmö are remarkable in a national context. The statistical information illustrates two important issues. First, that Malmö’s local labour market trends follow similar patterns as the country in general, however that Malmö never really recovered from the fall of the industrial era and second that local labour market participation constantly lies on approximately 11 to 14 per cent less than the national average. This marks out extensive problem pressure mounting on the City of Malmö over the last years (Panican et al. 2013).

Unemployment has been a constant challenge in Malmö and above all so at the beginning of the 1990s. Local term industrial restructuration, demographic changes and a major influx of immigrants combined with the national crisis constituted major challenges for the local labour market and as the crisis peaked, Malmö had Sweden’s highest unemployment rate in the year of 1995 as 15.3 per cent of the population aged 16-64 was unemployed and 20.2 per cent for 18-24 years old. Local unemployment levels then declined until the beginning of the new Millennium and remained stable as approximately 9 per cent of the population. The local unemployment levels remained fairly stable for a series of years but increased to almost 12 per cent in 2005 (15-74 years old). The Table 14 compares the unemployment level in Malmö to two other major cities as well as to the national average (Panican et al 2013).

Table 14. Unemployment in the age group 15-74, three main cities and national average (2005-2012).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Malmö</th>
<th>Gothenburg</th>
<th>Stockholm</th>
<th>National average</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>11.8</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>7.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>7.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>6.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>6.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>8.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>8.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>7.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>7.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Following the table, local unemployment patterns in the city of Malmö follow similar patterns as for the country in general, yet that Malmö’s unemployment rate is significantly higher than Gothenburg, Stockholm and the national average (excepting Gothenburg for 2010 when the unemployment was slightly higher than in Malmö) (Panican et al. 2013). With regard to long-term unemployment, this has been even higher and in 2012 the LTU rate (more than twelve months) was 37 per cent (among the unemployed population aged 16-64) (ibid.). Every fifth person from long-term unemployed individuals in the same age group has been jobless for more than two consecutive years (Malmö City Employment 2012). Previous studies furthermore demonstrate a fairly large part of the population as being working poor in the City of Malmö. Salonen (2012) for instance found that 29 730 individuals or 17.1 per cent of population (aged 18-64) had an income related to work or study which was lower than the threshold for income poverty for the year 2008. Working poor is, however, neither a targeted group in national reforms nor in local reforms. There is also highly limited research on this group in Swedish context (Panican et al. 2013).
Turning to employment situation in Glasgow, statistical sources estimate that 284,900 individuals were economically active in 2012, representing 67.8 per cent of the working age population (aged 16-64). This figure is lower than for Scotland in general (76.9 per cent) or for the UK (76.0 per cent). Of the economically active population 251,200 were in employment. The economic activity rate represents an estimate of the number of individuals which are engaged in the labour market, whether employed or seeking work. Of those considered economically active in 2012, 60 per cent of the total working age population was recorded as in employment which can be compared with 63 per cent in 2005 and 65 per cent in 2008. Unemployment peaked in 1992 when the numbers of individuals claiming unemployment benefit reached nearly 50,000. While this figure has reduced over time and there has been a concerted effort to increase employment levels in Glasgow, issues around poverty and inequality remain. The unemployment rate has risen from 6.5 per cent in 2008 to approximately 12 per cent of the economically active working age population by 2012. Whilst 66 per cent of claimants of Jobseekers Allowance (JSA) in April 2003 had been claiming for less than 6 months, this figure had declined gradually over the past ten years to now stand at only 51 per cent by 2013. As such, not only has the number of JSA claimants increased, but there has also been an increase in the number of individuals claiming JSA for longer. The figure for individual claiming JSA for 6 to 12 month has been around 19 per cent between 2003 and 2013 and for more than 12 month 10 per cent in 2003 and 15 per cent in 2013.

Turning to the issue of LTU we find that only 4 per cent of JSA recipients claimed benefits continually for over 2 years in April 2004. However, a decade later (April 2013) this figure stood at 15 per cent of all JSA claimants (claiming for over 2 years). In absolute numbers this implies an increase of long-term recipients (claiming JSA for more than 2 years), growing from 925 people in April 2004 to 3,620 in April 2013. It is important to notice that at no other point in time during the last ten years, this figure has reached such levels. Moreover, Glasgow also has a large 'inactive' population who are in receipt of health related benefits and are not always classified as unemployed (but they are targets to be 'activated' in the Work Programme.) To conclude, when combining these groups, approx. 45 per cent of the city’s working-age population is out of the labour market in April 2013 (Bennett & Clegg 2013).

It is a challenge to summarize employment data for the five local cities, yet based on the local reports in the COPE project the following pattern emerges. The table below demonstrates certain gaps between un/employment data for our five local cases and national averages. This is particularly evident in the City of Malmö, yet also Dortmund and Glasgow. The difference appears to be less significant in the cities of Radom and Turin. Moreover, each municipality in our study is facing extensive problem pressure (see Table 15). With the exception of Radom where the employment rate is higher than the average in Poland, each studied city features a history of low employment rates in a national context. The gap between the city and the national average varies across the cities with Dortmund representing the lowest (4-8 per cent) and Malmö with the largest gap (11-14 per cent) in a national context. The employment rate in Malmö and Glasgow has decreased since 2005 while the figures for Dortmund, Turin and Radom have increased during the last decade.
Table 15. Employment and unemployment in five European municipalities.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Employment patterns</th>
<th>Dortmund</th>
<th>Turin</th>
<th>Radom</th>
<th>Malmö</th>
<th>Glasgow</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Empl. rate increasing in last decade</td>
<td>Empl rate increasing since 2004, but declining since 2008</td>
<td>Empl. rate increased in last decade</td>
<td>Empl. rate fairly stable since 2005</td>
<td>Empl. rate slowly decreasing</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderately below national average</td>
<td>Empl. rate higher than the national average</td>
<td>Empl. rate significantly lower than national average</td>
<td>Empl. rate significantly lower than national average</td>
<td>Empl. rate significantly lower than national average</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unemployment patterns</th>
<th>Dortmund</th>
<th>Turin</th>
<th>Radom</th>
<th>Malmö</th>
<th>Glasgow</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment decreasing since 2005</td>
<td>Unempl. increasing quickly since 2005</td>
<td>Unempl. increasing and increasing since 2005</td>
<td>Unemploym. decreasing and then increasing since 2005</td>
<td>Unemploym. increasing quickly since 2005</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment approx. 13 per cent in 2012</td>
<td>Unempl. approx. 9,8 per cent in 2012</td>
<td>Unempl. approx. 22,6 per cent in 2012</td>
<td>Unemploym. approx. 12 per cent in 2012</td>
<td>Unemploym. approx. 12 per cent in 2012</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment moderately higher than the national average</td>
<td>Data missing</td>
<td>Unempl. significantly higher than national average</td>
<td>Unemploym. significantly higher than national average</td>
<td>Data missing</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Status of long term unemployed</th>
<th>Dortmund</th>
<th>Turin</th>
<th>Radom</th>
<th>Malmö</th>
<th>Glasgow</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No of LTU decreasing since 2006</td>
<td>No of LTU decreasing</td>
<td>No of LTU decreasing</td>
<td>No of LTU approx. 37 per cent in 2012</td>
<td>No of LTU increasing sharply over last years (from 6 per cent in 2003, to 15 per cent in 2013)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LTU approx. 43 percent of total unemployed in 2012</td>
<td>LTU approx. 45 per cent in 2012</td>
<td>LTU approx. 45 per cent in 2012</td>
<td>LTU approx. 45 per cent in 2012</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Severe problems with long-term unemployment in a national context</td>
<td>Data missing</td>
<td>Data missing</td>
<td>Data missing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Nevertheless, the figures for the employment rates are between 60 and 66 per cent across the municipalities which can be considered as low in general. Even the figures for unemployment and long-unemployment confirm that the cities feature substantial problem pressure. When it comes to unemployment, Radom stands out with 22.6 unemployment rate which is almost twice as high compared with Malmö which has the second highest rates for unemployment in
this study. Radom distinguishes itself even regarding long-term unemployment with a share of 45 per cent long-term unemployed from the local unemployed population in 2012, figures which actually indicate an improvement compared to 60 per cent in 2003.

**Poverty and social assistance in five European cities**

In this section we present the poverty situation for the five cities and local spending on minimum income provision.

Starting with the German city of Dortmund, the scheme dominating the local scene is the Arbeitslosengeld II (ALG II). As mentioned previously, costs for ALG II are to a large extent federally funded and local municipalities only bear the expenses for a part of the costs for housing and heating paid to ALG II beneficiaries. Since the implementation of ALG II, the total amount of benefits, i.e. the sum of all federally or municipally funded expenses, has decreased slightly. After a peak in 2006 with an annual benefit sum of more than 500,000,000 Euro, the expenses dropped down to a little less than 460,000,000 Euro in 2012. Dortmund’s costs for housing and heating were slightly reduced between 2012 and 2013.

The reduced expenses for the SGB II schemes (ALG II and ‘Sozialgeld’ - benefits for non-employable persons, mainly children and elderly, living together with ALG II recipients) do reflect the decreasing number of beneficiaries. In 2005 more than 45,000 needy households with more than 83,000 persons (about 14.2 per cent) living in these households received either ALG II or ‘Sozialgeld’. By 2011 these figures are on a lower level, i.e. almost 42,000 needy households with not more than 80,000 persons (about 13.6 per cent). Interestingly, the share of ALG II beneficiaries decreased more markedly than the number of persons receiving ‘Sozialgeld’ (for a description regarding the differences between ALG II and Sozialgeld see section 8, Governance of local minimum income schemes).

Table 16. Number of households and persons receiving benefits in the jurisdiction of SGB-II 2005-2011 (ALG II benefits or ‘Sozialgeld’).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Needy households receiving SGB II benefits</th>
<th>Persons receiving ALG II</th>
<th>Persons receiving ‘Sozialgeld’</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>45,325</td>
<td>60,512</td>
<td>23,066</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>43,322</td>
<td>61,726</td>
<td>23,925</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>42,315</td>
<td>60,204</td>
<td>23,636</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>40,026</td>
<td>56,188</td>
<td>22,673</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>42,106</td>
<td>58,409</td>
<td>23,024</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>42,671</td>
<td>58,824</td>
<td>23,073</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>41,845</td>
<td>56,999</td>
<td>22,362</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Spannagel (2013).

Turning to the city of Turin in Northern Italy, it is important to shortly reflect on the large regional disparities that exist in Italy and above all major difference between Southern and Northern parts of the country. Turin is located in the Northern parts of the country, being the capital of the Piedmont region. There does not exist data with regard to poverty levels for
local municipalities or cities, yet for the region of Piedmont 7.3 per cent (2012) of the households were living in relative poverty compared with 5.9 per cent in 2011. As table 17 shows, since 2008 the poverty rate in Piedmont has been always higher than other northern Italian regions, such as Lombardy and Emilia Romagna, albeit lower than for the country in general.

Table 17. Incidence of relative poverty for households 2008-2012.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>2012</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>11.3</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>12.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Piedmont</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>7.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Italy</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>6.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lombardy</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>6.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emilia Romagna</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>5.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The economic crisis of recent years has increased the number of persons receiving economic assistance by public services and the third sector organizations in Turin. The figure below shows persons receiving local minimum income provided by the City of Turin. The share of people not able to work living on social assistance has slightly grown since 2008 (Reddito di mantenimento / Minimum Income - it aims to ensure a standard of adequate living for people above 65 or under 18, invalid, disabled or pregnant) while the number of people able to work receiving social assistance is constantly increasing since 2009 (Reddito di inserimento sociale / Social Insertion Income).

Figure 6. Number of persons receiving social assistance from the City of Turin (Reddito di mantenimento and Reddito di inserimento sociale), 2008-2012.

Source: City of Turin, Department of social services & Maino & Zamboni (2013).

Although the number of people of the population living on social assistance related benefits has continuously risen since 2009, the proportion of the population actually receiving benefits
is very low, demonstrated in the figure below. Moreover, due to the limited number of people actually receiving benefits from these two schemes, the public costs for such schemes are fairly low, yet more or less completely funded by the local authorities. This confirms the typology explored by Clegg that the German and the UK models are extensive in terms of a large proportion of the population receive benefits from such minimum income like schemes, yet to a much less extent in Italy.

Figure 7. Percentage of persons on local minimum income as part of the local population (Reddito di mantenimento and Reddito di inserimento sociale), 2008-2012.

Source: City of Turin, Department of social services & Maino & Zamboni (2013).

Turning to the Polish city of Radom we find that the number of families benefitting from local social assistance provision has risen constantly since the start of the Millennium. Albeit that Poland has experienced a period of strong employment growth, lower levels of unemployment as well as sharply decreasing levels of severe material deprivation, we find that in this Polish city the take up rate in the local social assistance system has more or less doubled during the same time period. The number of families collecting social assistance benefits remained on a fairly stable level until a few years ago, and has since then increased sharply (see table below).

Local reports indicate that unemployment and disability are the main reasons for receiving social assistance benefits in Radom. The most common forms of social welfare are different cash benefits and food vouchers. Support is offered in passive (meals, accommodation, food packages, care services for the elderly, the long-term sick and the disabled) and active forms requiring the involvement of the poor (group actions, activity of the long-term unemployed volunteers, the home environmental self-help) (ibid.). Reflecting the structure of local social welfare services in Poland, expenditures on social assistance are a large part of the City budget (21.5 per cent in 2008, 15.5 per cent in 2012) (Kozek, Kubisa & Zieleńska 2013).
Table 18. Persons benefiting from social assistance, the City of Radom, number of recipients and per cent of population, 1999- 2012.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Number of person benefiting from social assistance</th>
<th>Social assistance coverage in percent of population of Radom</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>9,349</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>10,408</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>11,498</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>12,004</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>12,526</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>11,293</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>11,915</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>10,809</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>9,407</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>9,225</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>20,256</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>19,230</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>18,582</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Local investigations indicate that the population of working poor is large in Radom, although there are no accurate estimates or studies of this phenomenon. Single motherhood seems to be a stabilized aim of the social welfare in Radom. The expenditures on this purpose are referred to as the protection of motherhood. According to the data single mothers constitute currently 7 per cent of people receiving social assistance which is about 0.7 per cent more than in 2003. The protection of single motherhood is an area of family policy and seems to be more socially accepted in Poland than other policies, which is also visible in Radom. The local authorities look at the situation of single mothers realistically, as such mothers quite frequently ask for compensatory alimony, which they cannot receive from the fathers (ibid.).

The fourth city included in the COPE project is the city of Malmö. Malmö is generally coming out as one of the most poverty struck cities in Sweden. We find a major gap between a national mean and the situation at local level in the City of Malmö. Almost 30 per cent of the population in Malmö, in the age group of 18-64 years lived in 2008 in relative poverty. The figures for the national average are much lower (about 13 per cent), and this gap between a national average and local conditions seem to run like the main thread through our investigation of the city of Malmö.

The high levels of people living in poverty has certainly also been reflected in the local social assistance system. The trend for local social assistance provision was generally positive since the turn of the Millennium. In 2000 15 per cent of the local population received social assistance benefits from the local authorities, which certainly stands in sharp contrast to the situation in Turin. It also illustrates that at local level, the Swedish model of a residual social assistance system might in practice be much more complex as a large proportion of the population might be depending on social assistance for their daily living, not being able to qualify for unemployment insurance or other forms of public benefits. This high figure has then dropped, but remains at a much higher level than the national average, like most of the key indicators discussed in this report.
Table 19. Social assistance households 2000-2011 (rate of recipients, per cent of population).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Malmö</th>
<th>Sweden</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Malmö</th>
<th>Sweden</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The high numbers of people living on social assistance benefits is also reflected in the high costs that the city spends on social assistance. The statistics for 2013 are not completed, but we have indications (information from interviews with senior manager representing city’s central administration) that the costs for social assistance in 2013 will approach 1 billion SEK (Panican et al. 2013), which equates to approx. 115 Million EUR.

Table 20. Selected social assistance (SA) indicators, three main cities and national average, 2012.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Claimants as part of population</th>
<th>... of which very long term SA</th>
<th>Costs for SA per inhabitant</th>
<th>Children in families with SA</th>
<th>Young adults receiving SA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Stockholm</strong></td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>42.6</td>
<td>28.5</td>
<td>1112</td>
<td>5.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Malmö</strong></td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>45.1</td>
<td>31.4</td>
<td>2526</td>
<td>16.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Gothenburg</strong></td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>42.1</td>
<td>28.3</td>
<td>2133</td>
<td>11.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>National average</strong></td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>34.3</td>
<td>21.3</td>
<td>1089</td>
<td>7.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The decline in the proportion of people receiving social assistance benefits in the city of Malmö since the start of the new Millennium must also be analysed in the backdrop of local population growth, i.e. the decline in rate does not reflect the number of recipients and the costs for social assistance. On the contrary, in recent years we have witnessed a sharp increase in households receiving social assistance (Panican et al. 2013). These statistical changes must also be read cautiously. With regard to different household types, the three most frequent household categories on social assistance usually are single mothers, young adults and foreign born (Hjort 2012).

---

1 Number of social assistance claimants as part of population (adults and children)
2 Adults receiving social assistance 10-12 months last year, percentage out of all social assistance claimants
3 Adults receiving social assistance for at least 27 months during the last 3 years, only with max of two months without social assistance
4 Costs for social assistance/inhabitant (SEK), 2011
5 Children in families receiving social assistance anytime during the year, percentage of all children in population.
6 Young adults (18-24 years) receiving social assistance anytime during the year, percentage out of all young adults in population
Turning to our last case in this report, the city of Glasgow, it is important to have in mind that
Glasgow is part of a highly centralized system of minimum income support (see above).
Income Support (IS) was replaced in 1995 with ‘income based Jobseekers Allowance’ for all
unemployed claimants (JSA) which meant that IS became de-facto the means-tested benefit
for all claimants who were not considered unemployed and required to actively look for
work, namely single parents with children under the age of 16, as well as incapacitated
claimant who were not eligible to claim insurance-based incapacity-related benefits (Goerne
& Clegg 2013). The JSA Claimant count in April 2003 was reported as 17,275. There was an
overall decrease in total JSA claimants between 2003 and 2007. Since the 2008 crisis, the
figures have peaked at 25,290 in April 2011 before dropping to 23,475 in the data from April
2013 (Bennett & Clegg 2013).

As part of the change in claimant count there has also been a shift in the duration of JSA
claimants including a rise in the proportion of people claimants for over 2 years. In 2003 this
was approximately 6 per cent of JSA claimants, but 15 per cent by April 2013. In terms of
individuals only 1,010 were registered as long term unemployed and in receipt of JSA in
April 2003, by April 2013 this number stood at 3,620. Whilst 66 per cent of claimants of JSA
in April 2003 had been claiming for less than 6 months, this figure had declined gradually
over the past ten years to 51 per cent by 2013. As such, not only has the number of JSA
claimants increased, but there has also been an increase in the number of individuals claiming
JSA for longer (ibid.).

Income Support (IS) data from 2001 to 2012 suggests that there has been a huge decrease in
the number of lone parents claiming social assistance during this period, from almost 25 per
cent in 2001 to about 5 per cent in 2012. Though IS is available to some other parents (i.e. not
totally restricted to lone parents), the statistic has often been used to provide an indication of
lone parent rates. However, the data most reflects both changes to the benefit categories and a
large decrease in the number of lone parents in receipt of benefit payments. Lone parent
figures have dropped as they were targeted in the 1990s and 2000s by New Labour policies
and the support moved many into employment.

Compared to Edinburgh, the difficult labour market situation in Glasgow is apparent.
Glasgow has a larger percentage of the working age population in every benefit group. In
terms of numbers this means that in Glasgow there are more than twice the numbers of
individuals of working age in receipt of out of work benefits (96,990 compared to
Edinburgh’s 41,390). Collectively in Glasgow 23.3 per cent of the working age population
are out of the labour market in comparison to only 19.6 per cent in Manchester and 12.2 per
cent in Edinburgh (ibid.).

Coming to a conclusion, key features of these five local cases are summarized in the table
below. Although it has proven difficult to collect local data on poverty related figures, in
cases where we have such data, Malmö stands out in a national context as severely struck by
poverty (29 per cent for the year of 2009). We have not been able to collect similar data for
the other local municipalities included in the study.
However, according to statistics (NUTS 3 level), the rate of people at risk of poverty in the Radomski sub-region was 22 per cent in 2010 and 17 per cent in the same year in Dortmund which can be compared to 7.3 per cent in 2012 for Piedmont region.

Table 21. Local MIS features.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Dortmund</th>
<th>Turin</th>
<th>Radom</th>
<th>Malmö</th>
<th>Glasgow</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Expenditure on MIS schemes over the last decade</strong></td>
<td>Costs peaked in 2005, then slowly decreasing</td>
<td>Cost have been increasing since 2008</td>
<td>Costs fairly stable, although slowly increasing</td>
<td>Decline in local spending on SA (until 2009), then sharp increase</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Proportion of households - individual receiving SA/MIS</strong></td>
<td>Fairly stable proportion of household receiving ALG II or SGB. In 2005 (14.2 %) and in 2011 (13.6 %)</td>
<td>Increasing number of people receiving minimum income related benefits, still low proportion. In 2008 approx. 0.26 % of population and in 2011 0.34 % of population</td>
<td>Sharp increase in the number of people receiving SA. In 1999 approx. 4 % of the population and in 2011 approx. 9 %</td>
<td>Decreasing amounts of people on between 2000-2008, then sharp increase. In 2001 approx. 15 % and in 2012 approx. 9 % of population</td>
<td>Sharp increase from 2008-2012. In 2012 approx. 25,000 JSA claimants</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The constitution of poverty and social assistance provision at the local level partly reflects the national models of social assistance provision and active inclusion, as discussed above. The German and the UK systems are large and centralized systems, what is reflected in the proportion of the local population that receives benefits in the cities of Dortmund and Glasgow. However, social assistance is not a peripheral support scheme in the cities of Radom and Malmö. On the contrary a large proportion of the population receives financial support from these local systems, demonstrating that at local level, a national peripheral and residual system might very well be a key source of financial support for a large part of the local population. The case of Turin stands out as in another manner, as the local costs and the number of people actually receiving public support from these minimum income related schemes is very limited, estimated to approx. 0.35 per cent of the local population.

With regard to trends in each of these five cities we find the following pattern. We notice that the local expenditure in social assistance decreased in Dortmund. The figure for employment rate has increased during the last decade and the rate for unemployment and long-term unemployment decreased significantly between 2005 and 2011 which can explain the positive development on the labour market in Dortmund. However, the local costs for social assistance increased in the cities of Turin, Malmö and Glasgow. The extent of the problem
pressure in these cities suggests that the increase in the local expenditure is due to the 2008 crisis. Radom is an interesting case in relation to the other as the number of social assistance recipient is more than twice higher in 2011 (19,230 or 9 per cent) compared with 1999 (9,349 or 4 per cent); however the local costs for social assistance is almost on the same level in 2009 as in 1998. We find just the opposite development in Turin where the costs for social assistance raised nearly at the same rate (18 per cent) as the increase in the number of social assistance recipients (from 2,400 to 3,050 persons) between 2008 and 2012. The most interesting observation in Turin will be that the expenditure for social assistance reaches only a very small share of the population (0.26 per cent in 2008 and 0.34 per cent in 2012) whiles the rate for poverty (in the Piedmont region) was 7.3 per cent in 2012.

Summary

The cities included in the COPE project share several similarities with regard to key socio-economic features. They share a background as industrialised cities which have undergone extensive changes in recent decades. They are different in size, although most of them are larger cities in their national contexts (with Radom as the exception). They also demonstrate a gap with regard to country average as well as average among comparable larger cities when it comes to population, although different in-between. Turin is the largest city, thereafter follows Glasgow and Dortmund. In the context of the COPE project, Malmö and Radom are much smaller, yet Malmö still is the third largest city in a Swedish context.

The local cases have been selected because they should express a high degree of local problem pressure in each national context. We find fairly similar employment levels in the local cases of approx. 60 percent, which for the case of Malmö is very much lower than a national average, less so in the other countries. For the case of Turin, the city has higher employment levels than a national average, yet fairly high numbers in a Northern Italian context. With regard to unemployment figures, four of our local cases have unemployment levels of approx. 10 – 12 per cent, with Radom as an exception with levels of unemployment reaching 22 percent. In the city of Dortmund unemployment has actually been falling considerably over the last five years from almost 20 percent a few years ago, following the nation-wide pattern. The situation is different in Malmö, Glasgow and Turin, which all have experienced rising unemployment levels, much more so in Turin than in Glasgow and Malmö, which always have had fairly high levels of unemployment also in a national context.

The extent of poverty and minimum income recipients at the local level is hard to compare across countries. Malmö seems to be the case which stands out in its respective national context, as we find extreme levels of relative poverty and also very high levels of social assistance claimants. Glasgow seem to follow a similar pathway, yet the centralized nature of the minimum income scheme in the UK makes it harder to draw any comparable conclusions. Social assistance provision differs across the countries, as part of the local population. The highest levels of minimum income beneficiaries as part of the local population we find in the case of Dortmund in which more than 13 per cent receive ALG II. The lowest levels of minimum income beneficiaries we find in Turin, in which only 0,34 per cent receive support from the local schemes. In Malmö 9 per cent receive support from the local social assistance
scheme, which is a decrease from much higher levels some years before. In Radom approx. 9 percent receive support from the local social assistance scheme. These figures ought not to be used for direct comparisons, since the German ALG II system fills a different function than the locally based social assistance like schemes, which the above-mentioned data for the city of Turin refers to. To some extent social assistance costs/beneficiaries might be used as an indicator for local problem pressure, yet it is perhaps even more an illustration of the functions and profile of different local minimum income schemes, in operation in different national contexts.
7. The local political context and local poverty debates

The section provides information on the social and political context in the five cities. We will describe the local political legacies and ideologies, the local poverty debate, the constitution of poverty discourses and the status of poverty issues in the cities.

Consensus and wide inclusiveness in local poverty debates in Dortmund

Dortmund has always been a stronghold of the Social Democratic Party (SPD) certainly due to the industrial history of the City. The economic structure led to high percentages of blue collar workers, traditionally voters of the SPD. Since the end of World War II, every Lord Mayor in Dortmund was a member of SPD. Until 1989, SPD won all local elections with an absolute majority (Bömer 2010). Yet, the votes for the SPD have been declining since the end of the 1970s until 2009, yet increased again since 2009 (Spannagel 2013). For instance, in 1979, almost 60 per cent voted on the Social Democrats; by 2009 this figure has dropped down to less than 40 per cent. Nevertheless, it was only in 1999 that the SPD did not win the local council elections and the conservative Christian Democratic Union (CDU) was able to gain slightly more votes. This election brought a landmark political change as it resulted in an end of the one-party government of the SDP in Dortmund. From 1999 to 2004 the City was governed by a coalition of SPD und CDU. This period was followed by a coalition of the SPD with the Green Party (Prigge & Böhme 2013, Spannagel 2013). Arguably, two parties explicitly emphasize the need of comprehensive policy measures directed at the poor – the SPD and the Green Party – while the two others, the CDU and the FDP, are more focused on economic and financial policies (ibid.).

Not only political parties have been involved in debates and deliberation on issues relating to active inclusion policies in the city of Dortmund. The landscape of actors that are involved in active inclusion policies and in combating poverty in Dortmund is rather dense. The most important actors are the municipality, i.e. the municipality’s social welfare department and the JobCentre which is a cross-level institution that mixes competencies of the federal and the local level, but also nonpublic actors like the welfare associations, the business or industry organizations (Association of Metal Working and the Retailers’ Association) as well as the trade unions.

The city of Dortmund initiated a so-called Social City Commission to govern the implementation of social projects in the city of Dortmund and having a central role in the city’s local anti-poverty policies. Members of the Commission are high ranked officials (e.g. head of social welfare department, the chairman of the governmental committee for social issues, health and employment; and also the trade unions, the local chamber of commerce etcetera. This illustrates a local ambition to ‘…. include a maximum scope of actors’ (Spannagel 2013). Also welfare associations and other civil society organizations are involved in the operations of the Social City Commission. Spannagel notices that when analyzing ‘…. all the different actors that shape anti-poverty policies in Dortmund … it becomes clear how close they all operate. First and foremost, almost all of them are part of the dense network that has its institutionalized expression in the Social City Commission’
The activities in the Social City Commission hence includes both public actors of different kinds, as well as nonpublic actors in terms of representatives of business organisations as well as associations and organizations of civil society. The relations between these actors and their materialization in the activities of the Commission are described by interviewees as concerted as well as based on knowing each other. A similar pattern evolves for the governance of the local JobCentre, demonstrated below.

For these reasons it is hardly surprising that social policy issues are high on the political agenda in Dortmund. The great effort that is put in anti-poverty policies especially in the last two decades is to a great deal a result of the fact that the Lord Mayor Langemeyer (SPD) declared such issues as top-level matters as he was elected in 1999 (Prigge & Böhme 2013). His strategy was deemed as very successful and Langemeyer was re-elected in 2004. In his second term of office he put even more effort in combating poverty by strengthening the social profile of Dortmund. His main impact was to implement the Social City Program (`Programm Soziale Stadt`). This general policy line is continued until now by the current Lord Mayor Sierau (Spannagel 2013).

In 2009 election platform, SPD had one main topic named “We enhance social Dortmund”. A crucial part of the anti-poverty policy profile was the Action Plan Social City (`Aktionplan Soziale Stadt`) in which SPD opts for breaking down the measures to combat poverty very locally by concentrating them in the 13 parts of the City that are the most affected by poverty and unemployment. SPD is also very much in favour of the `Dortmund Pass` and the `Social Ticket` (`Sozialticket`). Both allow needy families reduced or free entry to municipal facilities as well as reduced fees for public transport in Dortmund. A further important paradigm of the SPD is the aim to generate jobs that are subject to social insurance contributions. Generally spoken, the SPD regards unemployed persons and ALG II (minimum income for job-seekers) recipients as an important clientele. Accordingly, they put much effort in developing political measures and strategies in favour of these population groups.

As indicated, also poverty related topics are high on the political agenda in Dortmund. There are two crucial aspects in explaining why poverty and unemployment are so widely discussed in Dortmund: the high shares of unemployment and poverty and the regularly published municipal reports on these figures. Interviewees mention few topics that are new in the debates on poverty in Dortmund. The main new aspects of these debates are the poverty driven migration from southern Europe and housing policies. Regarding the three target groups of the COPE project, we can state that long-term unemployed definitely are a topic in the debates on poverty, and that they have been on the agenda for a very long time. Lone parents are in the focus of the debates as well and gradually get more and more attention. Working poor do not seem to be a big issue in the poverty debates. No interviewee explicitly mentions them when asked to name the main topics of the debates (Spannagel 2013).
Extensive partnership arrangements in the local poverty debates in Turin

Municipalities play a major role in delivering many forms of public services in Italy. Such services include social assistance, local police, street cleaning, public transportation etcetera and during recent decades local municipalities have had an even greater mandate over public services as many such functions have been further decentralized to the local municipalities. They have gained greater autonomy and also authority, and local political leaders have also gained in decision-power over local issues. For a long period of time, the city of Turin was dominated by its left-wing governments. However during these years the main employer in the city (Fiat) experienced extensive problems. This, combined with several other factors, resulted in extensive social and political problems. The situation changed in the beginning of the 1990s.

Due to an extensive mobilization among a large number of local actors – including civil society actors – a Centre-left candidate came into office and also started to reform the local political culture in the city of Turin. What thereafter followed was a period often called the ‘golden-age’ of the city of Turin, yet even more so a period of partnership and collaboration building among a large number of societal actors in the city of Turin. One might trace these efforts back long time in history to the city of Turin’s extensive tradition of civic involvement. First and foremost, one started to search for alternative funding structures, since state and local public funding did not satisfy needs or the ambitions by local political leaders, and above all with a winter Olympic games coming up. Local bank foundations became a solution to the city’s problems, and have continued to be a key financial supporter for local regeneration projects as well as social projects of many different kinds. In 2000, the mayor presented a Strategic plan to lead the city’s development. The establishment of the plan had involved a large number and a strong network of leading individuals, coming from different societal spheres, yet with a commitment to contribute to the city’s renewal processes. The development of the plan was described as ‘… highly participative, involving economic, academic, cultural, social and political stakeholders, as well as hundreds of citizens…’ (Maino & Zamboni 2013). This Strategic Plan also marked the start of an extensive usage of public private partnerships in the city of Turin. Whereas Maino & Zamboni seeks to summarize the local political culture in the city of Turin, they not only note that the city has been run by left or Centre-left governments for a long time, but also that the city seems to follow a particular local political culture.

*What is characteristic of local government institutions in Turin is their willingness in negotiating solutions directly with all other public and private actors already active around specific issues, such as social and labor policies* (Maino & Zamboni 2013)

The city has also an extensive tradition of political efforts to combat social exclusion and marginalization. Turin – and its local politicians and administrative staff together with third sector organizations – has over the last decades taken an extensive political effort on combating poverty, social exclusion and inequalities. Since mid-2000s and especially after the 1998 economic crisis, Turin has started to develop many projects, aiming to improve quality of life for its citizens. The needs of families and poor are being addressed as a
priority. Other projects deal with housing, education of children, elderly, integration of first and second generation non-EU immigrants and training-linked employment prospects.

Currently, Turin is governed by a Centre-left coalition. The Mayor's political agenda is devoted to guarantee a particular attention towards vulnerable people in all network activities dealing with combating poverty and social exclusion, promoting employment, entrepreneurship, training, social inclusion, culture and urban regeneration. The Mayor's commitment on this front has been recently confirmed during the renewal of the City Council: in July 2013 the Alderman for Social services has been nominated also vice-mayor, stressing the point that one of the main goals is to give more attention to the social face of the crisis. Moreover the local administration aims providing more tools to build a wide range of opportunities for young people and to contrast labour market problems (Maino & Zamboni 2013).

A key feature in several of these efforts has been the strong relationship and partnership approached developed by local public agencies and non-public actors, e.g. the Bank Foundation Compagnia di San Paolo, but also many other third sector organisations. For instance, the cooperation between Compagnia di San Paolo, Turin City Council and Ufficio Pio for the development and qualification of welfare actions is formalized through a Memorandum of Understanding, a framework document by virtue of which the three institutions work together to support the development of programs in the fields of social policy, education, urban regeneration, the creation of shared spaces and work integration. In addition, the Protocol encourages the various Departments to work together in order to reach greater coordination on the priorities for action. Compagnia di San Paolo shows a consistent and significant focus on social interventions. This is visible from the progressive increase in the budget given to social policies in relation to the total resources used in institutional activities: from 20.3 percent in 2007 to 34.4 percent in 2012 (ibid.).

Another local example of how nonpublic actors and above all representatives of a few central foundations take part in local debates and policy-making processes is the Tavolo Coordinamento povertà of the city of Turin (Joint Board on Poverty Coordination), a place that was strongly supported by municipality of Turin and the Ufficio Pio, where local institutions and no profit organizations can cooperate and deal with people at risk of poverty. The Joint Board on Poverty has been established to share information, coordinate public and private actions, to avoid duplication of benefits and the double provision to the same benefit, to identify innovative solutions. The Joint Board could be defined as an arena for debates and deliberation as well as a clearing house to discuss resource allocations, that is, in joining forces, competencies and funds. Social needs are analyzed during regular meetings, where actors have the opportunity to get a more clear idea about existing problems and to further implement most appropriate actions. One of our interviewees said “No one tries to make up for the responsibilities of others, just as no other imposes a certain way of working rather than another, but it is a place to discuss the real needs of the city and especially the people and think about solutions”. Another example the close connection and relationship between the municipality of Turin and the Compagnia di San Paolo can be envisaged also in the
choice – in 2012 - to appoint the former Mayor Chiamparino as President of the Compagnia di San Paolo.

These local efforts illustrate a particular close partnership between certain public actors as well as representatives of well-established institutions. Key elements in the city’s local political culture hence resembles much academic reasoning on partnership coordination, i.e. strong ties between different actors and relations based on trust and reciprocity. The local arena seem to be circulating around certain key actors, such as the ancient Bank foundations, but also combined with a large number of associations and organizations of civil society, as well as academics and professionals, involved in networks linked to political leaders.

**Tensions and emphasis on employment in local social policy debates in Radom**

The political power in Radom is divided between the authority of Starosta (head of the Poviat) and the Mayor of the City. Starosta and the majority of the Poviat Council come from the coalition of the Polish People's Party (PSL – originally left but now more Centre-Right) and local committees. Radom has been ruled for two terms of office by the local politicians of the right-wing ‘Law and Justice’ (PiS) with the support of one city councilor from the Polish People's Party (PSL). Starosta supervises local PES, while the mayor is responsible for other policy areas and has a control over the social assistance organizations (Kozek, Kubisa & Zieleńska 2013).

Combating poverty is not defined as a direct strategic goal. The term ‘poverty’ and ‘the fight against poverty’, are absent in the main strategic document of the City. The City and the Poviat authority have developed other strategic documents in which the problem of poverty is partly addressed. These strategic documents show quite well the approach of local authorities towards social policy related issues. While the City authorities focus mainly on the problems of families and children in difficult situations, the Poviat authorities concentrate on the active labour market policy. There is no single strategy that would address comprehensively the main social problems (ibid.). The parties which decide about implemented plans in the City are primarily oriented towards economic policy, i.e. to create new jobs (ibid.).

All interviewees in the study of Radom (see Kozek, Kubisa & Zieleńska 2013) diagnose the problem of poverty as primarily structural, connected directly to the situation on the regional labour market. However, it is locally recognized that some poor people have been dependent on social assistance for many years and it has become inherited by younger generations as well. Some of the interviewees suggested that remaining in poverty becomes an individual choice and it is extremely difficult to change this attitude. The fight against unemployment is interpreted as the best form of poverty alleviation (ibid.). Although there is a large number of civil society organizations offering support and being involved in service delivery based on agreements with the local authorities, these seem not to be included in deliberation and decision-making procedures with regard to active inclusion policies. They are partly linked to the City Hall by the means of a local NGO Centre, which is however, mainly involved in delivering and coordinating service provision. This is not completely correct, as local third sector organizations are involved – by the means of this local NGO Center and other forms of
information exchange, in local social policy and poverty debates as experts on local conditions and local problems. As expressed by Kozek, Kubisa & Zielęńska 2013

‘Although the NGOs are not directly involved in the decision-making on local MIS schemes, they play a role of informing the MSAO about the local social problems, point out the local communities that need support. They provide expert knowledge about social problems. ... MSAO points out that NGO work closely with the social problems and therefore have recognition of problems and best solutions (ibid.).

The role of local third sector organizations in the City of Radom will be further explored in chapter 10 in this report.

The absence of poverty in the local social policy debate in Malmö

The political arena in the city of Malmö is clearly dominated by the Social Democratic Party. The Party has more or less been in local office since the introduction of voting rights in the beginning of the 20th century (with exceptions for 1985-1988 and 1991-1994). The city hence has clear similarities with the city of Dortmund and partly also Turin and Radom as we find a strong position of Left-wing and Social democratic parties. At present, the city is governed by a coalition of Social Democrats (with five Local Government Commissioners), the Green Party (with two Local Government Commissioners) and the Left Party (with two Local Government Commissioners) (Panican et al 2013).

Like Turin and Dortmund, Malmö – and its local politicians and administrative staff – has taken an entrepreneurial stance on fighting social exclusion and inequalities. The City has been very active in running projects and programmes aiming to counterbalance social problems. The latest program was initiated by the City Council which decides in March 2010 for a new policy for the next five years for an environmental, economic and social sustainability. The focus was put on four disadvantaged city districts with the greater aim to foster social sustainability. The intervention program was further divided into five key themes (employment, housing, learning, safety and participation). Just a few months after the initiation of this program, the City’s Executive Committee decided (May 2010) to establish a Commission for a Socially Sustainable Malmö (Social Commission). The Social Commission was politically independent and had the aim to produce scientific strategies to combat health inequalities in Malmö, including a wide number of policy areas such as issues of poverty and income inequalities. The Social Commission enrolled a large number of key experts and academics and has resulted in 31 scientific reports and 200 proposals to improve local health inequalities (Isacsson 2012, Isacsson 2013). However, unlike Dortmund or Turin we do not find involvement of other actors in this exercise.

The final report, delivered in March 2013, demonstrated that social factors play a significant role in the development of public health. The report presents also strategies in order to reduce health inequalities in Malmö. A general recommendation is that Malmö should establish a social investment policy that can level out differences in living conditions and make social systems more equal. Even the way to understand social investments should change, social
interventions should be seen as investments, not as costs and therefore as a burden on municipal finances. The Social Commission made a strong statement in favour of public investments in people to realize their full human potential, especially on childcare services yet also investment in education and measures to encourage people to (re-)enter the labour market. From a social investment perspective, it was also important to strengthen the relationship between economic growth and equality, improve the quality of jobs and to emphasize social security as a value in itself (Isacsson 2013).

However, poverty is a delicate issue in local politics. Despite that Malmö has extensive problems related to issues of poverty, the very notion of poverty seem to be excluded from the local political debate. Throughout interviews with local experts representing different local administrative units, the local PES and local voluntary organizations, it is generally held that poverty is rarely used in local political debates on the problems facing the City. The primacy of the work ethic and the work strategy as overshadowing any conceptualization of poverty; not being poor is all about having a job. This was also emphasized in our other local cases, especially in the city of Radom. It hence appears as if poverty is a non-issue for local politicians and for local social services. In the formal guiding documents for local social services, poverty reduction is not a priority or even expressed as an aim. Instead the City has developed policies in relation to several other social problems such as homelessness, housing problems and social assistance costs but whether these should be considered within a broader framework of poverty is not spelled out in local documents (ibid.). This particular case hence appears to reflect a process of depoliticizing poverty, as it is mainly turned into an administrative problem and equated to the administration of the local social assistance system. As an illustration thereof, we did not find any direct examples of institutionalized modes of participation and involvement of third sector organization in local deliberation and decision-making procedures on poverty related matters. However, the city has some forms of cooperation and coordination with the voluntary sector, yet in most of these cases, voluntary organizations fulfill the role of expressing the voice and raising the concern of their members. These, however, rarely touched upon poverty but much more in relation to the needs of other social groups. These institutionalized forms of participation most often took place at lower political levels in the municipality, and rarely involving key senior officials or politicians as we found in the cities of Turin and Dortmund.

Poverty as main issue in contentious local social policy debates in Glasgow

Like several of the other cities included in this project, Glasgow has a strong industrial base, a large working-class population and also been a stronghold for Social democratic parties throughout the 20th century. The city is often considered as the center of Scottish radicalism in terms of social reform and has contributed much to the political scene across the UK, particularly in terms of its strong left-wing politics and active political citizens in local, regional and national arenas. Post-war, Glasgow became strongly associated with the UK Labour Party and the Scottish Labour Party (Smith, 1984; Hassan, 2004). In recent years the greater Glasgow area has also been strongly associated with the Scottish National Party (SNP). This stands in contrast to the UK political scene which is dominated by two parties,
the UK Labour party occupying the centre-left and the Conservative party occupying the right.

Since 2010 the Conservative led coalition government in Whitehall has introduced a series of welfare reforms and policy changes throughout the UK which are particularly right-wing in nature and therefore differ markedly to the political orientation in Glasgow (Bennett & Clegg 2013). In 2010 the incoming UK coalition government introduced an austerity programme throughout the UK. The austerity programme and the associated budgets that have followed outlined a decrease in funding and financial support across all central government departments and reduced budgets and grants for local authorities. This included a reduction in the funding provided by the UK Treasury to the Scottish Government. Whilst the Scottish Government claims that they have received a substantially reduced budget from the UK Treasury, the cuts and reduction in spending throughout England have been comparatively more (ibid.). The Scottish Government has sought to reduce the impact of the austerity programme on Scottish Local Authorities and arguably, the cuts in Scotland have not been as severe as in England. The Scottish Government has protected some services from any cuts or changes to their funding budgets. However, UK departments which manage and operate within Scotland (such as the DWP) have experienced reduced service budgets affecting both staff numbers and the provision of benefits and support managed by this department (Bennett & Clegg 2013).

The austerity programme has led to major effects on the local Glasgow City Council (GCC). Although the organisation has been somewhat protected by the reduced budgets to local authorities as it receives its government grant from the Scottish Government, not the UK Government, it has seen a reduction in direct funding. Prior to the 2008 recession GCC got an annual increase in the grant received each year. GCC has received a decreasing grant settlement since 2009 and although clearly linked to the reduction in public sector funding across the UK, GCC has experienced greater year on year decreases than other local authorities in Scotland. In response GCC has implemented a service reform programme in order to continue to deliver public services in the City within the limits of the reduced grant settlement (Bennett & Clegg 2013).

Furthermore, the SNP (party in control of Holyrood) has introduced the Council Tax Freeze which means that GCC has been unable to increase revenues from increasing council tax. Council Tax is an amount paid to the local authority by each household every year, the amount paid varies and is based on historical ‘banding’ of homes based on their value. Council tax has been frozen in Scotland since the SNP came to power in 2007 and introduced the policy as part of its efforts to reduce spending for individuals households (although GCC introduced the policy for one year in 2006). The SNP government claims that the freeze assists those struggling in the current economic climate and protects Scottish residents from UK cuts to council tax benefit (Scottish Government 2012). This was policy is heavily criticised by political opponents in Scotland with claims that it benefits wealthier households most and that local authorities are unable to continue to offer services due to funding shortages (Bell, 2011).
Local debates on active inclusion and related issues need to be analysed in the backdrop of these administrative and political cleavages. Local discourses and debates on employment promotion and social inclusion policies are all hampered by the fact that such measures are mostly in the hands of Whitehall. However, we find that local government agencies have responded to this circumscribed formal mandate by extensive entrepreneurial efforts to craft new space for local policies, often addressing issues of poverty. For instance, throughout the 2000’s the Scottish Labour Party (which was ruling in a coalition at the Scottish Executive) was closely aligned to the UK Labour Party (which was in power in Whitehall from 1997-2010) in terms of its stance towards poverty alleviation, full employment, and the introduction of the national minimum wage (NMW) in late 1990s. In recent years the Scottish Labour Party has become slightly more distinct in terms of its stance on poverty and continues to promote a campaign to reduce child poverty, fuel poverty (a particularly acute problem in Glasgow) and pensioner poverty. The Scottish Labour Party 2012 manifesto focused on poverty alleviation through education and employment, with numerous references to the problems of unemployment and low skills. The Scottish Labour Party continues to emphasise an aim for full employment and that the route out of poverty is an employment based solution. Within the manifesto there was a dedication to ending poverty in Scotland (Scottish Labour Party, 2012). Moreover, the Scottish Labour representatives in GCC appear to adopt a strong commitment to addressing poverty and unemployment in Glasgow. GCC introduced a ‘Living Wage’ pay rates for all GCC employees in 2011. The Living Wage campaign seeks to increase the NMW or encourage employers to pay their employees a ‘living rate’, currently set at £7.54 per hour (the NMW is currently £6.19 per hour).

Moreover, the local government has introduced several ways to foster the involvement of third sector organizations and also users in debates and planning on poverty related issues. In 2013 the Council established a Poverty Leadership Panel to discuss poverty issues on a city-wide basis and to provide leadership, and to advise on the development of a city wide anti-poverty strategy. Membership of the Panel is drawn from people across Glasgow, and in some cases, Scotland. The Panel is co-chaired by the Leader of the Council and a person with direct experience of living in poverty. Partnership working is a central feature of the panel which seeks to make practical recommendations and support people living in poverty alongside, “Improving co-ordination and co-operation between organisations working to address poverty locally” (GCC 2013, p. 5). The Poverty Leadership Panel produced a ‘Tackling Poverty Together Report’ which identified five themes as a focus for this work. These five themes provide the framework for an Action Plan which will coordinate activities to address issues around poverty in Glasgow. These themes are: Attitudinal Change; Child Poverty; Credit and Debt; Welfare Reform; and Work and Worth (Bennett & Clegg 2013).

**Summary**

The five cities explored in this project have a strong heritage of being governed by Social democratic parties or other constellations of left-wing parties; which is not the case of Radom after 2005. This is also reflected in their main orientation with regard to general social policy issues and related problems such as unemployment, social exclusion and social integration (see table below for summary of the main local features).
The local discourse on social policy is generally painted by a strong belief on employment promoting actions and that employment is the best way out of poverty. This runs like a red thread in all local cases, more in some than in others. In the cities of Radom and Malmö this is highly evident as local politicians and key decision-makers more or less avoid talking about poverty. The work ethic is not only central in the Swedish welfare state and in Swedish social policies, but also in the context of the Social democratically run city of Malmö, namely the fight against unemployment is the best form of poverty alleviation. This approach can be discussed. For example, in Malmö, the unemployment level was 9.4 per cent in 2008 while the relative poverty rate was 29 per cent in the same year; working poor is not a target group in Malmö, this group is not even discussed, there is no knowledge about this group at all. Anyway, the huge gap between the unemployment rate and poverty rate can hardly be explained only in terms of work ethics and therefore a combat against poverty only with focus on work and labour market strategies can be judged as insufficient. The local neglect of addressing poverty as a social problem and framing it as a political problem is evident. In Malmö poverty is hence a non-issue for local politicians and for local social services. Despite an extensive problem pressure, neither politicians nor civil servants express that poverty is on the political agenda. Poverty is being replaced by related concepts and terms (e.g. low levels of income, social assistance costs). This can be explained by the City’s long-lasting Social Democratic legacy in which poverty is generally considered as a failure to the welfare state. Malmö as not only a typical but also an extraordinary Social Democratically governed municipality in a Swedish context. The multifold ways by which poverty is turned into an administrative issue furthermore illustrates a de-politicization of poverty at local level in Malmö. Poverty and poor people are mainly conceptualized as an administrative category, i.e. social assistance claimants.

A partly similar situation appears in the city of Radom, however, in this particular Polish context the neglect to talk about of poverty does not seem to be a denial of the issue, but rather a way of strategic neglect, one cannot win an election talking about poverty issues. This deadlock is also framed of the division of authorities and political leadership between levels, which seems much more contentious than in a Swedish context. Unsurprisingly, these two cities have less and partly weak involvement of stakeholders in local debates.

The local discourses in the cities of Dortmund, Glasgow and Turin have a much more mixed approach to the local social policy discourses and issues of poverty. In Glasgow, poverty is very much high on the political agenda, involving a large number of stakeholders, but also embedded in the larger political game between different political levels (Glasgow – Scotland and Whitehall). The poverty issue is not only a key matter –being an extensive local social problem and also embedded in the local political agenda – poverty also seems to be used as a strategic tool in local – central discussions. The local debates are very much less conflict laden in both Turin and Dortmund, and also involve a much higher number and variety of stakeholders in local debates and to some extent also decision-making forums. Poverty is certainly not the main issue for these participatory governance arrangements at the local level, but is embedded in broader local discourses on social integration, city renewals, social investments and the like. Such debates were also present in the other cities, but to a less degree involve poverty issues. See table below for a summary of main features.
Table 22. Local political context and poverty debates.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political tradition</th>
<th>Dortmund</th>
<th>Turin</th>
<th>Radom</th>
<th>Malmö</th>
<th>Glasgow</th>
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<tr>
<td>SPD stronghold for SPD</td>
<td>• Long history of left-wing governments</td>
<td>• Regional level government Centre - Right</td>
<td>• A stronghold for Social Democrats</td>
<td>• A Stronghold for left-wing politics</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPD in office</td>
<td>• Turin is currently governed by a Centre-left coalition</td>
<td>• Local Mayor from Rightwing</td>
<td>• Present coalition with Green/Left Party</td>
<td>• The Scottish Labour party dominate the political arena</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>General social policy orientation/priorities in local debate</th>
<th>Dortmund</th>
<th>Turin</th>
<th>Radom</th>
<th>Malmö</th>
<th>Glasgow</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Focus on employment promoting policies and combating poverty, social exclusion</td>
<td>• Focus on employment promoting policies and combating poverty, social exclusion</td>
<td>• Primary orientation towards economic policy, i.e. to create new jobs.</td>
<td>• Focus on employment promoting policies and combating, social exclusion</td>
<td>• Focus on housing, services and poverty issues</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Poverty as a political issue at local level</th>
<th>Dortmund</th>
<th>Turin</th>
<th>Radom</th>
<th>Malmö</th>
<th>Glasgow</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Explicit local focus on the need of comprehensive policy measures directed at the poor</td>
<td>• Combating poverty present at the local the political arena</td>
<td>• Combating poverty is not defined as a strategic goal.</td>
<td>• Poverty is a non-issue for local politicians and for local social services</td>
<td>• Strong commitment towards anti-poverty policies at local level</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Actors involved in local social policy and poverty debates</th>
<th>Dortmund</th>
<th>Turin</th>
<th>Radom</th>
<th>Malmö</th>
<th>Glasgow</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Wide range of actors: public agencies of differed kinds, social partner, employer organizations and third welfare associations</td>
<td>• Wide range of actors: Local politicians, administrative staff, third sector organizations, private foundations, academics</td>
<td>• Debates on social policy and poverty issues seems to be mainly – if debated – an issue for political parties</td>
<td>• Academics involved as experts in broader debates on social policies, third sector organizations partly involved yet rarely with regard to poverty</td>
<td>• Broad range of third sector organizations and public agencies and local politicians</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Forms of participation for nonpublic actors</th>
<th>Dortmund</th>
<th>Turin</th>
<th>Radom</th>
<th>Malmö</th>
<th>Glasgow</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Institutionalised in forms of local commission etcetera</td>
<td>• Institutionalized in local partnership arrangements</td>
<td>• Weak, partly through NGO Centre</td>
<td>• Weak, partly through bilateral arrangements</td>
<td>• Extensive in local partnership arrangements, panels. Not only including organized interests but also users</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
8. Governance of local minimum income schemes

In this section we will present a brief descriptive analysis of main features of the governance structure of MIS in the five municipalities with a focus on which administrative units have the decision-making authority (centralization-decentralization), eligibility and means testing and the extent to which other actors (involvement of NGOs) besides public ones are involved in discussions about MIS and / or in decision making.

Central steering and local acceptance in Dortmund

The minimum income system in Germany has faced landmark changes in the cause of the Hartz Reforms in the mid-2000s. These reforms were implemented to make the social system more efficient and effective by re-organising both the different minimum income schemes as well as the institutional framework of the whole minimum income system. The final Hartz IV reform in 2005 established ALG II (Arbeitslosengeld II) as a new categorical minimum income scheme, by merging the former social assistance and the unemployment assistance. ALG II integrates all needy households with at least one employable person into a single scheme. As a result, ALG II became the dominating minimum income benefit. This, however, did not imply a complete disappearance of social assistance. This last resort scheme retained its local embedded profile and is still under municipal responsibility. However, it has lost much of its former relevance since people, which have unemployment as their main problem ought to seek support from the ALG and not from a local social assistance scheme. Arguably, the importance of the municipal level and municipal actors decreased markedly.

The introduction of the Hartz reform also further enforced a process of centralization in German income support in sake of unemployment and local level actors, such as the city of Dortmund, have not so much to say when it comes to issues like how to regulate MIP. The ALG II scheme is to a great extent is exclusively governed by federal structures. On the federal level the main actor is the Federal Employment Agency. In order to organize the delivery of all ALG II transfers and services, the local administration and the Federal Employment Agency are merged to one local institution, the Jobcenter. Jobcenters function as one-stop shops, bringing together the three pillars of the highly integrated ALG II scheme: benefit transfer, job placement and delivery of social services. The Federal Employment Agency and the Jobcenter, and therefore the national and the local level, work closely together in this system. In the city of Dortmund, the municipality is also involved in the issues of the Jobcenter insofar as representatives of the local government are part of the Board of the Jobcenter (“Trägerversammlung”). This multi-stakeholder board under the chairmanship of the Lord Major has six members, three of them representatives of the Federal Employment Agency and the Jobcenter, three of them representatives of the municipality. This board decides about issues regarding organization and personnel of Jobcenter. However, what is unique for Dortmund is that it does not only have such a board but also a “Board of trustees” (“Trägerausschuss”), bringing together a large selection of societal actors to be involved in the governance of the JobCenter. This board was explicitly implemented in order to improve the involvement of municipal actors in the issues of the Jobcenter (Spannagel 2013). The governance of the local JobCenter arguably follows a
similar patterns as the way by which local debates were being structured. It appears as if the City is highly in favor of inclusive solutions that aim to include as many actors as possible.

The centralized nature of the German system is also reflected in the ways by which one organizes the benefit scheme in itself. The ALG II benefit is highly standardised in terms of formal regulation of benefit rates and eligibility criteria. In this respect, it leaves municipalities with little leeway. However, we found that local case workers at the Jobcenter have certain discretionary powers. As a local agency they are expected to pay benefits and offer job advice and job placement, however how such service offers and placement aspects are into practice is at discretion of the front line staff. The Social Welfare Office is in charge of the four other minimum income schemes in the German system: the social assistance (“Sozialhilfe”), the minimum needs-based provision for the elderly, the benefit schemes for asylum seekers and refugees and the scheme for victims of the war. But given the quantitative dominance of the ALG II scheme, there are only few people or needy households under the responsibility of the municipal Social Welfare Office.

The overwhelming majority of the ALG II benefits are funded at the national level under the lead of the Federal Employment Agency. The extent to which the local level has responsibilities in MIP is displayed in the next table.

Table 23. Distribution of responsibilities between the Federal Employment Agency and municipalities regarding the delivery of ALG II transfers and social services.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Standard rates (ALG II, Sozialgeld)</th>
<th>Housing and heating</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Additional demands</td>
<td>Childcare</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contributions to social insurances</td>
<td>Social services (incl. education and participation)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment services</td>
<td>One-off benefits</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Petzold (2013).

The benefits paid by the national level are the standard rates for ALG II and “Sozialgeld” as well as the benefits offered for further demands. Regarding the minimum income scheme, the financial responsibility of the municipality is to provide two third of the costs for housing and heating and certain one-off benefits. As already mentioned, the local level is in charge of delivering social and child care services. The municipality has to bear the cost for providing these services. The share of ALG II transfers and services supplied by the municipality is bound to the budget of the local Social Assistance Offices. The costs for benefits and services of ALG II including the costs for administration that are at the responsibility of the federal employment agency are fully paid out of the national budget. A lump sum is permitted for integration services and costs for administration. Taken together, 84.8 per cent of the costs for the administration of the Jobcenters like the one in Dortmund are paid by the federal budget (Petzold 2013, Spannagel 2013).

Dortmund does not have decisive discretion in terms of benefit levels of eligibility criteria, since ALG II benefits are all subject to national legislation. There are four criteria for being eligible to ALG II: (i) working age (15-65), (ii) employable - being capable to work for at least 3 hours per day, (iii) need as measured by the social minimum for households and (iv)
place of residence in Germany. In contrast to handling the sanction rules or to deliver social and labour market related services, the municipalities have no discretion in how to apply these eligibility standards. The benefit level varies according to the composition of the needy household (see table 24).

Table 24. ALG II Standard Rates by Household Composition.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Composition of needy household</th>
<th>Monthly standard rates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Single person or single parent</td>
<td>382€</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Couples (both persons &gt;17 years)</td>
<td>345€</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Persons aged 18 to 25</td>
<td>306€</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Children aged 6 to 17</td>
<td>289€</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Young children (up to the age of 5)</td>
<td>224€</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Spannagel (2013).

These federally funded benefits include all expenses for food, clothes, furniture, health, transportation, communication and leisure activities (Petzold 2013). Additionally, the beneficiaries receive financial support for housing and heating; these costs are partially financed by the municipality.

There are sanction rules for ALG II recipients carried out by the front line staff at the Jobcenter. All these rules are subject to federal legislation, however leaving the personal advice service and the case managers in the Jobcenter certain discretion in how strict to apply them. An important reference for applying the sanction rules is that the beneficiaries and the case managers enter into an enforceable agreement. If the beneficiaries refuse to take up reasonable job offers or if they do not behave in a matter that is appropriate to bring them back into the labour market than sanctions can be put in place by reducing the benefit rates. The reduction is limited to duration of 3 months. A first breach of the integration agreement is sanctioned by reducing the benefits by 30 per cent. The second one entails cuts of 60 per cent (Petzold 2013). As a last consequence, the beneficiaries can be refused the whole ALG II rate. In this case, the benefits are replaced by food vouchers (Spannagel 2013).

It is not intended in the ALG II system that the clients raise their voice regarding the local delivery of benefits and services. Nevertheless, both the Jobcenter and the local branch of the Federal Employment Agency in Dortmund have institutionalized complaints management. On the local level, the first person to address with complaints would be the individual case manager in the Jobcenter.

Local fragmentation of minimum income support in Turin

The local governance of minimum income protection in the city of Turin is a complex material to describe and to analyse. Kazepov described the governance of the Italian social assistance system as an illustration of a regionally regulated country, understood in his analysis as embedded in a structure of weak central and state steering, leaving extensive room of regional and local actors to moderate local systems of minimum income protections. The
Italian system was also described as weakly financed and relying to a large extent on non-profit actors for the design and delivery of benefits and services. The decentralized nature of the Italian system is hence a decisive nature of the Italian welfare state, but was also encourage by decisions made by the central government.

In the late 1990s, the so called Bassanini Law (Law 59/1997) started a process of devolution of competences, previously owned by the national level, to Regions (Regioni), Provinces (Province) and Municipalities (Comuni). Legislative decree 112/1998 (which enabled the implementation of Bassanini Law) and successive laws deeply increased the role of local levels of government in many areas, including social and labor policies (Maino & Zamboni 2013). With regard to social assistance, Legislative decree 112/1998 gave functions and competences to Comuni for a number of targets groups: minors, young people, elderly, families, handicapped, drug abusers. Furthermore, Law 328/2000 made the regional authorities and level responsible alone for selection of objectives, priorities and planning, and only the respect of national minimum standards was left to central government, following subsidiarity principle (Madama, Natili & Jessoula 2013).

However, it would be a mistake to depict the Italian system as only relying on local and regional regulation. A national social assistance framework law was actually approved in 2000 (Madama, Natili & Jessoula 2013). This new framework law defined some general criteria to overcome existing policy differences among local contexts and foreseeing non discretional rights. According to this law, the State has the responsibility for defining “Essential levels of provision” and to structure social policies by providing guidelines to regions and municipalities. The law also anticipated strong involvement of civil society and third sector organizations, which represents an innovative aspect of this law. At the same time the revision of Italian Constitution in 2001 entailed a new role for municipalities, which became, according to the principle of subsidiarity, the main actors of social policies within a context in which regions have gained legislative power (and in some areas also exclusive competences) over most policies areas (health, education and means-tested income maintenance, social assistance) (Maino & Zamboni 2013).

This complex political and legal context gives at hand that local conditions and cultures – most likely – have influenced how minimum income provision is organized across Italy. Our case is the city of Turin in the Northern parts of Italy, and as we already have observed, the city hosts an ambitious agenda on social policies and express extensive aims to combat a variety of social problems, one of which is poverty. Despite these ambitions, the local system support for able bodied people is very limited as only a minor proportion of the population actually receive support from the local public authorities (reddito di mantenimento and reddito di inserimento sociale) and the local costs for social assistance is low as approx. 55-6 million EUR is spend on economic assistance. (ibid.) As underlined in by Maino and Zamboni…

‘…. the absence of a binding national framework regulating social assistance allowed wide institutional fragmentation as well as variation at local level. Regional and municipal social assistance contributions and services tended in fact to be discretionary, uncertain in their
The local schemes in operation in the city of Turin reflect such an institutional fragmentation and local variation. The table below illustrates the variety of schemes that are in order in the city of Turin and which offer – according to different categorical definitions and conditions – support for people in need (see Maino & Zamboni 2013 for further elaboration). The table demonstrates that the local schemes can be ordered into three broad categories, i.e. national and regional measures implemented at local level; local economic assistance schemes developed by the city of Turin and schemes of tax reduction and fees.

The first category regards local benefits that are in principle national and regional measures, yet implemented at local level. This category can be further analysed in terms of two types of benefits: (i) family related benefits (maternity allowance, family allowance for at least 3 minor children, and economic contribution for at least 4 children) and (ii) housing related benefits (fund for rent support, and regional social fund). These two types of benefits follow some similar characteristics.

- A. Requirements criteria and amounts are pre-determined by the national or regional law, so they are identical in all country/region and cannot be reduced by local authorities
- B. The measures are configured as individual enforceable right, this means that municipalities cannot delay or deny their provision motivating it with the lack of resources available, otherwise they can be prosecuted by citizens
- C. Municipalities have a minimal implementation role as mere local executive agency. The municipalities can only collect citizens’ demands, validate and deliver them to those who are in charge of the payment (this is quite far from a more autonomous role that would allow local municipalities to build organic and coordinated projects for family poverty) (ibid.).

Arguably, these types of benefits and measures have a fairly strong central dimension to them, as being steered by central and regional authorities. However, an additional benefit scheme needs to be integrated into this category of centrally and regionally framed schemes. Recently Italy has implemented a benefit scheme that is named the New Social Card (NSC) which tries to introduce significant innovations in institutional relations in the fight against poverty at local level (Madama, Natili & Jessoula 2013). The new Social card was introduced in 2012 as an experimental national program to fight minor poverty for households in hardship economic conditions. It does not cover all regional and local entities in Italy, yet is currently introduced in 12 cities, Turin being one.
Table 25. Division of labour between levels of government for minimum income measures in the city of Turin.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Scheme</th>
<th>Determination of access criteria</th>
<th>Financing source</th>
<th>Amount's definition</th>
<th>Where submit application form</th>
<th>Check of requirements</th>
<th>Payment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Maternity Allowance</td>
<td>National law</td>
<td>National law</td>
<td>National law</td>
<td>CAF</td>
<td>CAF</td>
<td>INPS</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family Allowance for at least 3 minor children</td>
<td>National law</td>
<td>National law</td>
<td>National law</td>
<td>CAF</td>
<td>CAF</td>
<td>INPS</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic contribution for at least 4 children</td>
<td>Regional decree</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>R</td>
<td>Regional decree</td>
<td>Municipality</td>
<td>Municipality</td>
<td>Municipality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Social Card</td>
<td>National law</td>
<td>National law</td>
<td>National law</td>
<td>Municipality</td>
<td>Municipality</td>
<td>Welfare national agency</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fund for rent support</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>R</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Regional decree</td>
<td>Municipality</td>
<td>Municipality</td>
<td>Municipality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional Social Fund</td>
<td>Regional decree</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>R</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>ATC</td>
<td>ATC</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic assistance designed and implemented by city of Turin</td>
<td>Municipality</td>
<td>Municipality</td>
<td>Municipality</td>
<td>Municipality</td>
<td>Municipality</td>
<td>Municipality</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reddito di mantenimento</td>
<td>Municipality</td>
<td>Municipality</td>
<td>Municipality</td>
<td>Municipality</td>
<td>Municipality</td>
<td>Municipality</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reddito di inserimento sociale</td>
<td>Municipality</td>
<td>Municipality</td>
<td>Municipality</td>
<td>Municipality</td>
<td>Municipality</td>
<td>Municipality</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic grants for housing</td>
<td>Municipality</td>
<td>Municipality</td>
<td>Municipality</td>
<td>Municipality</td>
<td>Municipality</td>
<td>Municipality</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic grants for specific needs</td>
<td>Municipality</td>
<td>Municipality</td>
<td>Municipality</td>
<td>Municipality</td>
<td>Municipality</td>
<td>Municipality</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bonus for electricity</td>
<td>National law</td>
<td>Regulatory authority</td>
<td>Regulatory authority</td>
<td>CAF</td>
<td>CAF</td>
<td>Energy company</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bonus for gas</td>
<td>National law</td>
<td>Regulatory authority</td>
<td>Regulatory authority</td>
<td>CAF</td>
<td>CAF</td>
<td>Gas supplier</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bonus for water</td>
<td>Regulatory authority</td>
<td>Regulatory authority</td>
<td>Regulatory authority</td>
<td>Water supplier</td>
<td>Water supplier</td>
<td>Water supplier</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fee reduction for local waste service - TARSU</td>
<td>Municipality</td>
<td>Municipality</td>
<td>Municipality</td>
<td>Municipality</td>
<td>Municipality</td>
<td>Waste company</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tax refund for municipal property tax - IMU</td>
<td>Municipality</td>
<td>Municipality</td>
<td>Municipality</td>
<td>Municipality</td>
<td>Municipality</td>
<td>Municipality</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Municipal income tax exemption - IREEF</td>
<td>Municipality</td>
<td>Municipality</td>
<td>Municipality</td>
<td>Municipality</td>
<td>Municipality</td>
<td>Municipality</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The programme of the New Social Card is regulated and financed by the central authorities and hence departs from previous traditions of localized responsibilities over financial support for people unable to work and facing economic hardships. The national regulation regards the distribution of national funds at the local level, eligibility criteria, amount of benefits, details about timing and following administrative steps and tasks assigned to municipalities. The New Social Card hence appears to involve a fairly high degree of central regulation. National funding is allocated locally according to absolute poverty indicators. The basic requirements for receiving a New Social Card established by Ministry of labor and social policy are as follows.

- Having at least one minor child,
- Being Italian, EU citizens or foreigners holding a long residence permit,
- Being resident in Turin at least for a year,
- Being in a situation of economic hardship,
- Not receiving monthly welfare benefits for more than € 600,
- Being all unemployed at the date of application, but at least one must have been employed in last 36 months.

Municipalities are then responsible for collecting applications, checking priority conditions and selecting beneficiaries, while the payment procedure is attributed to a national agency. The City of Turin decided to involve all leading third sector organizations during all implementation phases and launched a public call for application, in order to allow the widest participation of beneficiaries. The New Social Card consists in a pre-paid electronic card, whose monthly amount depends on the number of household members, as table 25 shows (Maino & Zamboni 2013).

Table 26. New social card – monthly contribution.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Family size</th>
<th>Monthly contribution</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2 persons</td>
<td>€ 231</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 persons</td>
<td>€ 281</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 persons</td>
<td>€ 331</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 or more persons</td>
<td>€ 404</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


In the city of Turin, local policy-makers have welcomed the introduction of the New Social Card, as a complement for other forms of local support schemes. It is generally held that the New Social Card is an opportunity to invest more financial resources in financial support or people in need – following the conditions set by the central authorities. It is also seen as a further support for local cooperative efforts, as it promotes an active involvement of municipalities and third sector organizations in selecting beneficiaries and developing individual activation projects (Maino & Zamboni 2013). According to Ministry of labor and social policy calculations, in the city of Turin there is approx. 11 thousand households being eligible for a New Social Card support. However, funding opportunities are limited and not
sufficient to support all of them. For this reason the municipality approved act 02301/19, which contains a priority list (Maino & Zamboni 2013).

The second category of benefit schemes relates to forms of economic assistance, designed only by the city of Turin and implemented by the city of Turin. In the city of Turin, these dates back to the 1960s and are designed and implemented by the department of social services and financed with the municipality’s funds. The aim with these schemes is to ensure a minimum income support for individuals and households and promote social and economic autonomy of people through coordination with active labor market policies – administered by department of labor. There are four main instruments to support household income, which can be grouped into two categories, with housing grants staying in between, as shown in table 26.

Table 27. Economic scheme to support household income governed by City of Turin.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ongoing</th>
<th>Housing grants aimed to maintain an adequate living condition</th>
<th>Temporary Economic grants for specific needs for a temporary span of time</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Minimum income for people not able to work (Reddito di mantenimento)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minimum income for people able to work (Reddito di inserimento sociale)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Both Italian citizens and foreigners resident in Turin with very low income can apply. All measures are paid to the family unit, if this unit’s total revenues (also including donations, income from random jobs – although not documented for tax purposes – and subsidies granted by State or other public entities) gained at the time of application and during the period of payment of grant are below a certain amount. The application process in the city of Turin is quite demanding, in order to select between potential beneficiaries: households can apply to local social offices. Within the following 30 days, a local social worker will hold an interview the applicant. Economic grants can be awarded after have been verified eligibility criteria through database controls and also inspections by municipal police. The application procedure is hence quite demanding for both the application and also for the local authorities, and one can anticipate deterring functions on both parts.

The two main types of benefits schemes have different periods of duration. An approved benefit is granted for either six or twelve months. The maximum duration in time for Reddito di mantenimento is 12 months and the maximum duration for the Reddito di inserimento sociale is six months. In case of renewal, a new application process needs to be completed and social services’ must again check eligibility requirements in relation to benefits (see Maino & Zamboni 2013).

The reddito di mantimento (scheme for economic assistance for people not able to work) is the most important scheme for this particular group of people, provided by the Turin social services. In 2012, the city distributed approx. 2.1 million EUR to 1214 persons, which was a slight increase in relation to previous years. Eligibility criteria for minimum income aiming to
ensure a standard of adequate living for people not able to work over 65 or younger than 18, invalid, disabled or pregnant.

- not having a family income higher than the total amount of Reddito di mantenimento,
- not owning a medium-high value house,
- not owning a vehicle registered within 6 years preceding the application,
- not holding financial assets for more than a certain threshold and
- not having a family member able to work that is not involved with active job search

A one person household – following these conditions – receives approx. 480 EUR on a monthly basis, and with a possibility for extra rent support of 140 EUR.

Reddito di inserimento sociale is the second most important scheme, operated by the city of Turin. The scheme focuses on people being able to work and aims to facilitate social inclusion and employment for this particular group. People who are out of work and able to work and whose family income is lower than the Reddito di inserimento sociale are eligible to apply. However, a list of additional criterion is in operation. Households are not allowed to own a) a medium-high value house, b) a vehicle registered within 6 years preceding the application, or c) financial assets for more than a certain threshold. Moreover, individuals must also fulfill a certain set of working and training obligations. They are not allowed to have stopped working without a valid reason. Moreover, they need to actively seek a job, through frequent contact with employment centers or temporary employment agencies. They also need to accept any job offers, including temporary ones and attend regularly training sessions, internships or any other activity proposed by the government to facilitate participation in labor market.

The benefit level in the reddito inserimento di sociale is much lower than for the reddito di mantenimento, illustrating differences between deserving and underserving poor. Households with one member are entitled – when following all above-mentioned criterions – to a benefit of 181 EUR, with a possibility for additional 57 EUR for domestic bills. This amounts to a total benefit level of 238 EUR.

Although this is one of the major schemes in operation by the city of Turin, the city distributed only 1.75 million EUR to 1934 persons in the year of 2012, which still was a very sharp increase in relation to previous years, e.g. a 52 per cent increase since 2008.

In a comparative perspective, the small size of local minimum income schemes and minor amounts being spent by local authorities to people in need, both having problems relating to unemployment as well as social problems of various forms is striking. The low percentage of persons on minimum income support, as part of the population, in Turin (only 0.34 percent as shown in figure 7) and the low number of people receiving local financial support demonstrates that the city of Turin only provides last resort minimum income schemes and has defined and introduced very tight access criteria in order to receive local minimum income benefits.
However, there is also a third category of schemes in operation in the city of Turin, i.e. fee and tax reductions. Households may apply for reductions for public fees, for instance with regard to public services such as costs for energy, gas, water and waste. Depending on the income of the household, such benefits may apply and offer additional support in addition to the first and second categories of support for people living under financial hardship, yet possibly not qualifying for the second category of schemes. Moreover, households may also apply for tax reductions in terms of municipal property tax, municipal income tax, depending on the size of the households’ income.

These three categories combined build a complex system of public support schemes, regulated by central, regional and local authorities, granting support based on different categorical conditions (able/unable to work, household categories, family status etcetera). The complexity of the system has been illustrated in our interviews with local informants.

First, representatives of the city of Turin have expressed that the municipality has always met all requests for economic assistance, when being able to find necessary funds. Interviews also demonstrate that given that access criteria for these economic assistance schemes have become even more tight ‘… when a household does not receive support from municipality, it may apply to third sector organizations, which generally operate with more flexible intervention styles’ (Maino & Zambiono 2013). In the city of Turin, third sector organizations have traditionally played an important role in combating poverty, both by establishing forms of cooperation with public authorities and institutions and by providing interventions and services in an autonomous way. There are several important and also large actors stemming from the third sector offering support for people in various needs. *Compagnia di San Paolo*, one of the two bank foundations based in Turin and its instrumental body *Ufficio Pio* are among the main protagonists in the area of welfare and in funding and implementing initiatives and programs to combat poverty and prevent social exclusion (ibid.). Such complementary functions of third sector organizations will be explored further in chapters below.

Second, informants also explore that the complexity of the local system is hard for people to grasp, possibly for local officials and certainly for marginal groups. Households must be competent, active and informed on the various types of schemes in operation, what conditions that applies and where to apply to be able to navigate and also to add benefit schemes on top of each other. This is a result of the fragmented and complex nature of local minimum income provision in the city of Turin. Maino & Zambiono (2013) furthermore add that ‘… many different and fragmented schemes, managed by different institutions, increase administrative costs and do not communicate respective beneficiaries with each other’. This is partly also reflected in the relevance of third sector organizations in this particular local context. In fact, the citizens excluded from public minimum income schemes generally turn to the network of third sector organizations (charities as Caritas and Saint Vincent Association, and instrumental bodies such as the *Ufficio Pio*) as highlighted in the report.
The responsibility for minimum income support in the context of Poland is shared by the central level, and three sub-national levels, regions, poviats and gminas. Some larger Polish cities have a status as a Poviat, but still being a local level public agency operating at the same level as smaller municipalities, i.e. gminas. Traditionally each of these subnational administrative levels and authorities have been fairly independent from the central level in shaping central features of different social policy systems, however, circumscribed and embedded in legal framework and financial support structure from the central state (Kozek, Kubisa & Zielińska 2013).

The gminas are responsible for managing social, family and housing policy at the local level. The main actor responsible for delivering financial support or people living in financial hardship in the Polish city of Radom is the local Social Assistance Organization. The local municipality is the public actor with the formal mandate to deliver minimum income protection in a Polish context, and hence being given the legal mandate to put such activities into operation, as well as expected to have sufficient financial resources to complete such a task. The poviat is responsible mainly for specialized services such as care for the physically or mentally disabled. Poviats are also bound to prepare strategies for social inclusion of people from vulnerable groups (the disabled, the long-term unemployed). Furthermore, the poviat is the administrative level at which local PES operate. They are responsible for the delivery of employment services, i.e. payment of unemployment benefits and provision of ALMP job agency (employment consultancy, job seeking support, vocational trainings, apprenticeships etc.). There exist several overlapping activities between these levels. For instance, a local SAO and local PES can set priorities and seek for additional funding in case of tasks which are underfinanced. SAO and PES cannot exclude any social group defined in the social assistance act or add additional criteria.

The Municipal Social Assistance Office in Radom (MSAO - a city institution but carries out also some tasks assigned by the Radom poviat) is responsible for social assistance benefits and forms of social services. The role of the MSAO is essentially preventing the effects of poverty. Its task focuses strongly on groups referred to in the law on social assistance: large or single-parent families affected by the consequences of long-term unemployment. The approach towards these families is comprehensive and includes the provision of subsistence and many activation measures. Working poor are not of particular interest to MSAO because they do not match the threshold (Kozek, Kubisa & Zielińska 2013). Besides these responsibilities, the MSAO in Radom is also obliged to prepare local strategies for solving social problems and preparation of needs assessment in the area of social policy (ibid.). Although the local units (poviats or the City) have a large financial responsibility over local social assistance costs, these are shared with the central government. In the city of, the total SAO budget was financed as follows: 28 per cent from the City budget (gmina and poviat) and 72 per cent from the state budget (Kozek, Kubisa & Zielińska 2013).

Each family or individual who obtains benefits from MSAO is assigned to a caseworker who assesses the eligibility for allowances on the basis of a social interview. The decision made
by social worker has a legal character. The national standard for eligibility is formulated in the national social assistance act. People and families are formally eligible for temporary allowance if they fulfill the income criterion and at least one additional criterion from those defined by law, the act on social assistance from 2004: i) unemployment, ii) orphanage, iii) homelessness, iv) disability, v) chronic illness, vi) domestic violence, vii) human trafficking, viii) need for the protection of maternity (and numerous families), ix) helplessness in the performance of up-bringing functions and in running a household (especially in case of single-parent or numerous families), x) problems of young people leaving childcare facilities with adjustment to everyday life requirements, xi) need for inclusion of foreigners with refugee status or with right to supplementary protection and xii) adjustment problems after leaving prison, alcoholism and drug addiction, xiii) random incident or crisis situation, natural or ecological disaster (ibid.). However, only in four of those cases payment is obligatory: if someone is unemployed, chronically ill, disabled or awaiting an administrative decision about some other type of benefit (Wóycicka 2009, Szarfenberg 2009). In other cases the decision is left to the discretion of social services as it is based on social interview performed by a social worker.

The central act also stipulates a strong regulation with regard to how much money applicants are allowed to receive.

- Permanent allowance, max. 529 PLN (125 euro)
- Temporary allowance, max. 418 PLN (99 euro)
- Family allowances: child up to 5 years old 77 PLN (18 euro), 5-18 years old 106 PLN (25 euro), 18-24 years old 115 PLN (27 euro), numerous families benefit (80 PLN for third child and next children) (19 euro)
- Purposes allowance, sum not limited due to need of homeless, sickness or of fate situation
- Additionally, school books in the beginning of school year up to 100 PLN (23 euro)
- Housing benefits, average 206 PLN (48 euro)

The local SAO has some liberty in setting local standards in case of the income thresholds for warm meals and food provisions, on the level of 150 per cent of the threshold for social assistance benefits. However, most of our informants express that they follow national standards and provides allowances and services for the entitled claimants. Issues of local autonomy and local discretion very much concerned how to test that individuals actually were eligible to receive support.

The sanctions defined in social assistance act apply to situation when a person who obtains earmark allowances does not fulfill the obligations of the social contract or rejects job offers. In that case the earmark allowance can be withdrawn. Employment in the shadow economy, without a contract can be an argument to withdraw the allowances – since the real family income is higher than the official one presented at SAO. However no precise information about this kind of allowances suspension appears in the SAO documents and in interviews conducted.
Ordinary policies under extraordinary circumstances in Malmö

The Swedish national regulatory system of MIP is the social assistance system, which in turn is regulated by the Social Services Act (2001:453), a national framework law drafted in general terms (Government Bill 1979/80:1, 1996/97:124, 2000/01:80), mostly in forms of general intentions and imprecise requirements regarding benefit eligibility (Panican et al 2013). The national regulation hence allows local governments room for local interpretation, since implementation is given to local actors and based on their discretionary power. The municipality has a complete funding responsibility and has the possibility and responsibility to shape its own more detailed rules. However, certain regulatory mechanisms restrict a full decentralized profile of MIP.

First, since 1998 the National Board of Health and Welfare has had the responsibility to develop national standards for social assistance, both defining the amount given to households (depending on type and size of household) as well as what kind of needs are to be included in the standard. Since 2013, changes in national regulation have made it possible and advisable that local governments take a stand on what is to consider as reasonable amount to cover each need which is included in the standard, yet not change the total amount.

Second, the Social Services Act has provided individuals with a right to appeal to an administrative court, through a procedure known as administrative appeal (the County Administrative Court has the decision power). The right to appeal can be applied to all decisions made under the Social Services Act. If the applicant is displeased about the treatment from front-line staff, then it is possible to complain to the County Administrative Board which is the supervisory agency for the Social Services Office (ibid.).

An element of individualization is also evident in the legal and national regulation on local provision of MIS. According to the Social Services Act, the Social Services Office must always make an individual action plan. The plan should be established together with the applicant. The main purpose is to indicate what measures are necessary, the responsibilities of the applicant and each official involved in the case, any other possible actions taken by anyone other than the local Social Services Office and who have the overall responsibility for implementation of those agreements specified in the individual plan.

To receive social assistance, the applicant turn to the local Social Services Office and in most of cases, at least when seeking social assistance for the first time, meet a professional trained social worker for assessment. Individuals normally claim social assistance if either economically active but not entitled to unemployment benefits or economically inactive, e.g. due to health reasons. Each application is assessed individually but the Social Services Act covers some national standards according to which clients should be valued on their eligibility. Social assistance is a last-resort safety net for people who temporary cannot sort out their own financial situation. Each individual who turn 18 and residing in Sweden has the right to apply for social assistance. Parents have the duty to support their own children, if the youngster still a student at upper secondary school then this obligation is extended until the children turn 21. Recently coming refugees are entitled to introduction fee instead for social assistance. The requirements regarding benefit eligibility are the following:
• The applicant and other members of the household (primarily the partner, married or cohabiting) totally lack financial resources. The applicant may have to sell all own assets and demonstrate that there is no money left in the bank account.

• The applicant must prove that he/she is not entitled to any other general benefits such as unemployment insurance benefits, sickness and housing benefits, parental allowance or maintenance support.

• The claimant must be assessed as being available for work or make efforts to enhance their own employability by participating in recommended employability measures such as work experience programs, work rehabilitation measures, training programs, education courses and other knowledge-building activities.

• The claimant must actively searching for a job and be prepared to accept any jobs. The aim is to support itself by paid work and find a full-time job but accept part-time employments also. The applicant must agree to take even jobs outside the own professional field and be willing to commute or move to another city or different part of the country, if this is required to get a job.

The main principle is arguably to design a system that seeks to maximize claimants’ abilities to – as soon as possible – live a life without being dependent on social assistance benefits. The Social Services Act states special requirements on unemployed youth under 25 years old to take part in occupational schemes and other skills-enhancing activities; since 2013, municipalities are allowed to make such demands to all social assistance recipients, irrespective of age (Panican et al 2013).

The Social Services Act allow local authorities to take sanctions if an applicant turn down recommended employability measures or refuses to take a job without an acceptable reason. The sanction could be to reject an application for social assistance or to reduce the level of social assistance. The applicant has the right to receive the decision in writing and then to appeal the decision. The Social Services must follow the court’s decision. The local authorities are not allowed to take other sanctions in addition to the already described but the local social welfare board has the right to top up the social assistance or benefits granted under the Social Services Act. There is no time limit for how long a claimant can receive social assistance.

The process of decision making is further carried out at the local political level and in most cases by social workers who define the eligibility criteria in order to distinguish deserving from non-deserving claimants. The social worker assesses whether the claimant lack financial resources, if the applicant is to be judged as actively searching for a job and when and in which way sanctions should applied against the applicant who turn down recommended employability measures. In most cases the application for social assistance is for a month at a time (ibid.).

The social assistance includes support for upkeep and for other items. The upkeep or income support contains financial support which follow a national norm and support for reasonable costs for other common needs such as housing. The national norm includes expenses for food (sweets, snacks and wine are not included), clothes and shoes, leisure and play, health and
hygiene, insurance of children and young people, a daily newspaper, telephone and TV license fee. The Swedish Government establishes the national norm each year based on calculations from the National Council for Consumer Affairs representing a normal level of consumption. The financial norm in 2013 for a single person is 3,880 SEK per month (450 EUR) and for a couple 6,360 SEK per month (740 EUR). The norm for dependent children in a benefit unit (one or two adults) is linked to the child's age. The support for reasonable costs for other common needs refers to costs for housing, household electricity, home contents insurance, work-related travels, membership fees for a trade union and unemployment benefit fund. There is not a national standard which regulate this costs. The law states only that the costs should be reasonable. The expenses for these needs are assessed individually and it is the social worker which decides what reasonable cost at a plausible level is. Housing costs are not included in these calculations, as the Act regulates that the applicant has right to reasonable housing costs. The guideline for what is to be consider as reasonable housing costs are based on what a low-income earner in the applicant own municipality normally can afford.

Social assistance allowance can also be granted for costs which are not included in the support for upkeep. The authority to decide over what type of costs that are to be consider as ‘other items’ are taken at local level based on individual assessments. The National Board of Health and Welfare exemplifies that such costs could include assistance for medical and dental care, recreation and funerals, glasses, equipment for the home or moving house and in exceptional cases help with debts. As already mentioned the Social Services Act does not particularly focus on the three target groups in this report: single mothers, long-term unemployed persons and working poor (Panican et al 2013).

Local political entrepreneurship against central steering in Glasgow

The local governance of minimum income protection in the city of Glasgow share several similarities with the case of Dortmund. They are both local illustrations of centrally steered and employment oriented national models. However, whereas minimum income provision in Dortmund is embedded in a local culture of cooperation, partnership and cross sectorial alliances, the situation seem to be highly different in the city of Glasgow. Although local actors have limited room for formal discretion and autonomy, we find an extensive entrepreneurial effort on part of local public authorities.

First, the UK Government departments have the responsibility for the main tools for delivering welfare support an anti-poverty measures. This includes the main provision of (cash) benefits and financial support, and the provision and management of the tax credit system. DWP is the administering agency for out-of-work payments, benefits and a range of other social support payments. Pensions, Disability and Carers services and support are also the responsibility of the DWP. The DWP also has responsibility for the provision of employment services such as the public employment service, Jobcentre Plus (JCP) and for the contracting of welfare-to-work programmes in all localities across the UK. The provision and administration of social security payments and benefit support is a reserved (i.e. not devolved) matter and remains within the responsibility of the Department of Work and

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Pensions (DWP), which is part of the UK civil service. This means that benefit rates, administrative processes, eligibility, entitlements and benefit categorization takes place at the UK level and through the UK parliament. Moreover, Jobcentre Plus (JCP) and its actions are not influenced by the local council elected representatives, and in Scotland they are also not influenced by the Scottish Government or elected members. The funding for activation programmes, benefits and tax credits derives from the UK treasury and through the DWP or Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs which are UK agencies. There are no local income schemes operating in Glasgow which involve the transfer of cash payments to benefit claimants (including any of the three target groups) (Bennett & Clegg 2013).

Second, the Scottish Government does not have any devolved powers in terms of the main welfare state provisions such as benefits and eligibilities for out-of-work support. Yet, it does have a number of levers and opportunities to assist those in poverty through other budget areas. Individuals in Scotland can therefore receive some different minimum income payments on top of or replacing the UK national provisions. The Scottish Government also has a number of devolved powers which enable it to provide local levels of support in the broader poverty and activation agenda. To date this has predominately focused on youth unemployment, and the provision of training and education. These are both devolved issues and therefore the Scottish Government is able to enact some influence and create its own policies under these broad policy banners. It has also been able to operate a number of policies and programmes through its regeneration budgets and objectives and the associated housing policies. Whilst it may not have control or influence over the cash benefit rates, rules and allowances for those seeking support from the welfare state, it is able to introduce and enact some local influence in the provision of services and support in order to increase economic development, or to directly influence the well-being of people experiencing poverty (Bennett & Clegg 2013).

Third, the local City’s authority (known as Glasgow City Council- GCC) has hence a fairly restricted formal responsibility over the local minimum income system. Its main formal responsibilities rather lie in areas of general public services such as museums, public parks, education, refuse collection, social work and some transport issues within the boundaries of the City. It has the authority to collect of council tax from their residents and the provision of housing benefit and council tax benefit to those residents which qualify for assistance. Arguably, Glasgow City Council does not have a specified budget for the provision on MIS and welfare services as the responsibility for these policy areas and social assistance programmes lies with the DWP and the UK government. But GCC does provide some activation programmes and some MIS and income maximisation support, however as the funding does not come directly from the Scottish or UK government for these specific activities it is not possible to differentiate and compare within the Council’s official accounts the total amount of funding spent annually on MIS provision (Bennett & Clegg 2013). GCC is able to set council tax reduction eligibility criteria for some groups and in recent years has been made responsible for the provision of discretionary housing payments for individuals affected by the UK. GCC has overall responsibility for issues of homelessness and housing benefit. The council also provides some ‘passported benefits’ such as free school lunches for children from particular social-economic situations (ibid.).
The conclusion is that there is very little room for differentiation and interpretation. Local governments are not able to add local sanctions to national regulation and they are not part of the policy making process surrounding the use of and the eligibility for sanctioning in the provision of welfare services. Front-line staffs therefore are not provided with discretion in their application of sanctioning policies. In practice this implies that the main minimum income scheme in the city of Glasgow (as elsewhere in the UK) is the centrally regulated and financed Jobseekers Allowance (JSA), Income Support (IS), Employment Support Allowance (ESA), working tax credits and family tax credits, as well as housing benefits, council tax benefits and various other locally administered passported benefits. While JSA are administered and paid by the DWP, in-work-benefits in the form of tax credits and child benefit are paid directly by the Treasury. Passported in-kind benefits, as well as housing benefit and council tax benefit, fall within the responsibility of local authority that are reimbursed by the respective responsible government department (ibid.)

In the tax year 2012/2013, IS and JSA for all claimants aged 25 and over was £71 per week, and £65.25 for claimants aged 16 to 24. Single parents can access the higher rate already once they reach the age of 18. Various premiums for families, children or disabilities can be added to the basic rate. For couples where both partners (both aged 25 or above) are claiming JSA, only the lower rate is paid. A recently passed law restricts benefit up-ratings to 1 per cent per year for a period of three years (2013-2015), temporarily suspending the normal parliamentary benefit level review process. Benefits are paid fortnightly, directly into claimants’ bank account. Claimants have to be aged 18 or over, and under State Pension age. They must be legal residents in the UK.

IS and JSA are means-tested benefits that can be claimed in full as long as incomes do not surpass the so-called ‘applicable amount’. This is calculated by subtracting an earnings disregard (£5 for singles) from the sum of the personal IS or JSA allowances and premiums. In 2012, singles with weekly incomes below £66 would usually be entitled to the maximum amount of IS or JSA, provided that their individual savings do not surpass £16,000. Individuals with savings of over £6000 can still claim reduced rates (up to savings of £16000), with weekly benefits being reduced by £1 for every £250 (Bennett & Clegg 2013).

IS and JSA claimants are allowed to engage in part-time work (maximum 16 hours per week), however additional earnings from work will lead to benefit reductions by the same amount above an earnings disregard of £5 per week for singles, £10 for couples and £20 for single parents. Part-time workers claiming JSA will be expected to continue looking for work above 16 hours per week. Anybody working more than 16 hours per week is not entitled to JSA or IS, but can claim tax credits instead. JSA claimants who have left their job on their own account, or lost it because of their own actions, aren’t eligible for a maximum of 26 weeks (which at the same time appears to the standard duration) from the start of their claim. Only one person per couple can make a claim for JSA. In case that both are unemployed, this will be considered a ‘joint claim’. If only one person is unemployed, they cannot claim JSA if their partner is working more than 24 hours per week – in that case, it would be assumed that the unemployed person is subsidised from their partner’s income, who, if income is low, can claim tax credits (Jin et al., 2010). IS can be claimed only by single parents, provided that
their youngest child is not older than 5 years. Where the youngest child is older than 5, single parents have to claim JSA. Furthermore, carers of a disabled person or an ill family member can claim IS. IS is also the benefit of last resort for all those who are not eligible to one of the other social security benefits. Detailed eligibility criteria are provided in DWP (2012a).

However, the local government has used its abilities to expand its local mandate, both directly relating to minimum income schemes and related benefits. As the system remains centralized there is no formal system for user groups or local decision makers such as councillors or community representatives to engage with the design and decision-making processes of the activation services provided by JCP and contracted welfare-to-work providers. One area where the local actors have some influence on poverty levels and experiences of poverty is through the provision of passported benefits. GCC provides free school meals, subsidised support for individual’s attending job interviews and some free childcare for lone parents attending into-work interviews.

More importantly, the GCC and local public agencies are directly involved in expanding its limited formal mandate in the field of minimum income support, poverty alleviation and employment related services. In the city of Glasgow, public resources are directed towards funding financial advice and income maximization services, which focus on providing individuals with support to navigate and claim payments from the national schemes. There are arguably two main purposes for local authorities and local actors to adopt an income maximization approach. The first is because as it is not responsible for the costs of these benefits payments, income maximization is a straightforward way to assist individuals receive their entitlements. The second is that income maximization in Glasgow is also considered as an income for the local economy on the whole (GCVS 2010, RAS 2010). This approach has historically formed part of GCC’s finance department and the social work department’s efforts to assist residents in need and remains within the broad remit of the work of these departments. It has also featured heavily as a strategy across Scotland for dealing with issues of poverty and unemployment for the past two decades (Scott & Mooney 2009). Although local actors have little influence and discretion on national MIS schemes, they use local resources to gain from and appeal to the national schemes. This is an interesting feature of the central-local relations in the UK system in terms of local support for those in poverty (Bennett & Clegg 2013).

Moreover, there are local programmes that directly seek to assist jobseekers into employment and many agencies involved in supporting those in receipt of benefits and/or experiencing poverty. Furthermore, agencies and local organizations are increasingly involved in partnership working and joint strategic service design in order to assist those in poverty through the provision of advice, sign-posting and referring to relevant organizations, and designing organizational activities which meet the needs of service users. For GCC and its associated partners and Arm’s Length External Organizations, there is an element of negotiation and steering required when designing and accessing funding for local activation programmes and anti-poverty initiatives. Some of these negotiations are technical and administrative whilst others derive from historical and political features of local-central relations (Bennett & Clegg 2013).
These activities in the city of Glasgow take shape in the backdrop of central-local tensions, however, must also be analysed in the backdrop of recent reform activities in part of the UK government. The autumn 2013 saw the introduction of the governments’ flagship initiative the Universal Credit (UC), which aims to replace all means-tested working-age benefits; the UC implementation is not going well. Current estimates are that it will be rolled out in 2017 although it will more likely be 2018. A key driver behind most of the reforms has been the desire to cut overall welfare expenditure (even if some initiatives, like UC, will require high transitional funding), which is a key component of the government’s overall commitment to austerity as a response to (or in spite of) the current crisis. This re-categorisation will lead to the homogenisation of benefit rates and benefit tapers. UC will furthermore reduce complexity as it will be administered by a single agency – the DWP – in contrast to the current situation, where claimants have to deal with several agencies (ibid.). Key features of UC include a) a single withdrawal rate for all benefits, in-work or out-of work, b) a linear withdrawal rate for in-work-benefits, doing away with current 16 hours cliff-edge, c) continuous in-work-conditionality for in-work-benefit claimants who work low hours and earn less than the equivalent of working full time at the national minimum wage, d) abolition of disability-premiums, and instead introduction of higher earnings disregards for disadvantaged groups, e) a move to monthly payments (currently: fortnightly), made to the head of the household (currently: working tax credits paid to member of household who is actually working), and f) a move to ‘digital by default’, meaning that claims will be processed through an online form. The full width of this reform is still to be proven, but it will certainly keep most reform powers in the hands of the central government in Whitehall.

Summary

The cities studied in this chapter can be analysed on the background of the regime typologies developed by scholars such as Gough and Kazepov (see chapter 3 above). Kazepov argued that European minimum income schemes and above all national social assistance models could be depicted according to different regime typologies, such as the local autonomy – centrally regulated model; the centrally regulated model; the regionally regulated model and lastly countries in transition. These model typologies have great relevance for the analysis completed in this chapter, and can be used for some further analytical comments on the central – local dynamics spelled out in our five local cases. We have tried to summarise the main features of local governance patterns over minimum income support in the following table.

Each municipality in this study is characterized by extensive problem pressure (high unemployment rates, low labour market participation, high costs for social assistance, pervasive patterns of marginalization and social exclusion) over the last years. How have this then affected local governance patterns?

First and foremost we can make some interesting and general conclusions with regard to how central – local regulations over social assistance provision is being materialized in the five local contexts. Dortmund and Glasgow share several similarities when it comes to the organization of the national schemes. They are both colored by strong central regulation over
benefits (eligibility, benefit levels, sanctions etcetera) as well as financing. Local agencies operating in the cities of Dortmund and Glasgow are extensively circumscribed by such central regulations. The city of Turin follows a much more mixed version of regulation, as some parts of the schemes are centrally regulated (the New Social Card) whereas others are directly and only part of local regulation patterns. The degree of central regulations is more modest, but still highly present in the cities of Malmö and Radom. Actors at local levels in these two cities operate under a framework of central regulation including elements of mandatory legal regulation, yet also looser forms of expectancies on local entities to follow the aims and ambitions spelled out in national regulation.

What is striking when comparing these local cases is that they act highly differently in relation to these national regulations. The cities of Radom and Malmö follow national regulations and standards, although they have a much higher degree of local autonomy and discretionary powers to develop models and forms of interpretation on national standards that much more would reflect local conditions and ambitions. Radom, to make this would have to have own funds on this purpose. This is highly interesting in the case of Malmö. In Sweden local authorities have full funding responsibilities over local social assistance schemes and at present the local costs for social assistance has been sky rocketing. In a national context, Malmö seem to be an extreme case when it comes to problem pressure. Despite these conditions, the city practices fairly ordinary policies when it comes to the policies and measures being introduced locally linked to the MIP.

The cities of Dortmund and Glasgow also follow their respective central regulation, yet in these cases we find much more local entrepreneurial activities, and above all in the city of Glasgow. Although being framed and restricted by a strong central regulatory framework, the local government has made extensive efforts to developed parallel policies and activities to limit the local dependency on a centrally regulated scheme. Only in Glasgow can we find a system of income maximization through funding financial advice and income maximization services which focus on providing individuals with support to navigate and claim payments from the national schemes. In our empirical data it is explained that income maximization is used as a strategy across Scotland for dealing with issues of poverty and unemployment for the past two decades in helping individuals receive their entitlements financed by the UK and not by the local authorities. Arguably, local autonomy is much more used in a context where we did not expect to find it.

The local governance of minimum income support in the city of Turin comes out as a different model of local organization. Partly it is a mix of central and local regulation, it is a complex patchwork of a wide numbers of benefit schemes, yet which are limited and fairly small. As a complex local system, it is difficult for local beneficiaries to navigate within. The element of having a right to support is hence weak in this particular context. The benefits might be adequate for those people who receive support, but the actual numbers being covered by the local schemes is very limited. This reflects the arguments raised by Kazepov and Barberis (2012) (see chapter 3) on the regionally framed models, although further illustrating their limited width.
Second, in a comparative perspective the Swedish social assistance model stands out for its high degree of means-testing. This is less evident in the centrally regulated schemes, which also have much more employment orientation that the locally socially regulated schemes, (see chapter four above). All models include elements of needs and means-testing, yet this seem to be a very central feature of the Swedish system, as being practiced in the city of Malmö. As part of the eligibility test, individuals are required to seek all other solutions and use all other means before social assistance could be granted. Those who become eligible have more or less emptied savings and other resources which is not the case in the other cities. The applicant and other members of the household must totally lack financial resources in order to receive social assistance. This means that the applicant may have to sell all own assets and demonstrate that there is no money left in the bank account. In this sense, the applicant and members of the household must give away some civil rights such as property rights. For instance, in Turin, the benefit recipients are allowed to own their own house (yet, not owning a medium-high value house) and a vehicle (however, not owning a vehicle registered within 6 years preceding the application). In the UK, the applicant is allowed to holding financial assets to a certain thresholds; singles with weekly incomes below a certain amount of money would usually be entitled to the maximum amount of IS or JSA if their own savings do not surpass £16,000.

Last but not least, Poland is located as a form of countries in transition according to Kazpeov and Barberis (2012). As such the third sector is considered as very important, levels of funding as low and based on corporatist and that local decision-makers and social workers used so called extra legem in their activities in relation to central regulation. The case of Radom does not completely fit with these general descriptions. Certainly we find that third sector organizations play a significant role and that the level of funding is fairly low. However, we also find extensive central funding for local social services and social assistance provision and moreover that local actors seem to follow the rules and regulations established by the central government. The practices by local decision-makers and social workers much more resemble the description of local autonomy, centrally regulated model, at least when it comes to the interactions between central and local regulation.
Table 28. Local governance of minimum income support schemes in COPE cities.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dortmund</th>
<th>Turin</th>
<th>Glasgow</th>
<th>Radom</th>
<th>Malmö</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Degree of central regulation</td>
<td>• High</td>
<td>• Low, but varied</td>
<td>• High</td>
<td>• Medium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Degree of local autonomy</td>
<td>• Very limited, but used by local agencies</td>
<td>• Extensive</td>
<td>• Very limited, but very much used by local agencies</td>
<td>• Moderate and not directly used by local agencies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public unit responsible for delivering local benefits</td>
<td>• Federally regulated JobCentre, Municipal social welfare office catering for those with ‘social problems’</td>
<td>• Municipal social welfare office</td>
<td>• Centrally regulated JCP</td>
<td>• Municipal social welfare office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Example of benefits</td>
<td>• ALG II and Sozialgeld</td>
<td>• New Social Card, Reddito inserimento di sociale (ablebodied) and Reddito di mantenimento (unable to work)</td>
<td>• JSA</td>
<td>• Temporary benefit, Permanent benefit, Purposeful benefit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrative levels involved in local regulation of MIS</td>
<td>• Two levels: federal and local levels, the federal level dominates</td>
<td>• Three levels: National, regional and local level, mainly local and regional</td>
<td>• Two (or three) levels: Central to a high extent, less so local</td>
<td>state, region, poviat &amp; gmina</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Funding structure for local MIS</td>
<td>• Mostly centralized (e.g. in Dortmund ALG II is paid by 84.4 per cent by federal means), Sozialgeld only local budget.</td>
<td>• Mixed. New Social Card by central government. Other schemes on local city budget.</td>
<td>• Central budget only</td>
<td>• Mixed. Central budget pays a large proportion, including costs for social assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Main structure of local MIS</td>
<td>• One general scheme for all unemployed. Sozialgeld is for those persons who do not meet the eligibility criteria for</td>
<td>• Mixed and partly patchy structures at local level.</td>
<td>• Mainly one scheme. Complementary tax reductions schemes.</td>
<td>• One general social assistance scheme, covering unemployment and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eligibility criteria</td>
<td>• Working age, employability, residence in Germany</td>
<td>• Lack of financial resources, partly family status, employment status</td>
<td>• Limited</td>
<td>• Fairly detailed. National standard for eligibility formulated in the social assistance act.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------</td>
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<td>-------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Use of means-testing</td>
<td>• Limited</td>
<td>• Moderate</td>
<td>• Limited</td>
<td>• Moderate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National and local eligibility criterion</td>
<td>• Low decisive discretion at local level. • Sanction: reducing benefits from 30 % up to the whole ALG II rate. Replaced benefits compensated through food vouchers • Institutionalized complaints management</td>
<td>• NSC: at least one minor child, Italian, EU citizens or foreigners with long residence permit, resident in Turin for a year, not receiving monthly welfare benefits above € 600, being unemployed but at least one must have been employed in last 36 months • Means testing used for all schemes • Economic assistance: varying criteria between people able and not able to work</td>
<td>• Key MIP schemes: JSA, IS, working &amp; family tax credits, housing benefits, council tax benefits &amp; various other locally administered passported benefits. • Autumn 2013, UC replacing all means-tested working-age benefits. • Legal appeal structure for claimants to the relevant UK agency</td>
<td>• Social worker plays an important role in the activity of SAO • Sanctions if the client does not fulfill the obligations or rejects job offers</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
9. Patterns of coordination and integration in local active inclusion policies

A key issue in the COPE projects regards the multi-dimensionality of active inclusion policies, i.e. the forms and degree to which policies are formally or informally coordinated or even if we can observe the introduction of one-stop shops models, as a way to directly coordinate and integrate policy areas. Issues of policy coordination and organizational integration primarily concern links between activation policies and minimum income support, and hence between agencies responsible for carrying out such activities.

Extensive integrated services in the city of Dortmund

A cornerstone in the German Hartz IV reform was the merger between parts of the unemployment insurance and the previously local social assistance system. The less known Hartz II reform implied the introduction of a one-stop shop model at local level, the so-called Jobcentres. The ideal was to fully integrate employment services (PES) and financial support for those – able-bodied – in need and entitled to ALG II. However, these ambitions were criticized for being against the constitution and a complete merger never really took place at local level, but the reform have resulted in a close formal cooperation between municipalities and public employment services, although these two organizations still are separate, yet within a common organizational frame.

In the city of Dortmund, the Jobcenter is responsible for job counselling and placement as well as for all financial issues of the ALG II beneficiaries. ALG II recipients have privileged access to employment services. Those services are at the discretion of the Jobcenter and are paid out of the budget for placement. The case managers and the personal advice service provide services of career counselling and placement which are primarily important for long-term unemployed and single parents (Petzold 2013). Activation measures are part of the individual integration agreement between the beneficiaries and the case manager. As the Jobcenter is linked to the municipality, there are no special exclusively municipally run activation units in Dortmund (Spannagel 2013).

The municipal administration and the Jobcenter are closely cooperating in the field of activation services. The individual case managers offer the employment services and are in charge of coordinating the activation measures. These are offered by various local institutions which are run by the municipal administration, the Free Welfare Associations or third sector organisations. The funding of these institutions varies, some of them are funded directly by the Jobcenter and therefore receive federal funds, other are entirely municipally funded. A third group of organisations receives third party funding, mainly from the ESF. In Dortmund, this group includes for example activation measures which are especially directed at migrants or lone mothers (Jobcentre Dortmund 2011, Spannagel 2013).

Services offered by the Jobcentre include several measures: to get familiar with vocational training as well as with labour market requirements, to detect, reduce and if possible remove placement obstacles, to find an employment subject to social insurance contributions, to get familiar with self-employment and to consolidate recently started employment. Most of these
services mainly aim at (re-)integrating the recipient into the labour market. Especially with regard to persons younger than 25, these activation services follow a work-first approach; even though the work first approach is stricter for younger people, it is also applied to all other recipients, maybe less so to older persons and lone parents. All services will be granted by the Jobcenter if they are conducive for labour market integration. The three dominating activation measures are firstly the “One-Euro-Jobs” (such working opportunities have to be of public interest as well as neutral in terms of effect on competition and must not exceed a total of 24 months within a period of 5 years), work opportunities with additional expenses compensation (named like this because their hourly wages mainly are between 1 and 2€), secondly integration grants and thirdly job entry premiums (Petzold 2013, Spannagel 2013).

Public actors dominate the activation scene in Dortmund. Private organisations do not seem to play an important role in offering activation services. There are two ways how an actor can become part of the employment service system: through voucher systems and through competitive contracting-out. The voucher system consists of activation and placement as well as training vouchers. Beneficiaries can redeem these vouchers in public and private organizations. The latter, however, have to be accredited; otherwise the beneficiaries will not be allowed to choose their offers. Secondly, placement, activation and training measures are also contracted-out to private providers that have successfully applied to a tendering procedure. Yet, such private providers seem to play a minor role in Dortmund (Petzold 2013, Spannagel 2013).

Moreover, also social service provision is integrated into the local Jobcentre. Frontline staff members cooperate closely with external organisations providing social services, e.g. social services to which beneficiaries have privileged access, insofar they are necessary for (re-)integration into the labour market are: care of under age or disabled children and relatives who are in need of care, credit counselling, psychological and drug counselling. ALG-beneficiaries younger than 25, are also eligible for special services that are part of the Education and Participation Package (ibid.).

Arguably, the Jobcenter in Dortmund is responsible for sending needy persons to social service providers. The Jobcenter pays for the social services delivered to the recipients insofar as they are part of the activation strategy. The social services themselves are mainly carried out by the third sector organizations many of them part of the Free Welfare Associations (FWA). These organizations are non-profit institutions with a public responsibility. They traditionally play a crucial role in the German welfare state setting (Spannagel 2013). Their main fields of activity are (Bauer 2005): education and counselling for children and young people, family care, support for old people, support for mentally and physically impaired persons, health care, support for persons with special problems, employment services and vocational training, counselling and care of migrants, asylum seekers and refugees, services for people on the road as well as emergency aid.
The Italian system of employment protection and activation offers is not linked to the local provision of either social services or minimum income support. On the contrary, a large disparity between employment policies and social services characterize the Italian welfare system (Maino & Zambiono 2013).

On the one hand, employment policies ‘… are regulated at the national level and unemployment protection is based mostly on compensatory benefits and provided throughout a complex and fragmented system’. This fragmented nature was partly a result of a decentralization process during the years before and just after the Millennium, aimed to increasing the role of the sub-national levels of government accompanied by targeted activation programs trying to overcome the passive labour market policies in Italy (Graziano 2012). Second, most of the Italian activation measures in operation at local and regional levels have been funded by the European Social Fund. Third, at national level the general contribution-based scheme covers a limited proportion of the unemployed population, less than 10 per cent. A recent reform has however replaced this benefit scheme (called ASPI (universal unemployment social benefit scheme for those involuntarily losing their jobs, managed by the National Social Security Agency). These changes combined and above all the absence of an adequate national framework, this has led to disparities with regard to what kind of activation policies are actually in place at regional and local levels.

On the other hand, social services and minimum income provision (see previous chapters) are mostly regulated and provided at the regional and local level, although local social services are partly financed by the National Social Assistance Fund. Local and regional authorities have extensive autonomy and decision-making discretion to decide whether services should be provide in-house or contracted-out, which has led to regional territorial differences and in many cases also disparities. These differences have also been further nurtured by decentralization processes also within the field of social services’ provision (ibid.). Local social measures are moreover based on the involvement of local non-public actors both in policy programming and service delivery, see below for further exploration.

These organizational and administrative gaps in the Italian welfare system confirm that whereas activation policies are promoted and supported by the Department of labor policies, they are not related to the provision of minimum income schemes at local level or to the different measures and interventions that are in place at local level. These issues have been eloquently illustrated in our analyses of the activities in place in the city of Turin. If we focus on local level activities by local level actors, it is evident that in the city of Turin, third sector actors play – as in other policy fields – a significant role also in the design and implementation of local activation services, and once more the Compagnia di San Paolo has a key role in the city of Turin.

Several local activation projects are based on close public-private partnership arrangements between a wide range of actors, often partly funded by the Compagnia di San Paolo together with other funding sources (European, national, regional and local). One such project is based social training and work promoting activities in the area of ‘care of the community’. Unemployed people are involved in activities by third sector organizations, through the use of
a particular voucher system. That is both offering households and families under financial strain some supplementary income as well as aiming to (re-)integrate them into the local labour market as local employers and organizations can use these vouchers. The Compagnia di San Paolo is also involved in projects and local programmes that support people who are directly laid off as a result of the current financial and economic crisis. The programme is promoted by the Compagnia di San Paolo in collaboration with the city of Turin, labour unions and other local banks to overcome cash flow difficulties in times of people being laid off and waiting to receive income support payments from the national unemployment protection fund. A third example of local partnership arrangements in the development of local activation projects is a programme focusing on occupational mobility and training. The main aim with this programme is to offer unemployed people – with low household income and not being supported through public welfare programmes. The programme has been in operation for a few years and combines analyses of local labour markets and the needs of local companies and training, activation and internship offers to unemployed people living in the area of Turin. The projects is hence a full activation programme combining both training and matching elements, which we often find in regular public employment services.

To conclude, as far as activation service concerns, the conclusion is that private, nonprofit organizations as well as public institution work together and are very much involved in providing local activation services, yet that these local services are often carried out without any direct connection, coordination or integration with the offers developed by central employment policies.

**Tensions between central and local agencies in Radom**

Local active inclusion policies in the city of Radom are materialized in the backdrop of a division between local, regional and central authorities. Following a similar pattern as the Swedish welfare state, central authorities are responsible for activation policies (job-seeking activities, employability offers, and training etcetera).

The local Public Employment Services (at the Poviat level) is an organizational unit that is subject to the Starosta of Radom Poviat. Being a PES at a Poviat level, the PES in the city of Radom has a responsibility not only for the city of Radom area but also for the nearby sub-region. The PES is governed by an employment council, which is an advisory body for the local PES and is appointed by the Starosta, however, although the chairman of advisory body for local PES is Vice-Major of Radom, the City does not have much sense of the impact on PES (Kozek, Kubisa & Zieleńska 2013). The PES has recently been the object of marketization reforms and all activities above a certain budget line needs to be out for tender, offering the contract for the lowest price bidder.

At the same time, local social assistance provision is organized and managed by the local municipality via the social assistance office. The municipality and the local social welfare office have also been developing local activation projects on their own. Most of these has a social training profile and are directed at long-term unemployed and social assistance recipients, i.e. so-called socially useful jobs’.
Our investigations, however, demonstrate little coordination between the two actors and policy areas and rather examples of direct tensions and conflicts. An interesting illustration thereupon regards funding structures. Public employment services receive funding from various sources, but mainly from central authorities. However, in the Polish context some of this money is given to the local municipalities to be further delivered over to the local PES. This funding arrangement is based on the ‘... assumption of good cooperation between municipal authorities and PES.’ (ibid.) and the anticipation that local municipalities would top up on the budget for the local PES. Yet, there are cases that instead of addition, the amount of money transfer is lower. According to PES, the municipal authorities try to run their own employment policy. According to municipal authorities, PES activities are insufficient and ineffective (ibid.). This seems to be the case in the city of Radom, as the local municipality has kept some of the funding, which have caused extensive conflicts between the municipality and the PES. This conflict also seems to spill over on other actors. Several interviewees representing various local third sector organizations express that they either have contact with the local municipality or with the PES, and rarely with both these actors.

However, we also find elements of coordination as the relation between those two important institutions relies often on informal cooperation between the employees and managers. On the local level certain sympathies and interests come into play. The relations between SAO and PES are dependent on political links and territorial interests, especially when it comes to division of financial resources and the territorial scope of activity. Both institutions have a very scarce and superficial knowledge about the activity of the other institution (ibid.).

Two separate tiers of active inclusion policies in Malmö

Coordination between policy areas and public agencies in the context of Malmö needs to be analysed in the backdrop of the long-lasting legacy of active labour market policies in the Swedish welfare state. The National Labour Market Board has traditionally been responsible for employability measures and Sweden is often – in a European context – considered as the active corner in Europe. However, since then many other European countries have started to develop activation policies and to make unemployment and minimum income protection schemes more employment promoting. However, although we find extensive efforts by the national labour market board in the areas of activation policies, many local municipalities have also developed local activation policies on their own, partly as a reaction to the rigid bureaucracy of the central public employment services and partly as a reaction to the fact that it is the local municipalities that are fully responsible for the local social assistance scheme, including a total funding responsibility, as well as having a high degree of local autonomy. In recent years there has also been a push towards marketization of active labour market measures in the Swedish context. The PES is currently much more operating according to marketization logic, due to decisions taken by the central government. The present Centre-Conservative government pushed for an increasing role of private profit-oriented providers in order to support unemployed with more effective types of coaching activities; the private actors get paid based on their results, namely if they manage to get people into jobs which means that a part of the state PES traditionally assignments has been privatized.
These parallel systems – and their lack of coordination – are clearly spelled out in the context of Malmö. Although Malmö was a pioneer and already in 2001 started to develop one-stop-shop solutions, inviting the public employment service and also the social insurance offices to work together and to have joint offices, these local initiatives have since then fallen. Instead the city of Malmö has concentrated its efforts to develop extensive activation services parallel to the national regulated PES and also institutionalized these to a large extent within the City’s formal political and administrative structures.

The most recent initiative with regard to local activation measures in Malmö concerns the Job Malmö launched in March 2011, which could be pictured as an internal umbrella unit for a large number of local initiatives and services to foster labour market integration among inhabitants. The unit, with about 260 employees, approximately 3,000 participants per year and a budget of 20 million EUR for 2013 (Malmö Handlingsplan 2013), focuses on groups such as young unemployed (regardless of unemployment duration), jobless with various forms of disability and long-term unemployed who have received social assistance for more than two years (Malmö City 2013). The purpose of this unit is to complement already ongoing activities by the PES, covering different types of active labour market measures and groups of unemployed. The main profile of these activation services are training, education, help with job search, assessment of work skills and job placement. Our investigations demonstrate limited coordination with the PES, although senior officials attend joint meetings and other joint activities.

One important aspect with Job Malmö certainly regards if and to what extent these local activation services are linked to social assistance provision and eligibility. In public documents, participation in the City’s local active labour market policies is described as voluntary, yet at the same time, if an individual neglect participation without an acceptable reason, then the sanctions put in order for social assistance recipients can be to questioned the entitlement for social assistance or to reduce the level of social assistance. As explained in the previous section, an applicant for social assistance must be assessed as being available for work or make efforts to enhance the own employability by participating in recommended employability measures. Therefore, Job Malmö has – at least in principle – a clear link to the local social assistance scheme (Panican et al 2013).

However, such eligibility tests, sorting out claimants that are to participate in Job Malmö activities, necessitates a certain degree of cooperation between the Social Services (social workers making tests for social assistance eligibility), the local PES (offering services in addition to the Job Malmö services) and Job Malmö (running local activation services). Our investigations demonstrate that the social services units are rarely involved in managing or running activation services in cooperation with Job Malmö. Our respondents explain that all municipal activation services gather under Job Malmö, while the Social Services Office handles social assistance benefits. As illustrated, the City of Malmö does not use one-stop-shop models anymore to integrate and provide several municipal public services under ‘one roof’. Each organization has its own budget and assignment and is located in a separate building. Different political committees also govern them. However, we also find extensive examples of the pros and cons of coordinating or even integrated services and benefits. One
official working at the City’s central administration described that: ‘It is important for us to distinguish between local activation services and social assistance. Labour market initiatives must be free from connection to benefits. There's actually a link to benefits but these decisions are to be taken by the Social Services Offices. The services offered by Job Malmö will be based solely on needs, quality and motivational work to improve individuals’ employability’. Another of our informants representing the City’s central administration mentioned that: ‘The collaboration between local public authorities can be improved. The collaboration has actually been deteriorated in recent years. We have now too much of a 'drain-pipe logic’. In addition, we need a more comprehensive perspective and a way to working based on the family's needs rather than on organizations own budget and requirements’.

Superficial integration in Glasgow

The central orientation of the UK system is also reflected in the local organization of active inclusion policies. As we already noticed the delivery and design of minimum income benefits at local level is mainly an issue for the UK government, although we found extensive activities on part of the Scottish as well as the local GCC, in terms of seeking to explore their mandate in relation to these centralized policies and systems. A similar pattern emerge when we address the issue of coordination and integration between policy spheres in the area of active inclusion policies – that is – between minimum income support, activation offers and local social services (Bennet & Clegg 2013).

A cornerstone of local active inclusion policies in the city of Glasgow is the Jobcentre Plus (JCP) as the main agency and place for people to go to seek minimum income support and other related services. It constitutes a merger between local benefit agencies and local job centers into a joint organizational unit, which should accommodate benefit eligibility tests and benefit payments as well as work tests and employability measures. The main impetus for this reform in a national context was to introduce a stricter work strategy and also to implement such a policy orientation into all levels of government. Rules and routines are highly standardized in these centers, and part of a centrally governed programme, as we have illustrated throughout this report. In that sense, the Jobcentre Plus could be depicted as a form of a one-stop-shop model, as it integrates both benefit and employability services into one coherent organizational unit.

The Work Programme replaced all welfare-to-work programmes in 2010 throughout Great Britain and it is contracted out by the Department of Work and Pensions (DWP) to non-state organisations. JCP’s role in the delivery of the national activation programme, The Work Programme, is limited to mandating and transferring individuals from their register to the provider after a designated period of unemployment. For many, but not all, JCP remains responsible for the continuation of benefit payments. Whilst previous welfare-to-work programmes in Glasgow involved a range of actors, particularly third sector organisations, the two main contract holders are currently private sector organizations: Working Links and Ingeus Deloitte. These organizations hold contracts for the provision of The Work Programme across the whole of Scotland. They are required to compete on targets and are
predominately paid by results. As such, the high number of individuals in receipt of Jobseekers Allowance and Employment Support Allowance in Glasgow are a major focus. The Work Programme providers as their income and business model is dependent on moving the highest number of individuals into work. In Scotland, both organizations sub-contract some aspect of the contract to local third sector organizations although the involvement of TSOs has declined since the introduction of welfare-to-work programmes in 1998 (a trend across the whole of GB). Neither JCP nor GCC are involved in the design of The Work Programme or the tenders from the two winning organizations in Scotland. The contracting process managed by the DWP bypasses both the Local Government infrastructure (including the Scottish Government), and local JCP offices.

Our investigations in Glasgow, however, demonstrate that although joined-up working is evident at the local level, there appears to be some disconnect between the local activation and employment provisions and those from the UK agencies. First, there is an uncoupling between the work of the DWP contracted Work Programme providers and the local activation and employment support activities funded by the Scottish Government and ESF. Second, there is also some distance between the work designed by the Scottish Government and the local agencies’ policy and programme design efforts to tackling poverty in the city. These two layers of tensions are discussed in more detail below.

Although this particular policy area is of a highly centralized nature in the UK context, we notice that the Scottish Government has been active in developing policies and programme on their part, outside local actors’ strategies and partnerships as well as outside the UK national programme. Even more so, the GCC and other local agencies connected to the city of Glasgow, have also been highly active in developing different types of activation and employability measures, without any direct connection to the Work Programme. Bennett and Clegg (2013) observe that several of the programmes run by the GCC are fairly extensive. For example, GCC’s Glasgow Guarantee and Commonwealth Initiative targets young people in the city aims to create over 1300 jobs in 2013, building on the success of 2012 where over 1,000 jobs were created (and individuals supported into them). These programmes also include qualifications and training outcomes. The Glasgow Work ESF Skills and Employability Programme (ends 2013) have currently recorded 8221 engagements and 1956 job outcomes. In 2012/2013 Jobs and Business Glasgow, an ALEO of GCC provided 18,481 people with employment related advice and helped 3,027 into employment. It further reported supporting 4,639 people into education and training (JBG 2013b).

What hence appear to be two – or even three – parallel systems in operation at the same time at local have caused tensions between actors and policy areas, and in sharp contrast to the situation in Dortmund, we find lack of consensus, shared view and coordination. On the contrary, we find tensions, patterns of de-coupling.

For instance, most local activation and employability programmes are based on a mix of local funding and also funding coming from EU-based sources, above all the European Social Fund (ESF). However, respondents claim that the Scottish Government states that service providers are not allowed to mix funding from the ESF with Work Programme related
activities. This illustrates some of the tensions and adverse effects operating at the local level. Moreover, Work Programme providers are not connected and involved in local decision-making forums, such as the formal CPP or Poverty Panels and hence there is a lack of strategic partnership in terms of what services to develop and what groups and areas to target. However, we find elements of coordination between the actors, as local activation and support programmes have more and more been redirected towards individuals who are not eligible for the Work Programme, illustrating deliberate move of resources away from The Work Programme which has therefore created a secondary and separate ‘sphere’ of activity.

Arguably, this specific area of delivery and service provision suggests that the relationship between the services provided at the local level, from the Scottish government, and the UK government is complex. First, in terms of the ways in which services are procured and programmes designed and the unintended consequences of service delivery relationships. The second, in terms of the politics of multi-level governance and the impact of central-local relations. This shift in relationship with the national programme was attributed to the influence of the Scottish Government as GCC respondents talked about an earlier desire to include Work Programme providers in the local welfare mix in order to maximise their efforts at reducing poverty and unemployment, albeit aware of the disagreements regarding the design of the programme and the profit-making feature of the contract. Furthermore, there appears to be a political influence in terms of programme design and joined-up provision whereby competing agendas, policy making attitudes and approaches to welfare and activation conflict at the local level. As one respondent stated: “It’s quite messy, the level of harmony between UK-Scottish-Local Government policy is very low at the moment… “. The situation in Glasgow arguably seems to have resulted in two separate systems. On the one hand, we find a system based on local agencies running local employability and activation projects, based on funding from the local council as well as from the EU, closely integrated with the efforts of third sector organizations, offering welfare services and to less extent financial support (although this takes place). On the other hand, we find a closely coordinated benefit and activation system based on the JCP and Work Programme provider relationship.

Summary

These short analyses of patterns of coordination and integration in the five COPE cities illustrate the following. We find that in most of our cases there is weak or no coordination or integration between employment and activation policies and local minimum income offers and social services, when these are materialized at local level.

Following our previous distinction between employment regulated and social regulation minimum income schemes, the cities of Malmö, Radom and Turin rest formally on a two tier logic. Employment policies and activation policies are mainly an issue for central government and authorities, implemented at the local level. In each of these cases we find weak coordination between these centrally regulated policies and activities and the local level activities relating to issues of minimum income support and social services. They seem to be two separate systems, very much so in the case of Turin, and partly also in the cases of Malmö and Radom. In the latter we also find extensive tensions and conflicts between the
two policy areas, regarding aims and mission, target groups and above all regarding financial resources. In the former, we find innovative efforts of locally initiated one-stop shop models, yet which have fallen into oblivion and the city is nowadays characterized by two full systems of activation offers in place in the local context: one funded and operated by the central PES and one funded and operated by the local Job Center. In each of these cases, coordination is weakly fostered with the local minimum income scheme (social assistance).

In the city of Turin local activities and actor seem to be well coordination and integrated into dense public-private partnerships in funding, managing and delivering local activation offers. These are, however, neither connected to the local minimum income schemes in operation by the local city, nor to the central employment policies run by the central authorities.

The cases of Glasgow and Dortmund are embedded in much more centralized activation policies and services. Despite these institutional differences, the city of Glasgow has some clear resemblance with the three above-mentioned cases since in the Glaswegian case there seems to be limited connection between centrally originating policies and activities, and all the other activities that take place at the local level (local financial support schemes, local activation services and other forms of local welfare services, often both being carried out by the GSS and/or in close cooperation with local third sector organizations). The thick cooperation and partnership arrangements that we find at local level between the GCC and a wide variety of local third sector organizations, stands in sharp contrast to the gap and even conflict laden relationship that exist with the JCP and the central Work Programme. This tension is even more fuelled by the complex two – three level game that is being played vertically between the local GCC, the Scottish government and the UK government, with some spill-over effects to the area of minimum income support and active inclusion policies.

Turning to the case of Dortmund, this is the only case in which we find coordination and even elements of integration between policy areas and also between organizational units. These coordination efforts seem not only to be based on a link between benefits and employment offers, but also to integrated social services’ provision into the equation, materialized in the organizational form of the Jobcentre which actually is a general characteristic feature of the German MIS and does not only apply to Dortmund (see table below).
Table 29. Governance of local active inclusion policies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Central – local dimension to local activation services</th>
<th>Dortmund</th>
<th>Turin</th>
<th>Radom</th>
<th>Glasgow</th>
<th>Malmö</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• In principle, one tier system – JobCentre as joint institution of the municipality and the federal employment agency.</td>
<td>• Two tier model: state &amp; regional PES, whereas social services and minimum income support mostly regulated &amp; provided at the regional and local level.</td>
<td>• Two tier model: state &amp; regional PES, combined with local activation through the MSAO</td>
<td>• Three tier model: state, regional &amp; local PES</td>
<td>• Two tier model: state PES &amp; and local activation services (Job Malmö)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Funding arrangements for local activation services | • Mainly federal funding. | • Central PES funded by central sources, whereas local activation services in the city of Turin, a variety of funding arrangements (local, regional, national and European) as well as public and nonpublic. | • Central PES funded mainly by central sources, municipal activation services by local authorities and European funding sources. | • Central PES by central sources, local activation services by mix of sources (GCC, Scottish and European). | • Central PES by central sources, municipal activation by municipality. |

| Degree of coordination in local activation services | • Jobcenter is an integrated one-stop shop bringing together benefit transfer, job placement and social services | • Limited coordination between MIS, social services and employment services at local level | • Limited coordination between employment services, MIS and social services. | • Coordination between MIS and employment services within tiers, but not between tiers. | • Limited coordination between PES and local activation services and between local activation services and local MIS. |

<p>| Role of non-public actors in local activation services | • Private companies limited role, although elements of contracting out. | • Private companies’ limited role, but increasing in PES. | • Private companies’ limited role, but increasing in PES. | • Private companies’ extensive role, high degree of marketization. | • Private companies limited role |
|                                                      | • Some involvement of third sector organizations. | • Third sector organizations extensive role at local levels. | • Third sector organizations moderate role in local activation services. | • Third sector organizations extensive role in local activation services. | • Third sector organizations limited role in local activation services. |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cooperation or conflicts between actors</th>
<th>Extensive cooperation between actors at local level and across levels</th>
<th>Extensive cooperation at the local level, not across levels.</th>
<th>Cooperation at the local level between actors, but tensions between levels</th>
<th>Cooperation at the local level between stakeholders, but frequent tensions between levels</th>
<th>Limited cooperation at the local level between actors, tensions between levels</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Main horizontal governance mechanism in local activation services</td>
<td>Partnership arrangements between a wide range of different actors (public and nonpublic), across levels</td>
<td>Partnership arrangements between a wide range of different actors (public and nonpublic) at local level, not across levels</td>
<td>Elements of partnership arrangements at local level, not across levels</td>
<td>Partnership arrangement at local level, not across levels</td>
<td>No partnership arrangements.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
10. The role of third sector actors in delivery of local welfare services

A key issue in the COPE projects regards multi-stakeholder involvement in the delivery of social services. We touched upon this issue in previous sections to the report and illustrated that there is a stronger tradition of such involvement in the countries of Germany and Italy, than in Sweden, with Poland and the UK somewhere in-between. The following section will analyse the degree and forms by which third sector organizations are involved in delivering services in the area of active inclusion policies (minimum income support, activation and social services) and also to seek to analyse the relationships between public and third sector actors.

The role of third sector actor in active inclusion policies in Dortmund

The role of third sector organizations in the German welfare state has long historical traditions, following established principles of subsidiarity. The case of Dortmund is not an exception to the rule, as the main Free Welfare Associations fulfil a key role in providing social services for the local population. The Jobcenter in Dortmund is responsible for sending needy persons to social service providers, but the Center does not deliver such social services itself. Instead social services themselves are mainly carried out by third sector organisations, many of which are part of the Free Welfare Associations (FWA). These organisations are non-profit institutions with a public responsibility and until today they form a sound pillar of the German welfare regime. The six most important ones which form the Free Welfare Associations are Caritas (a part of the Catholic Church), the Diakonie (part of the protestant welfare associations), the Arbeiterwohlfahrt that has its origins in the workers movement; Paritätischer Wohlfahrtsverband (joint non-denominational welfare association), the German Red Cross and the Zentralwohlfahrtsstelle der Juden (Jewish welfare association). These associations are all organized at local level in the city of Dortmund and provide services in all fields of social work like old-age care, childcare and various kinds of counselling. They also closely cooperate at the regional and federal level and are integrated into higher-level consortia, which negotiate agreements with the main funding institutions of their services, namely the municipal authorities, on how they ought to provide and deliver their social and welfare services. These centralised systems upheld by the welfare associations cause some frustration among local decision-makers since they lack control over the money being spent on local services.

The involvement of third sector organizations in the city of Radom also follows the general pattern already detected in previous discussions. The city seems to rests on a strong local culture of cooperation and involvement of a wide array of stakeholders, including these free welfare associations. These associations are part of a dense network that is institutionalised in the Social City Commission and is hence also highly formalised and connected to the city’s local policies and practices. People seem to know each other in person and issues are generally resolved during these meetings, either in the Social City Commission or other forms of multi-stakeholder bodies. Arguably, these formal networks and especially the Social City Commission are really important when it comes to explaining the comprehensive anti-
poverty approaches in Dortmund as they facilitate concrete joint actions directed at tackling poverty and unemployment related problems. Our interviewees have generally described the Welfare Associations as well networked, being involved in both local formal networks as well as local informal networks. They also state that the relevant actors in this city know each other personally, especially on the operative level, not only on the strategic level but also on the operative level. And that’s why there is certainly also informal cooperation, what does sometimes accelerate things beyond what the formal structures do”

The third sector in Turin, more important than the public agencies

The constitution of welfare production, and above all benefits and services related to the area of active inclusion policies does not only involve public actors in the city of Turin. On the contrary, a wide mix of nonprofit actors are involved in granting individuals financial benefits (ranging from emergency relief to more long-lasting financial support) as well as a plethora of different types of welfare services. Since it is not possible to give a full picture of this complex arena of non-public actors and their relationships to public agencies, our main intention is to shortly present some of the main traits of this local complexity.

First and foremost, in the context of Turin we find a few actors that seem to have extensive significance and recognition in the field of granting individuals financial support and different forms of services. Characteristic for the Turin context is the central position of foundations related to local companies. One of the most important is the Compagnia di San Paolo (founded in 1563), which is a local bank foundation. Another key foundation is the Ufficio Pio also established in the late 16th century and could be regarded as the instrumental body of the Compagnia di San Paolo. Both of these foundations have extensive funds and spend a large amount of their resources to social policy related issues, social innovation projects and particularly on poverty related issues. In several cases, these two foundations also engage a wide variety of third sector organizations, having the direct contacts with the different beneficiaries across the city.

Over the last decade, the role and function of these two foundations have changed considerably. Our local investigations demonstrate that the crisis of the welfare system has led to a high reduction of resources by public institutions, both in terms of financial benefits and in terms of delivery of services aimed at promoting personal autonomy (Maino & Zambiono 2013). In the backdrop of these changes in public welfare systems, foundations such as the Compagnia di San Paolo and the Ufficio Pio has taken on a more operation role and also become much more engaged in working with other actors, and not merely funding projects, which we illustrated in previous sections addressing the close working relationships between the city council and representatives of the Ufficio Pio.

The projects run by these actors are also significant in size and organization. The Ufficio Pio has a large number of professional social workers employed; together with a large cohort of volunteers that across the city and the metropolitan area. One of the projects currently running focused directly on people living under financial hardship, providing local beneficiaries with financial support as well as guidance and services to seek exit paths out of
difficult situations and social problems. In 2012 this particular project had more than 10,000 people applying or benefits and support and managed to involve 3,600 beneficiaries, of a total amount of 4.5 million EUR. This single project hence had a higher budget that the city of Turin’s minimum income schemes for both able and non-able bodied, as well as supported a higher number of beneficiaries.

Another key actor in the city of Turin is Caritas. Over years – with the increasing pressure of poverty problem – this particular organization has changed it traditional role and started to promote some direct interventions for households. It has kept its traditional function in terms of providing individuals in need with guidance, monitoring and advise about opportunities available, but also providing direct support through the local parishes and counseling centers at local level (which are multifold in the city of Turin and engages approx. 2000 volunteers). Caritas has also a great deal of activity directed at provision of material aid (food box, clothing, medication) and / or economic assistance to cope with emergency situations. Economic aids are directed to people that cannot afford sudden expenses (e.g. retired, unemployed, single-income household). Requests for financial assistance are subjected to a special committee at the diocesan level. In 2012, approx. 2000 people applied for financial support from this particular function of Caritas, and two third of the applicants were granted support. Main requests for material assistance are domestic bills, food vouchers, housing cost (e.g. rent, mortgage, deposit for public housing) and health cost (e.g. medicines, medical or dental care). As we already have observed, these third sector organizations are also involved in social training activities and other forms of employability promoting activities (see above).

These short examples add an important piece to our analyses of the local governance of active inclusion policies, as well as the organization of minimum income schemes in the context of Turin and above all demonstrates that the local capacities to handle social problems and poverty related issues should not merely be understood in relation to public efforts carried out by the city, but involving a wide range of non-public actors, often with substantial resources as well as exercising extensive activities in the field of active inclusion policies.

**An extensive third sector catering for the poor in Radom**

Turning our attention to the city of *Radom*, we already touched upon that also in the Polish context does nonprofit actors and third sector organizations play a significant role in complementing or even replacing public benefit schemes and services. Throughout our investigations we have observed that the third sector is very developed in Radom with almost 400 registered local organizations of which more than a dozen of which have special law status (the ability to obtain 1 per cent of the citizens tax).

The municipal office organized Centre for Non-Governmental Organizations to integrate their activities and enable them to exchange experiences and plans. Although the NGOs are not directly involved in the decision-making on local MIS schemes, they play a role of informing the SAO about the local social problems and point out the local communities that
need support. SAO plans to cooperate more intensively with NGOs and to transfer as much of the social work to third sector as it is possible, in a form of contracted out tasks.

The most important non-governmental stakeholders are organizations related to the Catholic Church. The largest is Caritas which provides assistance to the homeless, the sick, the disabled, large families, victims of domestic violence. It is a much respected actor in Radom as an organization capable to provide help to the poorest, the most needy and strongly excluded from social life. The organization works partly on contract with the City and in close cooperation with the MSAO. Its activities range wide as it runs hostels for the homeless, canteens, distributes food, clothing, medicines, household equipment, rents medical equipment and, when necessary, finances some others relevant expenditures related to poor families’ needs (e.g. arranges summer holidays for children, runs a therapeutic and environmental facilities for children). Moreover, there are also other large organizations directly offering support and services to people under financial strain, such as the Radom Food Bank and Dobry Duszek (Good Sprite Foundation). The first-mentioned of these operates as a distributor of food allowing 110 third sector organizations to provide food to poorer families. The Radom food bank acts outside the city district area and provide support for 50 thousand families, handing direct support to social assistance claimants but also working poor families.

These are merely two – albeit central – illustration of the activities that third sector organization apply in the context of Radom. It is also interesting to notice that these actors are well coordinated within the framework of the local NGO Centre, founded by City Hall. The NGO center functions as a form of an incubator for local organizations, as a place to meet, learn how to raise external resources, etcetera. Moreover, these voluntary organisations cooperate closely with each other, informing about the beneficiaries and their needs. By the means of the local NGO center, local politicians and officials express that they will start to work more closely with these particular actors and to ‘… MSAO plans to cooperate more intensively with NGOs and to transfer as much of the social work to third sector as it is possible, in a form of contracted out tasks. MSAO points out that NGO work closely with the social problems therefore have recognition of problems and best solutions. The cooperation with NGO and more tasks contracted out would be helpful for MSAO because of the bureaucratic work overloads at the social assistance office, which prevents social workers from substantial work with the claimants’ (Kozek, Kubisa & Zielenska 2013).

The third sector in Glasgow, a local partner for the local government

Following the profile of a liberal welfare state, a large number of third sector organizations are involved in providing individuals with support and guidance on welfare topics, providing them with financial aid, as well as acting as subcontractor to the public government in several policy areas in the city of Glasgow. The local organizational landscape includes a wide range of organizational types but generally refers to organisations which are not clearly part of the public sector or operating commercially as private sector organisations do. This includes charities and community based groups, organisations comprised of voluntary employees, and social enterprises. According to recent calculations there are currently 2,300 charities that are
currently operating in Glasgow. Some of these – if we include credit unions and housing associations – have a wide range of staff members, and – if we include social enterprises – have large income and financial resource basis. Some of them are hence directly involved in the provision of out-sourced public services and initiatives, whereas other are much more based on the initiatives of users or local communities. Apparently it is a complex landscape of different type of organizations, some of which directly involved in providing individuals with financial support and other more involved in delivering all types of services for beneficiaries. If one would seek to generally map these organizations involvement, we make the following broad thematic arrangements.

First, we can identify third sector organizations that provide basic support to those in poverty, or support for particular situations. Some of the organizations involved in this area provide advice to citizens regarding benefits, debts, legal support, housing issues and employment legislation. These organizations hence operate in close correspondence to the local council’s ambitions to foster income maximization and benefit appeals processes for local beneficiaries. There are also local neighborhood groups, community groups, and faith groups which operate in local communities and neighborhoods to alleviate poverty for residents. Some of these provide reactionary and immediate support for those experiencing poverty. These organizations tend to be community and voluntary sector organizations such as charities or church groups which provide food, furniture, and clothing. Many of the respondents spoke about the growth of food banks and emergency care and attributed this work to this group of local organizations which respond to local neighborhood needs.

Second, a large share of the local organizations operates as a subcontractor to the local council and local public agencies. In terms of the marketised welfare services where organisations compete to secure a contract advertised by a public sector agency (such as care, some social and health care services, welfare-to-work, some local activation services) the delivery is in most cases providing the service based on a formal and legally binding contract. This means that all TSOs (and commercial actors) involved in the delivery of services in this policy area will be working to a formal contract which has often been tendered for in a competitive market (or quasi-market). It is not possible to provide data on the number of contracts between GCC and non-public organisations across these policy areas. Similarly, it is not possible to state that all TSOs involved in service delivery in Glasgow are arranged under formal contracts. In some areas this will not be the case and as outlined previously, some work continues to be commissioned to TSOs. Arguably, the governance arrangements between GCC and local TSOs remains complex with different departments, funders and programmes operating slightly different arrangements to provide services and formalized relationships. That said, it is possible to note that there has been a shift more broadly across the public sector to formalize through contracts, tendering and open competitions the provision of welfare and public services by non-public actors.

Such contracting out arrangements is particularly evident in areas relating to activation policies. Some third sector organizations are heavily involved in providing employment programmes based on public funding arrangements. Others are directly working with providing individuals with training and education opportunities and job-seeking activities.
There are currently three large and notable employment and regeneration TSOs which are involved in the provision of employability services and/or anti-poverty work in terms of activating and moving individuals into the labour market. Besides relying on local funds, they also receive funding from Scottish Government and UK government sources for the delivery of specific local schemes. They are central actors in most of the employability and activation work taking place across the city (i.e. Glasgow Works, Jobs and Business Glasgow and the Wise Group (Bennett & Clegg 2013).

This short discussion can only briefly illustrate that in the city of Glasgow, there are a large variety of TSOs working in Glasgow on service provision of anti-poverty projects. They vary in size and purpose ranging from local community based support using volunteers to large social enterprises with multi-million pound turnovers. The governance arrangements are complex, some work with public agencies through historical informal agreements and established relationships, whilst others are involved in competitive open tendering (often against private sector organisations or other public sector agencies) to deliver services previously delivered directly by the public sector. Policy areas such as regeneration, housing, and employment support are often associated with the growth of TSOs in Glasgow during the 1980s, 1990s and 2000s although recent market based changes to health and social care provision may also become operating spaces for TSOs in the city. Welfare and advice services often work in partnership between public organisations and TSOs through contractual arrangements and service agreements. At the same time there are hundreds of VCOs (voluntary and community organisations) in the city providing day to day and neighbourhood specific advice, support and anti-poverty services.

Neglect and denial, the role of third sector actor in Malmö

The role of third sector organizations in the Swedish welfare state and also in the city of Malmö is rather modest. Voluntary organizations are not to any greater extent involved in delivering social welfare services in the Swedish welfare state. In line with classic thinking on a Social Democratic welfare state, it is the central, regional and local public authorities that primarily have been producing services to different categories of citizens. The City of Malmö seems to reflect and resembles a classic Social Democratic position on which actors to be involved in delivering services and goods to the population. Malmö has been highly reluctant to contracting out different forms of welfare services to private for-profit providers. The situation is similar regarding the role played by voluntary organizations. The City has not developed any direct formal policy on how to act vis-à-vis voluntary organizations. The City seems to support and defend the idea that welfare is best produced by public agencies (Johansson et al 2013).

In a recent calculation made by the city’s administration they accounted for approx. 570-580 local voluntary organizations that got some degree of funding from the city. Reflecting the Swedish tradition of popular movement organized, they rely on large degree of membership stocks and also a high degree of voluntary involvement, these organizations are rarely directly operating on direct contract from the public authorities. Most of them are active in fields such as sports and cultural activities, and not in the fields of welfare services provision.
(see Johansson et al 2013). Nevertheless, local voluntary organizations are working in the field of social welfare covering a broad range of topics such as homelessness, disability, elderly issues and violence against women. Non-profit organizations can apply for money from the local Social Resource Administration (SRA), which has a fairly large budget to fund different type of activities. This administrative unit distributes approximately 16 million SEK (about 1.9 million EUR) each year to different voluntary organizations in Malmö. The main requirement to get support from the City of Malmö, through SRA, is that the voluntary organization’s concept can be judged as an important alternative or complement to the City’s own efforts to help people in vulnerable situations; however, these vulnerable situations rarely include living under financial hardship, as none of the three target groups (SM, LU, WP) are prioritized by the SRA. Public authorities are hence generally considered as the main provider of services, and especially with regard to people living under financial strain. Our local investigations demonstrate that voluntary organizations, charities, churches and private foundations have a minor role in providing services and guidance to the poor. Our informants express that combating poverty is mainly a municipal responsibility. A senior employee with experience from different local public authorities provides us with an eloquent illustration as he expresses that the ‘...voluntary sector is excluded, it is the public actors who make the decisions, this development we've had the last 3-4 years ... and I regret that. It is almost impossible for a non-profit organization to get money from the municipality. Non-profit organizations that want to be able to participate in order to fight against poverty feel that the municipality has a far too complex system of rules. Voluntary actor’s ability to fund such activities [in combating poverty] is equal to zero.’ We find similar types of arguments among other informants, who express a certain degree of self-reflection as they declared that it would be desirable for municipal agencies to show more openness towards non-profit actors.

**Summary**

The role of third sector organizations in local social services provision has been a growing focus for comparative research. The UK, Italian and German welfare states are the ones having the highest proportion of people employed in third sector organizations, among the countries included in the COPE project, and among which the German and the Italian organizations are mostly involved in the areas of social services production. Our local cases seem to reflect such national differences, as it is in these three countries in which we find the most extensive involvement of organizations – of great variety of forms – in local welfare production.

An interesting case of dense and complex government – third sector relations can be found in the local case of Turin. Ranci & Mantagini (2010) previously reminded us that the Italian third sector plays a most significant role in social service delivery, and without these actors, the capacity of the Italian welfare system to meet welfare needs would be much lower than it is. This is highly evident in the case of Turin, in which the local foundations play a significant role. Whereas local public minimum income support was highly limited in a comparative context, these actors seem to complement or even replace some of the functions of the local public agencies, being highly embedded in local policy-making procedures and developing or even imitating public rules of eligibility and conditionality tests. This extensive
function certainly raises questions on the changing role of the local public authorities. The fragmented nature of the local public system, combined with the strong role of third sector organizations creates a highly complex welfare mix, in which the local authority does not disappear but becomes the promoter of a network of actors involved in services production, keeping a strategic planning function, but not directly involved in securing adequate support or benefits for residents. A similar dense networks and extensive involvement can be found in Dortmund, in which the free welfare associations are extensively enrolled in providing residents with services, acting as semi-public institutions. Some major difference, however, prevail as the local public authorities in the city of Dortmund are both much more capacitated as well as keeping a much stronger central position in governing local services provision, e.g. by controlling the funding for local services production. In each of these cases local relationships seem to be based upon principles of mutual partnership, more so in the city of Turin, but also evident in the city of Dortmund. Activities in Glasgow also involve extensive numbers of third sector organizations, both when it comes to policy planning activities as well as in services delivery. But this does not seem to be evolving around such a limited number of central actors as in the previously mentioned cases.

According to the logic of the John Hopkins studies we would find limited involvement of professional third sector organizations, and partly this is also reflected in our local cases of Malmö and Radom. In Malmö third sector organizations are not involved in either planning or services delivery to any greater extent. Local activities in Radom are, however, extensive, but based on volunteering efforts, combined with the involvement of some major charities, such as Caritas and a few other organizations, often being granted financial support from external funders, such as the European Union. These patterns can be summarized in the following table.
Table 30 The role of third sector actors in planning and delivery of local welfare services

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Dortmund</th>
<th>Turin</th>
<th>Radom</th>
<th>Glasgow</th>
<th>Malmö</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Size of local third sector</strong></td>
<td>Mainly constituted around a few large welfare associations</td>
<td>Extensive, but mainly dominated by a few local foundations</td>
<td>Extensive, dominated by Caritas and conglomerates of emergency relief organizations</td>
<td>Extensive, including a wide variety of types of organizations</td>
<td>Extensive, but mainly in the fields of sports and recreation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Involvement in local welfare production</strong></td>
<td>Extensive</td>
<td>Extensive</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Extensive</td>
<td>Limited</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Governance arrangements in public – TSO relations</strong></td>
<td>Partnership arrangements</td>
<td>Strong partnership arrangements</td>
<td>Moderate by Municipal Center for NGO</td>
<td>Partly partnership, also commissioning and contracts</td>
<td>Mainly hierarchy in terms of commissioning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TSOs involvement in planning and delivery</strong></td>
<td>Mainly in delivery, partly in planning</td>
<td>Both in planning and delivery</td>
<td>Mainly in delivery and consultation</td>
<td>Partly in planning, mainly in delivery</td>
<td>Neither in planning not delivery</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Governance arrangements in planning and delivery</strong></td>
<td>Planning: partly partnership, Delivery: mainly commissioning</td>
<td>Planning: strong partnership, Delivery: strong partnership</td>
<td>Planning: weak integration of TSOs, partly an expert role, Delivery: mainly based on commissioning, but also sub-contracting</td>
<td>Planning: extensive integration of TSOs, Delivery: based on commissioning and sub-contracting</td>
<td>Planning: weak integration of TSOs, Delivery: weak involvement of TSOs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Main funding arrangements for local TSO activities</strong></td>
<td>Public funds mainly from the municipality</td>
<td>Variety of public funds, private foundations and citizens taxes</td>
<td>Local public funds, charities and EU funding, and citizens taxes</td>
<td>Local public funds, foundations and EU funding</td>
<td>Public funds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Policy orientation</strong></td>
<td>Social services delivery primarily</td>
<td>Wide policy spectrum</td>
<td>Emergency relief and social services</td>
<td>Wide policy spectrum</td>
<td>Mainly based on the orientation of certain user groups</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
11. Conclusions

This report seeks to analyse local active inclusion strategies in five European welfare states, and strategies in five cities that during the last decade have experienced extensive socio-economic difficulties, e.g. in terms of high levels of unemployment, long-term unemployment and poverty in a national context. The countries included in the project represent different welfare state regime typologies (Continental/Corporatist, South European, Post-Socialist, Social-democratic and Liberal), the cities have all a strong industrialized heritage, yet in recent decades have undergone an a process of intensive de-industrialization. Most of them have also been dominated by strong Social-democratic and/or left-wing parties (less so for the city of Radom). Three research questions have steered the analysis.

- First, the report has analysed *the implementation and/or adoption of national active inclusion models in the local governance of active inclusion policies*. What effects have local autonomy and/or strong central steering on local adjustment patterns in relation to local active inclusion models?

- Second, the report has analysed *the degree and form of multi-dimensional coordination between policy areas in local active inclusion models*, i.e. patterns of coordination and/or integration between policy areas as well as between local public agencies responsible for the implementation of local active inclusion policies.

- Third, the report has analysed *the degree and form of multi-stakeholder involvement in local active inclusion models*, and above all the involvement of third sector organizations in debating, planning and delivering welfare services for the three target groups included in the COPE project.

The report hence seeks to contribute to the overall debate on the strengths and weaknesses of local welfare states/societies to introduce a full-fledged active inclusion strategy, both with regard to the comprehensiveness of the three pillars as well as to local institutional capacity for the successful multi-dimensional as well as multi-stakeholder integration. This includes the activities of key actors/providers (public, non-profit, profit, family) within MI schemes and an analysis of their discourses and strategies, and the corresponding institutional local governance structures, based on form (partnership, network, public contract) and in relation to national and European levels. The following discussion seeks to present our main findings with regard to these three research questions (see also table below for summary of main findings in each respective local context).
Table 31. Forms of coordination at local level.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Forms of coordination</th>
<th>Elements of coordination</th>
<th>Cities included in the COPE project</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Central – local coordination in active inclusion policies (especially MIS)</td>
<td><em>Forms of central regulation</em></td>
<td><strong>Dortmund</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Degree of formal local autonomy</td>
<td>Limited</td>
<td>Low degree of central formal regulation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patterns of local implementation</td>
<td>Policies developed in relation to local traditions and conditions</td>
<td>High degree of central formal regulation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Discontent over funding. Some entrepreneurial efforts.</td>
<td>High degree of central formal regulation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Direct discontent and extensive efforts to craft local policy power/space, e.g. income maximization</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Local public reactions to central regulation</td>
<td>Little discontent, but some entrepreneurial efforts</td>
<td>No direct discontent.</td>
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<td>No direct poverty discourse at local level.</td>
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<td>Constitution of local discourse on poverty</td>
<td>Similarities between national and local discourses</td>
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<td>Multi-dimensional modes of coordination and integration in active inclusion policies</td>
<td><em>Forms of vertical coordination and integration between policy areas and public agencies in active inclusion policies</em>&lt;br&gt;- One-tier system including employment and MIP.&lt;br&gt;- The JobCentre as a one-stop-shop model.</td>
<td><strong>Dortmund</strong></td>
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<td><em>Forms of horizontal coordination and integration between policy areas and public agencies in active inclusion policies</em>&lt;br&gt;- Extensive coordination between local poverty policies and social services.&lt;br&gt;- Public and</td>
<td>No centrally regulated integration or coordination between MIS, employment and social services</td>
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<td>- Limited coordination and no integration efforts between MIS and employment services</td>
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<td>- To some degree informal coordination, but no integration between employment and MIS.</td>
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<td>- Low coordination between JCP and local poverty policies and social services.</td>
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| Multi-stakeholder involvement in cooperation in deliberation and decision-making and service delivery in active inclusion policies | **Involvement and participation of public and nonpublic actors in deliberation and policy-making processes** | - Who: Highly inclusive, involving public actors, social partners and TSOs.  
- How: Institutionalised in forms of social city commission  
- Over what: mainly employment, to less extent poverty and services  
- Partnership arrangements, between public actors, but also (to a less degree TSOs)  
- Private for profit actors little involved | - Who: Highly inclusive, involving public agencies, TSOs and private foundations  
- How: institutionalised panels, partnerships, with regard to Local Strategic Plan  
- Over what: city development, social services and poverty, less on employment | - Who: TSOs involved to some extent,  
- How: less institutionalised arenas for participation and involvement  
- Over what: social services, and poverty less so on employment | - Who: primarily public bodies and agencies, less TSOs  
- How: highly limited involvement of nonpublic actors.  
- Over what: poverty, social services | - Who: local public authorities and extensive involvement of TSOs  
- Highly institutionalised in forms of panel arrangements and local strategy involvement  
- Over what: poverty |

| **Involvement and participation of nonpublic actors in active inclusion service delivery** | - Extensive involvement of TSOs in social services, less in activation.  
- Partnership arrangements and clear role as purchaser/provider | - Extensive involvement of TSOs in service delivery  
- Partnership arrangements, but TSO acting both as purchaser and provider (mixed) | - Extensive involvement of TSOs mainly in relation to poverty and social services  
- Some contractual arrangements with for profit | - Limited involvement of TSOs, albeit in some areas as a complement to public services  
- Contractual arrangements with for profit | - Extensive involvement of TSOs in service delivery and emergency relief support  
- Partnership like arrangements between public... |
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Active inclusion strategies in scalar relations

The very essence of the government – governance debate regards the role played by the government and public authorities, and what forms of mechanisms governments can use to steer societies and actors. The suggested flow of authority and regulatory capacity from the central government, to other governmental levels can be depicted as a hollowing out of the state, giving more powers to both supra-national as well as local public agencies (as well as non-public agencies). This raises a set of central analytical issues with regard to the policy fields analysed in the COPE project: What role does local public authorities play in national active inclusion strategies? Do they follow and adjust to national models, or can we detect local strategies and models clearly diverging from the national trajectories? Unpacking this empirical question we might also raise questions of more general analytical nature regarding the regulative capacities of local authorities in the fields of active inclusion policies? If/how do they make use of the powers given to them? If/how do they make use of the powers claimed by them? To what extent can we identify that the European Union interferes in local policies and practices, sidestepping the role of central governments?

The cities of Turin, Radom and Malmö belongs to highly different welfare state regime typologies, yet have some things in common when it comes to central-local regulation of minimum income provision. In each of these countries, we find that central regulation rests on the premises that local authorities and agencies are better equipped than central governments to make the final adjustments to the design and delivery of local minimum income provision. The issue also embeds elements of the mandate central and local governments have in each respective welfare state and above all the function of minimum income provision in the larger welfare state architecture. The scope has never been extensive, and mostly seen as of last resort. These features are evident in Poland and Sweden, in which the central government designs a legal framework for local agencies to implement. Other forms of institutional coordination are also in place (national standards, legal complaint structures, clearly established categories in legal acts, etcetera) limiting the scope for local discretionary practices, albeit still being the principle of the central-local divide. The Italian case is different since central regulation in the field of minimum income provision is generally weak (with some exceptions, e.g. the New Social Card) and the national legal framework allows for even more extensive local variation, fuelled by the decentralization of regulatory powers to the regional level. Whereas local governments’ actions in Poland and Sweden are circumscribed and framed in the context of national political and legal framework, this is less evident in the Italian case of Turin. The relation between central and local governance has then not the same meaning and content in the Italian case, as the central level does not interfere to any greater extent in local policies and practices.

The cities of Malmö and Radom both follow central regulation when it comes to local minimum income provision (standards, eligibility tests etcetera), although this national framework allows them fairly extensive local autonomy. Both cities are also facing extensive social problems, relating to high levels of poverty and unemployment, but such local problem pressure does not seem to trigger local policies that to a larger extent diverts from national
policies and models. The degree of local acceptance to central regulation is high, when speaking of the local organization and practices with regard to minimum income provision, i.e. social assistance benefits. Some multi-level tensions are however observed, and above all in the case of Radom. Relying on mixed (central-local) funding sources, the transfer of funding from different agencies is a source of constant hassle. There is also an element of political and ideological conflicts between political levels color the design and provision of local social policies. These tensions have for instance directly implied that poverty is a delicate issue that politicians seek to avoid. Less multi-level tensions are found in the context of Malmö. Central regulation seem to be generally accepted, but this needs to be interpreted in the context that Swedish local municipalities have more or less full authority over the organization and design of local provision (except for the level social assistance benefit) and also funds local provision completely based on local taxes. Local agencies hence have most of the decisions in their own hands, potentially limiting the frictions with central governments. In other words, the cities of Radom and Malmö are hence given autonomy to be used at local level, a ‘gift’ that does not seem to be used to any greater extent (when addressing social assistance provision). Although sharing some similarities in central-local relations, the scope of the local systems of minimum income provision in the cities of Radom And Malmö differs significantly. Coming back to the models developed by Kazepov, there seem to be no direct reason to sort Poland into a type of its own, since it shares several similarities with other countries included in the model of the local autonomy, centrally regulated (if we primarily focus on local discretion and central regulation).

The degree of local autonomy in the city of Turin is more extensive, and above all as we find benefit programs of minimum income type that only exist in this particular local context (Maino & Zambioni 2013). The central level does not seem to interfere to any greater extent in these local programmes, with the exception of some newly implemented schemes. Local policies and practices seem much more to be originating from local conditions and agency set-ups, mainly illustrated in the strong role played by some local foundations. In a comparative perspective it is noteworthy that albeit facing an extensive problem pressure in a North Italian context, the scope of these local public programmes is limited. Compared to the schemes in the countries included in the COPE project, only a very limited number of people are actually receiving benefits from these local schemes. Local autonomy is arguably explored in relation to local conditions, and not in relation to central regulation or steering. The notion of fragmentation seems to reflect the policies and practices in operation in the city of Turin. The large basket of schemes and programmes show that some of them take the form of national/regional measures implemented at local level, and hence being configured as a form of a social right, while others are discretionary measures designed, funded and implemented based on the autonomy of local authorities. We observe that the fragmented nature of the system has some contra-productive effects for the beneficiaries. Due to the fact that several public agencies are involved in delivering benefits, together with a complex mix of non-public actors, it is time-consuming and difficult for individuals to gather the necessary information on where and according to what rules and regulations one can actually apply for a benefit in the local setting.
There are both reasons for and against to discuss the cities of Glasgow and Dortmund as local illustrations of similar national models. In contrast to the other three countries included in the COPE project, we find that minimum income support is much more centrally regulated – or only centrally regulated – in these two countries, giving very limited autonomy and leeway for local agencies to change implementation practices. In other words, in both these we find strong interference of central steering in local policies and practices. However, we also find extensive variation of these local policies and practices in the two cities included in the COPE project.

The local policies and practices in the city of Glasgow are articulated in the backdrop of the extensive central steering by the UK government, allowing little if any local differentiation and discretion for local actors and agencies involved in anti-poverty work (see Bennett & Clegg 2013). The DWP and HMRC are responsible for the design and provision of out of work benefits, payments to low income households and the interaction between these cash payments and labour market activation and in-work support measures. This includes decision making regarding income levels, thresholds for eligibility. Discretion regarding the implementation of national schemes is minimal and unaffected by local requirements and desires. Local authorities do have some role in the provision of services such as housing benefit and council tax benefit, although again the parameters of the value of these services and eligibility rules are defined at the UK national level. However, despite these extensive efforts by central government to reduce the room for local maneuver, local actors and local public agencies has given illustration of extensive entrepreneurial efforts often in direct opposition to the decisions taken in Whitehall. Whilst central regulation was evident in the provision of certain specific benefits and cash transfer payments, we found a range of support mechanisms, passported benefits and financial assistance schemes directly stemming out of the local anti-poverty and support efforts. This implies that despite operating in the context of a heavily centralized system, these local actors were able to negotiate, manage and create ‘levers’ through which they could influence and design anti-poverty work at the city and community levels.

We find a clear consensus among diverse local actors (public and non-public) to develop partnership working, referral systems, and cultural reform in public sector organisations to meet the needs of those in poverty. The separation of the main benefits and support for those in poverty from the local activities and requirements created tension and complications for service provision (particularly in regards to welfare reform). The UK’s centralised minimum income system causes difficulties for local actors and limits their power and control over welfare state policies which have in recent years has become perceived as a threat and cause of poverty for people within the city. At the same time, the separate systems have meant that the local actors have developed over time a well-established (if currently over-stretched) local support system for income maximisation and benefit lobbying with MIS considered an inward investment to households and the local economy. The conflict between the central and sub-central tiers can hence be portrayed as productive since it has led the local government to focus very actively on the provision of advice and support to local benefit claimants. It has also been able to distance itself from the right-wing rhetoric and amendments to the provisions of the welfare state introduced by the UK government and have at times adopted a
position which attempts to mitigate, reduce and alter the UK welfare policies. The complex relation to the Scottish political level fuels these tensions even further. In other words, while there is a plethora of public and private, central and local, actors involved in the fight against poverty locally, the governance of local anti-poverty policy remains difficult and conflicted, despite some innovative structures for coordination of policy having been developed. Within this political context there are complications and difficulties in aligning competing and (sometimes) hostile agendas regarding welfare provision.

The degree of conflicts, tensions and local entrepreneurial political efforts found in the case of Glasgow is not reflected in the context of Dortmund (see Spannagel 2013). In the backdrop of the Hartz reforms, the role of the local level has changed considerably and particularly the importance of the municipal actors within the architecture of the German minimum income system. The importance of the municipalities has declined markedly: Since the Hartz IV reform, the overwhelming majority of all needy persons and households are eligible for the federally regulated ALG II scheme. Quite a few of them would before the reform have received social assistance, a scheme that is under municipal responsibility. ALG II is completely regulated formally on the federal level. Eligibility criteria as well as the benefit level are exclusively governed by federal law. This also applies to the activation paradigm of the scheme and therefore to the basic, highly integrated structure of ALG II: The receipt of benefits is closely tied to activation measures and social services that aim at (re-)integrating unemployed persons into the labour market. This directly fits the threefold concept of active inclusion used by the EU, i.e. the triad of benefits, activation measures and access to quality services. This general architecture is completely regulated on the federal level. However, how these three pillars are organised at the local level differ from municipality to municipality (Reis 2011). The discretion on the local level mainly regards the decision about the delivery of labour market related and especially of social services as well as the question how strict the sanction rules are applied. The front-line staffs in the Jobcenters have quite a leeway in organising these services according to the special needs of the unemployed person. Yet, the Jobcenter does not deliver these services itself. This is mainly done by public, municipal or third sector actors. In this regard, the municipalities do also play a decisive role, but not when it comes to the provision of minimum income support.

An issue not directly discussed in the analysis above regards the role played by the EU in local active inclusion policies and practices. As already stated, the EU has explored new ways of fighting poverty and social exclusion, the active inclusion strategy being one of them, but the is also in charge of several other policy tools of relevance for our local analysis. However, across our local cases we do not find any direct evidence of direct relevance of the EU’s active inclusion strategy in local policies and practices. We, however, find extensive examples of how the EU interferes – directly and indirectly – in local active inclusion policies. First, in most of our cases the EU is a central funding source for local projects in the areas of urban regeneration, labour market training, but also projects directly relating to community development and poverty relief. This is most evident in the context of Radom in which much local practices seem to be funded – to some extent – by funding sources stemming from outside that particular local context, above all activities run by local third sector organizations. Similar patterns emerge in the city of Glasgow and partly also Turin, in
which the EU is a central contributor financially to local projects. There are no reasons to think that the cities of Malmö and Dortmund are exempted from EU funding, but possibly to a slightly less extent. Second, we find illustrations of how local third sector organizations acts across levels and borders. National and local branches of EU based networks, such as the European anti-poverty network are visible in our local cases, demonstrating the interconnectedness between the EU and the local levels in fairly unexpected ways. They seem to transfer ideas, models and practices to the national and local contexts, putting pressure on governments to act more in favor of people in need. These short examples demonstrate that although the EU’s strategy in itself is not mentioned or known by local level actors, these two levels are interconnected and even integrated by the means of other policy tools and non-public actors, i.e. side-stepping national governments in the governance of local active inclusion policies.

The discussion above illustrates the local articulations of the national models of the active inclusion, presented in previous chapters. Our main conclusion is that these local articulations is not a reflection of national models, on the contrary national models give rise to complex local activities and ways of organizing minimum income provision, engaging public as well as non-public agencies, sometimes in congruence with national policies, yet partly in direct opposition to the national policies in question. The role of the EU is not central in the policy field, yet of some significance and above all as a source for financial support for some local activities.

Multi-dimensional policy coordination and integration

The abundant academic literature on inter-organizational relations has paid increasing interest into a specific form of organizational cooperation, that is, ion the forms of so-called pone-stop shop models. The topic has also occupied welfare state scholars who have particularly investigated the recent trend of coordination between policy fields, e.g. employment policies and social protection policies, part of the general trend towards more active welfare state and active social policies. These ambitions to foster greater coordination and cooperation are also found in the regulation of benefit provisions and activation programmes, possibly addressed as a form of conditionality for individuals, but also system and policy integration. Whereas this seems to be an evident trend in many European welfare states, some countries have also opted for the solution to directly merge local public administrative units into quasi-, semi or fully integrated one-stop shop models, (e.g. Clasen & Clegg 2011, van Berkel 2011, Minas 2008 & 2010). In countries like Germany, Finland, and Norway, these national reforms have implied a – at least in theory – merge of a wide array of public services, like employment service, benefit provision and social services, illustrating what Minas referred to as a broad entrance into the one-stop-shop, compared to the reform trajectories in Denmark and Finland which have mainly concentrated on integrating employment and activation services and benefit provision.

As part of the COPE project we have conducted analyses of how such local patterns of cooperation (e.g. shared information and support), coordination (common tasks and compatible goals), collaboration (integrated strategies and collective purpose ) or even
coadunation (unified structure and combined cultures) takes place in local governance practices, also in countries where no such extensive national reforms have taken place.

The strongest and most integrated forms of cooperation – and hence the most fully fledged implementation of an active inclusion strategy – is found in the city of Dortmund. As part of the Hartz reforms, the country decided to install a one-stop shop responsible for job counselling and placement as well as for all financial issues of the ALG II beneficiaries. The JobCentre’s activation measures are part of the individual integration agreement between the beneficiaries and the case manager. However, the JobCentre’s is not a complete integration of public agencies, but can rather be identified as light form of coadunation, since municipal administration and the Jobcenter are closely cooperating in the field of activation services, but retains their respective separate formal mandates. In practice, this implies that the individual case managers offer the employment services and are in charge of coordinating the activation measures. These are offered by various local institutions which are run by the municipal administration, the Free Welfare Associations or third sector organisations. The funding of these institutions varies: Some of them are funded directly by the Jobcenter and therefore receive federal funds, other are entirely municipally funded. A third group of organisations receives third party funding, mainly from the ESF. In Dortmund, this group includes for example activation measures which are especially directed at migrants or lone mothers (Jobcenter Dortmund 2011). Whereas this is a reform that has been implemented across the entire country, we find that the city of Dortmund has amended the model according to the local conditions. A local Support Centre has namely been developed to complement the formal obligations of the Jobcenter. We previously touched upon this local Fördercentrum, being an added agency that coordinates all relevant social and labour market actors operating at local levels (public, and non-public). Our investigations demonstrate that this Support Centre rests on close cooperation between service providers and the Jobcentre, in which different actors meet to discuss mutual roles and responsibilities, as well as to make sure that individual and local needs are being satisfied. The aims – and in our interviews – also the function of this Support Center seem to be a way of coordinating that ‘…everybody does hits bit…’ (see Spannagel 2013). Social services’ provision is also part of the internal operations in the Jobcenter, but less so, as local Free Welfare Associations act as a service provider. They are not integrated into these cooperative structures fully, and are more operating as providers of services, based on the decisions taken by public authorities. These elements combined, demonstrate the relevance of local factors and local cultures.

The case of Dortmund is interesting to contrast to the local practices in the city of Glasgow. As we already discussed, these two countries have enacted slightly similar reform processes, seeking to accomplish greater coordination between policy areas, and also installing one-stop shop models. Despite being a merger between local benefit agencies and local job centers into a joint organizational unit, which should accommodate benefit eligibility tests and benefit payments as well as work tests and employability measures, we find that the JCP has not been embedded or integrated into the local context. Instead the central reform has given rise to a wide plethora of alternative and complementary activities on part of local agencies. We find evidence of extensive uncoupling between the work of the DWP contracted Work Programme providers and the local activation and employment support activities funded by
the Scottish Government and ESF. We also find examples of distance between the work designed by the Scottish Government and the local agencies’ policy and programme design efforts to tackling poverty in the city. Despite that the central Work Programme is certainly the main bulk of the country’s activation programmes, the local authorities have been highly active in developing different types of activation and employability measures, without any direct connection to the Work Programme. To conclude, what hence appear to be two – or even three – parallel systems in operation at the same time at local have caused tensions between actors and policy areas and contrast to the situation in Dortmund, we find lack of consensus, shared view and coordination. In contrast, we find extensive tensions and patterns of de-coupling.

The case of Malmö offers another intriguing example of local coordination and integration between policy areas and public agencies, or rather, lack of coordination and integration. Despite having a tradition of extensive public activation services, a well-established local system of minimum income support and extensive local social services – that is all the main pillars of a ‘complete’ active inclusion strategy – there seem to be little coordination and integration between these policy areas and units at local level. The policies in practices in the city of Malmö demonstrate that social services is not part of the active inclusion equation, being considered as a universal service for all local citizens, irrespective of status as beneficiary or labour market status. The relationship between the local branch of the central PES and the local provision of minimum income support, is however complex and colored by conflicts and tensions. The local authorities in the city of Malmö has developed extensive activation offers for local unemployed people, which now to a large extent can be depicted as a locally run PES, constructing a parallel system of activation support and training beside the central system. These local activation efforts have been developed partly as a response to and a direct critique of the central PES lack of local activation offers for people receiving social assistance. They have also been developed due to the fact that the local system of social assistance provision has turned into a regular system of (lack of) income support for a large proportion of the locally unemployed, not being qualified to other forms of unemployment support. The local and municipality run (and financed) activation system is almost of the same scope as the local PES, but despite these efforts we find limited forms of coordination between these agencies and units. We also find limited forms of coordination between the municipality’s local JobCenter and the local provision of social assistance. Important to notice is that this lack of cooperation takes place in the backdrop of extensive efforts to install local one-stop-shop models, which actually was in operation during a period of years just after the start of the New Millennium. National institutional separation can result in even further local institutional separation, as a form of drain-pipe logic implemented into local policies and practices.

A similar form of institutional separation can be found in the city of Radom. Local social services and local social assistance provision is not linked to the employment services, which is a centrally delegated issue to the local branch of the PES. The relation between these agencies and units are not even to be considered as a form of coordination, but rather neglect of coordination and tensions, illustrated in the form of lack of transfer of financial means across administrative agencies. However, whereas the city of Malmö developed local
extensive activation policies as a parallel system to the central PES services, this is not found to the same degree in Radom. The efforts to coordinate or even integrate public services and agencies, above all with regard to employment services and minimum income provision is limited in the Italian case of the city of Turin, illustrating the fragmented nature of the local system.

To sum up, the issue of coordination and integration – above all between employment services and local minimum income provision is a central topic for welfare states across Europe, giving rise to various examples of one-stop-shop solutions. Our cases demonstrate that the integrative efforts of national models might have direct adverse results at local level, creating barriers and tensions between agencies, or forms of institutional separation. However, this is only one side of the coin as we also detect that such institutional separation give rise to other forms of cooperation and coordination among local level actors. The only case in which cooperation and integration seem to run fairly smoothly is the city of Dortmund, in which our analysis also demonstrates that such national models of integration became embedded in a local culture of cooperation among a wide variety of local stakeholders.

Local welfare states or local welfare societies

The distinction between a local welfare state and a local welfare society is relevant in relation to the analyses of our local cases. All of them bear illustration of a welfare mix, in which third sector organizations are involved in social services production, and sometimes also involved in the deliberation and planning of social policies in general and forms of welfare services in particular. This raises questions on the role local third sector organizations play in local welfare provision? What mechanisms that govern the relationship between public and third sector organizations, e.g. partnership arrangements or more contractual arrangements. However, the variety is extensive between our local cases.

At the one end of the analytical spectrum we find Malmö. Being a city run by a Social democratic party in a Social democratic welfare state, it is not surprising that there is strong belief and support for publicly designed and publicly organized services. The role of private for profit and nonprofit third sector organizations actors is generally limited, albeit a growing issue in both national and local practices. A general interpretation is more or less that the city seeks to keep minimum income provision and other forms of social services within its own realm. Third sector organizations are not to any greater extent involved in deliberative forum, planning forums or participatory governance arrangements, albeit with some exceptions. They are neither to any greater extent involved in delivering services for the poor or other social disadvantaged groups. The local public authorities are in the driving seat. There is limited use of partnership arrangements in local coordination and the relationship between local authorities and third sector organizations is not based on principles such as equality, reciprocity or trust. If interdependence could be seen as a prerequisite for a partnership arrangement, this seems to be lacking in the context of the city of Malmö.
At the other end of the analytical spectrum we find the cases of Dortmund and Turin. Taking the example of Turin first, this city follows a peculiar welfare mix. The public system for local minimum income provision is generally fragmented relying on a complex mix of benefit schemes, regulated at different political levels, providing citizens with a complex structure of benefit provisions. This might be correct, but it would be misleading to only focus on forms of public provision in the context of the city of Turin. On the contrary, we find an extensive involvement of local third sector organizations and also an extensive involvement of large local foundations in the development of local social policies as well as anti-poverty policies. These local foundations shoulder an extensive role in providing local residents with financial support, yet also a variety of social services and employment related services as well. The functions of these foundations cannot be underestimated and in their practices and the ways they organize their work, they almost seem to take a semi-public function as one of the pillars constituting the local welfare society. The relationships between the large plethora of local third sector organizations, these larger foundations and public agencies are highly institutionalized. Based on different forms of Memorandums of Understanding, local collaborative arenas have been form, as space for local policy development as well as negotiations on how to handle local social problems. If the city of Turin appeared to be fairly weakly equipped – at least in a comparative perspective – in offering local residents public support in times of financial hardships, the city seems to have much more local institutionalized capacities when including public and nonpublic actors. The notion of partnership arrangements is well put to reflect on these local relationships, covering both forms of services production and delivery, as well as local political debates. The levels of interdependence seem to be high, including extensive mutual trust and reciprocal relations.

Such mutual relations and forms of cooperation is also highly evident in the city of Dortmund, but much more linked to the local public agencies and authorities, in combination with the local welfare associations. Local third sector organizations are generally involved in local service provision, in terms of the strong historical roots of the Free Welfare Associations, which are operating as the main social services’ provider in the city of Dortmund. The very notion of a welfare mix is hence institutionalized in local active inclusion policies and practices. The relationship between public and third sector organizations seem to be based on the logic of partnership arrangements, yet more ma mix of contractual partnership arrangements as the public authorities seem to have kept the purchaser role, whereas local welfare associations are mainly shouldering the provider function, based on local public funding. At the same time, these governance arrangements are integrated in a larger context of close participatory arrangements between local politicians and a wide array of local stakeholders, including political parties, social partners, third sector organizations etcetera. Different institutional arrangements open up local arenas which fosters trust and recognition of roles and responsibilities in a local welfare society. There seem to a strong support for consensus seeking arrangements to handle the problems and challenges facing the city.

Also in the city of Radom we find how local third sector organizations constitute an important complementary function in relation to local public support systems and services provision. They are heavily involved in emergency relief and also to cater for the groups that
seem to be less covered by the public support systems, e.g. the working poor. Despite fulfilling this important function in providing local resident with services and financial support, local third sector organizations are not given the same public recognition as we find in either Dortmund or Turin. They are not involved in local deliberations and political discussions, and although local authorities have started to develop support centers and similar, these are mainly aim to improve their role as services providers in a local context. Although there are close connections between the local social services and some larger local third sector organizations and often charity organizations, these are rarely directly integrated into joint partnership arrangements.

The involvement of third sector organizations in the city of Glasgow is a complex matter, since their involvement covers several policy areas and includes a variety of governance arrangements with local public authorities. We find that the relations between public and third sector organizations are structured using both contractual as well as partnership arrangements, e.g. through grants and commissioning arrangements. Their involvement is not limited to social services or community services, but includes employment services and direct financial support for people in need. The significance is even greater considering the various ways that third sector organizations are being involved in local decision-making procedures and planning discussions. In contrast to the other cases included in the COPE project, this has not only imbued the organized advocacy of third sector organizations acting in the name of a wider beneficiary, but also based on the direct involvement of users, in local user panels, people experiencing poverty arrangements.

This analysis illustrates that a local welfare society is far wider than local public welfare provision, also in the context of the Swedish welfare state. The role of third sector organizations is evident in all countries included in the COPE project and seems to be highly institutionalized in the cases of Dortmund and Turin. In both these local context, local actors – the Free Welfare Associations as part of the countries long-lasting legacy of strong welfare associations and the local private foundations in the city of Turin – almost fulfill semi-public functions. This seems to be most evident in the city of Turin, where these local foundations take a leading role in local welfare provision, demonstrating new forms of local welfare governance in which public agencies are possibly not the main actor in delivering and developing welfare services, but only one actor among many in a complex network of initiator and providers.

Concluding remarks

The EU’s active inclusion strategy is an attempt to overcome some of the challenges lying ahead for European welfare states. The strategy rests on the argument that European countries need to develop more comprehensive policies with regard i) sufficient income support, i.e. ‘… the right of individuals to adequate resources and social assistance as part of consistent and comprehensive efforts to fight social exclusion’, inclusive labour markets, i.e. ‘… assistance for those who can work to enter or re-enter and stay in employment that best relates to their capacity to work’ and access to quality services, i.e. ‘… proper social support is given to those that require it, in order to promote social and economic inclusion. The
strategy also includes an element of policy coordination as it is maintained that Member States could better come to a grip with these social problems if they developed a more comprehensive and integrated approach to these policy areas. Such an integrated approach ought to rest on i) ‘… the right mix of the three strands of the active inclusion strategy, taking account of their joint impact on the social and economic integration of disadvantaged people and their possible interrelationships, including synergies and trade-offs’, ii) ‘… integrated implementation across the three strands of the active inclusion strategy to effectively address the multifaceted causes of poverty and social exclusion and enhance coordination between public agencies and services which deliver active inclusion policies’, iii) ‘… policy coordination among local, regional, national and EU authorities in the light of their particular roles, competences and priorities’ and iv) ‘… active participation of all other relevant actors, including those affected by poverty and social exclusion, the social partners, non-governmental organisations and service providers, in the development, implementation and evaluation of strategies’ (EC 2008). As such the strategy seeks to go beyond established categorical divisions between passive and active policies, between levels of policy implementation and beyond public and non-public actors’ involvement in policy design and delivery.

This report has shown the relevance of the local level and local factors for the successful development of an active inclusion strategy, but even more so that a fully-fledged active inclusion strategy needs to take into consideration the local actor set-up of public as well as non-public actors in both policy-design and policy delivery if one seeks to meet the demands currently facing European welfare states in the backdrop of the crisis.
References


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Appendix 1. Analytical model for analysing local welfare systems

Source: Mingione & Oberti 2003
Appendix 2. Template for the WP6 local background report

A cross-country comparative study of the local arenas of the governance and provision of minimum income support requires a certain amount of background information; information that is hard to collect through expert-interviews and is relevant as contextualisation in the analytical interpretations of empirical interview data.

We know from previous studies that local welfare systems differ considerable between and within national contexts and we can anticipate finding extensive variation within countries with regard to the challenges local agencies are facing when it comes to issues of poverty and active inclusion policies (local levels of poverty, long-term unemployment, poverty levels, political participation etcetera).

The countries included in the COPE project represent different welfare state regimes and rely on different traditions and regulations on the role of local agencies and government in the provision of minimum income support. In some countries, local self-governance and self-determination is an essential political rationale, above all with regard to the governance of local minimum income schemes and the central state has a limited mandate and few means to intervene into the organization of local minimum income schemes.

The local arena might also entail local traditions of cooperation between public and non-profit organizations in the delivery of services and goods to poor and socially excluded groups, varying extensively between local arenas within countries.

We anticipate that most of the themes listed below could be done by classic desk-research (e.g. analyses of financial statements, annual reports, budget documents, evaluation and monitoring documents, organizational charts and other relevant public documents from local authorities and other relevant agencies, combined with basic statistical information on the local case).

This information is to be summarised in a report to the Swedish COPE team and used as background data in the report that each team will write on the local cases.
Theme 1. Local political context
- Shortly describe the social political context in your city – progressive, ambitious, key profile areas etcetera.
- Please briefly describe the orientation of the main parties (in and out of office) regarding positions on poverty and local MIS.
- Describe the financial situation for the city/local government over the last ten years, e.g. financial debt/surplus
- Have there been any cuts in social spending/austerity measures over the last years? In what areas?

Theme 2. Local socio-economic factors (and when possible for our 3 target groups) (if possible use Eurostat data or relevant national/local statistical sources)
- Number of people in local population, over the last ten years
  - Age cohorts in local population (present in short)
  - Ethnic composition in local population (present in short)
- Local employment patterns, over the last ten years
  - Number of and percentage employed persons
  - Employment patterns specified for different groups
- Local unemployment patterns, over the last ten years
  - Number and percentage of unemployed persons
  - Unemployment patterns specified for different groups
- Local long-term unemployment patterns, over the last ten years
  - Number and percentage long term unemployed
  - Long term unemployment specified for different groups
- Local expenditure for minimum income provision, i.e. money spent by the local authority, over the last ten years (if possible)
  - Total amount (EUR) of money spent on social assistance by the local government. If possible specify if administrative costs are included and if so the total amount of those.
  - Number of persons/households receiving social assistance from local government
  - Percentage of persons/households on social assistance as part of the local population
  - Three most frequent household categories on minimum income support (social assistance or equivalent), percentage of total households

Theme 3. Governance structure of local minimum income schemes
- The local governance of MIS
  - Which local actor(s) are responsible for implementing national regulation on MIS? Which administrative body has the main responsibility?
Does national regulation allow local governments room for local interpretation? On all matters, or just on specific aspects of local MIS? Which matters?

Are non-public actors involved in local decision-making on local MIS schemes (e.g. user committees, by the means of voluntary organizations etcetera)? On all matters, or just on specific aspects of local MIS? Which matters?

- Funding structure for local MIS
  - Provide information on to what extent local minimum income schemes are funded by central state, regional authorities and local government?
  - What financial relevance has other sources?

- Individual complaints and co-decision
  - To what extent are individual action plans or similar methods used to give clients an opportunity to raise their voice in relation to local social services?
  - Can clients appeal to a court or an administrative body, raising complaints on the decision taken by local governments and front-line staff? On all matters or just on specific matters? Are there substantial differences regarding formal right to appeal and actual possibilities to do so?
  - Are local authorities and/or other non-public organizations (e.g. advocacy organizations) involved in providing advice and support to poor in claiming their benefits? ('income maximisation')

- Changes in governance structure
  - Have there been any significant changes in the local governance system during the last ten years in relation to MIS (i.e. with regard to implementation and local decision-making; funding structure; possibilities for individual complaints and co-decision)? Please describe briefly.

Theme 4. Formal regulation of local MIS standards

- Local and national standards
  - Does there exist a national standard according to which clients are valued on their eligibility? Is it legally and/or administratively sanctioned?
  - Does there exist a local standard (or several) according to which clients are valued on their eligibility?
  - Does the local standard follow and/or differ from the national standard? On what matters?

- Describe local MIS standards according to the following topics.
  - What is the amount an individual (single household) might receive from local authorities when applying for financial support (per month and in EUR)?
- What is included in a local standard for a client receiving MIS (financial support for what? – income support for food, clothes, health, hygiene, leisure and play, housing and other living expenses such as medical and dental care)?
- What is not included in the local standard for a client receiving MIS?
- How does the standard(s) apply for the groups included in the COPE project?
- Are certain groups formally excluded from receiving support from public MIS, e.g. undocumented migrants, people with foreign citizenship.

**Local sanctions**
- What local sanctions do national regulation (legal documents and administrative guidelines) allow local authorities to use?
- Are local governments allowed to add local sanctions to national regulation? If so, describe which types of sanctions are included/emphasized in local regulation of local MIS?
- Do these types of sanctions apply in a similar manner to all groups?
- Are any of our 3 groups specifically targeted in any policies?
- Do these sanctioning possibilities leave room for discretion on part of front line staff?

**Changes in formal regulation of MIS standards**
- Have there been any changes in the minimum income standards/scheme over the last years. If so, please briefly describe.

**Theme 5. Local activation structures (run by local authorities)**

**General structure**
- Have local public authorities a specialized administrative unit to offer unemployed social assistance recipients activation services?
- Is this unit linked to units providing social assistance provision? How?
- Is this unit linked to local public employment services (if it is relevant to make such a distinction)? How?
- What is the main funding source for local activation projects run by the local authority (local, regional and national or European agencies, e.g. ESF).

**Activation offers**
- What is the main profile of these activation services (training, education, job placement, work first etcetera)?
- Is participation voluntary or conditional to receive minimum income support? If a person neglects participation, what sanctions are put in order?
- Are certain groups exempted from participation in activation services? Why?
- Are non-public actors involved in delivering activation services for social assistance recipients? If possible describe to what extent these are for-profit and/or not-for profit organizations.
- If possible, illustrate if the relationship between public authorities and non-public providers are based on formal contracts and market mechanisms?
  - Integrated activation services
    - Are local activation services integrated with PES? Is minimum income provision included into these integrated services?
    - If there exist integrated activation services (combining e.g. different authorities providing activation support) please indicate how such integrated services are organized (formalized cooperation, one-stop shop models, joint projects, informal cooperation on personal basis etcetera)?
    - Are other public services (or non-public service agencies) involved in these local integrate one-stop shop models?
  - MIS and other social services
    - Is the public authorities offering
Appendix 3. Interview guideline

For the interviewer

Selection of interviewees: A total of 10 interviews will be conducted. We suggest that you contact key persons (senior civil servants) from public authorities (e.g. units for social services and social assistance provision or similar together with local labour market office and local PES office) together with relevant non-public actors, e.g. key representatives of civil society organizations (service and/or advocacy organizations, providing voice and offering guidance and support for people suffering from poverty and social exclusion) or non-public for-profit actors, when relevant. We suggest that you also include interviews with key politicians, representing parties in and out of office. We suggest that you contact people centrally placed in these organizations and not front-line staff.

These suggestions needs to be adjusted to national conditions and relevant local context, in which we rely on your competence to find a balance of stakeholders that will provide you with the possibilities to analyse issues of governance of local MIS/social assistance schemes; relevance of non-public actors and (dis-)integration of policy fields.

Since the person interviewed can be a representative of a public, private or voluntary organisation, the interviewer should adapt the questions to suit the organisation that the interviewee represents. Not all questions can be asked to each interviewee and we rely on your competence to adjust questions so they match interviewees’ level of expertise.

Interview guideline: The interview starts with general questions on local public debate on poverty, what actors (public and non-public) that are involved in this debate and working against poverty at local level. Then we turn our attention to the organization of the local social assistance system/MIS, followed up by questions on the relation between local minimum income support and local activation services and other social services. The interview ends with a section on the relevance of integrated services at local level and European-local level dynamics.

Conducting the interview: Start the interview with an introduction of COPE and aims of the research and inform the interviewee about anonymity. Each COPE team should respond to the questions considered to be relevant in their own country's welfare regime and judged on the basis of the local conditions. The interviewer should not be satisfied with simple yes-no answers or general answers. The interviewer should use follow-up questions in the same way we did in the national interviews (WP5). Please ask for concrete examples.

Ask for internal documents during the interview (e.g. strategy, evaluation, meeting minutes).
Introductory question

- Describe your position and role in your current organisation/workplace.

**Theme 1: The poverty debate at local level/in your city**

- Is poverty a major issue in the public debate in your city?
- What is the general view on poverty and poor people locally?

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Poverty is a structural problem dependent upon changes in the labour market</td>
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<td></td>
<td>The need to reduce public social assistance costs</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Poverty is a consequence of the economic crisis</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Poor people are morally responsible for their own situation</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Poverty needs to be reduced in order to prevent social unrest</td>
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</tbody>
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- What is your organization’s position on poverty in general and how to combat poverty in particular?
- What positions on poverty and poverty reduction are expressed by the local political parties?
- Are other actors involved in the local debate on poverty (public, private, voluntary)? Do they present other ideas on how to combat poverty than public authorities and political parties?
- Have the local debate on poverty changed in the last decade? If so, please explain how? [e.g. changes in local government; changes in national government; national reforms; financial crisis and austerity measures].

**Theme 2: Composition of actors at local level**

- What public authorities provide service and financial support for poor people in your city? Has the need for support grown recently?
- What role do voluntary organizations (include also the church, unions and other relevant organizations) play to provide support for poor and socially excluded groups at local level? Which benefits/services do they provide? Have they become a more or less central actor?
- Are there for-profit actors in your city that are involved in fighting poverty? Has the number of for-profit actors working with anti-poverty measures decreased/increased in recent years? Which benefits/services do they provide?
- What role does the family have in providing support for poor persons at the local level? Has the role of the family become more or less important?
- Have these actor similar/different understandings of how to fight poverty at local level? Has this led to conflicts between representatives? If possible, give examples?

**Theme 3: What activities are run by your organisation in order to fight poverty?**
• What concrete services and activities does your organization offer poor people? Do you run services and support for the working poor, long-term unemployed and single mothers? Are all groups of poor people welcome to seek support from your organization?
• Your organization’s activities, do they differ from services offered by the local authorities [or vice versa when speaking with representatives from public authorities]? If so, how?
• Has the ways by which you offer services and support to poor people changed recently? If so, why?
• [Q to non-public actors] Why are you involved in developing services to poor people at local level? Do you operate on public contracts and/or funding? How would you describe your relation to local decision-makers and public authorities, e.g. social services or public employment services?

Theme 4: Regulation of the local social assistance systems/MIS
• How would you describe the social assistance system in your city? Exemplify its good and bad points?
• Have there been reforms of the local social assistance system over the last ten years? If so, please exemplify?
• Have these reforms been initiated by central/national government? How have local governments responded to such central/national reforms?
• Have there been locally originating attempts to change the local social assistance system, yet which have not been implemented? If so, please exemplify?

Theme 5: Administration of social assistance provision
• What is your opinion of the social assistance system, does it provide people with adequate financial support? Please specify for single mothers, long-term unemployed and working poor?
• What needs/costs are included in the social assistance standard? Has there been any debate on what needs/costs that are to be included in the local standard? Please exemplify.
• What duties do individuals have to fulfil to be eligible for social assistance support? Are sanctions applied if individuals do not meet up with these requirements? Please exemplify.
• What are the main methods social workers are using in their contacts with social assistance claimants [e.g. individual actions].

Theme 6: Social assistance, activation policies and links to other social services
• Have the city/local municipality developed activation services [job search activities, training, work first activities] for social assistance claimants and/or for unemployed people? How are these organized? Who pays for them?
• Have these activities been implemented due to national reform processes or depending upon changes in the local context?
• Are some activation services run by the local municipality while others run by other public agencies, e.g. PES? If so, please explain how they differ?
• Has the scope and focus of these local activation activities changed recently?
• Could you please explain how social assistance claimants get access to local activation services? Who decides on what program, project or measures to participate in?
• Are people forced to participate in employment-related support in order to receive social assistance benefits?
• Do you think that the long-term unemployed, single mothers and working poor receive enough support?
• What other social services do you think are relevant for poor people to help them out of poverty? What other social services do you think are relevant to help people back into the labour market [health services, housing services, dental and drug treatment services etc.]?
• Which local actors (public or non-public) offer inhabitants such services? What are the pro and cons with this type of local organization of services?
• Do social assistance claimants have the same type of access to these social services as other citizens?

Theme 7: Patterns of coordination, integration and conflicts
• Have there been attempts to increase coordination between public actors offering financial support and services? If so, please exemplify? If not, why?
• Are there any barriers to improving the link between social assistance, employment-related support and social services in your city? If yes, what type of barriers (legal, organisational, political)? Have they been resolved?
• Have there been any conflicts between public agencies or public and non-public actors in these re-organization activities? Please exemplify.

Theme 8. Europe and the local fight against poverty
• In your opinion, have EU policies for combating poverty and promoting active inclusion influenced the local debate on poverty since 2000? If so, please exemplify?
• The EU has in recent years developed quantitative anti-poverty targets as part of the Europe2020 strategy. Do you think that these targets have had any influence on the local debate on poverty and/or on anti-poverty measures in your city?
• The EU currently organizes some of its policy work based on a so-called European Semester, in which Member States are required to draft National Reform Programmes and National Social Reports. Has your organization been involved in the process with regard to the definition of the national anti-poverty strategy? Was it involved via institutional bodies representing municipalities (e.g. State-Regions-Municipalities Committees or similar)?
[For political and institutional actors] Is your city a member of Eurocities? Has your city been involved in Eurocities’ activities related to the Europe2020 anti-poverty strategy?

[For social partners, CSOs etcetera] Is your organization a member of a network or umbrella organization operating at EU-level? Has your organization been involved in its activities related to the Europe2020 anti-poverty strategy?

Which role do European social funds play in financing anti-poverty and active inclusion measures in your city (e.g. European social funds: European Social Fund, Fund for European Aid to the Most Deprived, European Global Adjustment Fund, European Regional Development Fund)? If the role is limited or irrelevant: ask why. Which factors limit the recourse to/relevance of EU funds?

Which are the most relevant or innovative programs financed by EU funds?

Have EU funded programs allowed the construction of local multi-stakeholder networks? Which actors are mostly involved?

Does your organisation receive EU funding to fight poverty and support specific groups?

Final question

Do you have any final comments about what needs to be done to fight poverty in your city?